1 10 110 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/d6f06ac91b95b00e4eeb418a3bf465ba.pdf fcd88a0bfdea344549ae7adb39f2a8ed Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NAM Outlines Subject The topic of the resource 2015 The ARCUK Initiative. 5 page introduction to NAM's ARCUK involvement Description An account of the resource NAM OUTLINES - 2015 The ARCUK Initiative This commentary has been prepared to assist in the process of reprising the history of the New Architecture Movement in 2015 for the possible interest of a new generation of students and researchers forty years after NAM's original foundation in 1975. It is one of a series of short summaries that it is hoped to produce for this purpose and intended to identify and focus on particular aspects of NAM's activities. This Outline looks back at what I shall call 'The ARCUK Initiative'. It might not be too gross a generalisation to suggest that NAM's activities were of two broad types — 'outward facing' and 'inward facing'. In the former category might be placed its various engagements in community architecture, the interest in direct labour organisations (DLO's), linkage with the Feminist Movement and the initiative towards establishing a public design service within the framework of municipal democracy. In the latter category were those activities directed towards mobilizing a general critique of the architectural profession at the time — unionisation of the salaried profession and support staff, the development of cooperative models of practice, etc. NAM's engagement with ARCUK (Architects' Registration Council of the United Kingdom) may be best placed in the 'inward facing' category inasmuch as it was motivated by the desire to understand and re-appraise the governance structures of the profession itself. To appreciate the relevance of this rather obscure-seeming body, ARCUK, to a movement such as NAM one has to understand the pre-disposing 'in-grown' culture of the contemporary profession and specifically its principal organization, the RIBA, which was largely controlled by principals in private practice and seemed to epitomise the elitism and exclusivity of architecture, its predominantly 'top-down' organisation and its apparent inaccessibility to 'the common man'. Even the (then) quite considerable investment in social housing — the building type perhaps most directly relevant to ordinary people - was generally pursued through various surrogate procurement processes that avoided any actual or meaningful engagement with the supposed beneficiaries. The RIBA, an institution established by royal charter and dating from 1834, seemed not to offer any very accessible or likely means of changing this situation. The ARCUK — a statutory registration body established by Parliament in 1931 to regulate entry to the profession and use of the title 'architect' - did however have more 'secular' credentials and also presented opportunities for access through the statutory mechanisms for creating its governing Council as defined in Schedule 1 of the 1931 Act. These provided for a range of representation by various architectural associations and also several other bodies connected with the building industry, including trade unions. Within the architectural constituency provision was made for pro-rata representation (1 delegate per 500 members, or part thereof) of those architects who were not members of any of the associations named in the Act — a definition for which the term 'Unattached Architects' was commonly used. Unlike other representatives on the ARCUK Council, who were generally just appointed annually by their sponsoring organizations, the Unattached were elected by their peers — a democratic feature which added to its attraction as a vehicle for NAM's interest. From the mid-70s accordingly (dates to be checked) an increasing number of NAM members began to stand for election to ARCUK, soon forming a coherent grouping within the Council that could present an alternative position to the long-standing orthodoxy of the (majority) RIBA representation. Apart from forming a distinct bloc within Council itself, the NAM delegates were also able to participate in the work of its various committees — Admissions, Professional Conduct, Finance & General Purposes, Disciplinary — by virtue of a convention known as the Gentlemen's Agreement, whereby token representation was accorded to minorities in Council by the RIBA, whose membership quota of course always ensured their continuing majority in all committees and council. In this way NAM gained a platform for the presentation of what might be termed an oppositional stance within an organisation which had hitherto functioned as little more than a statutory rubber stamping agency for RIBA policy. From the fairly wide range of topics that came before ARCUK over this period (c. 1976- 1982 — dates to be checked) the one that in retrospect seems to have dominated (apart from NAM campaigning for majority lay representation on Council) was the issue of the mandatory minimum fees (MMF). Adherence to the MMF was one of a number of stipulations imposed by the RIBA Code of Professional Conduct, which in all essentials was given quasi-statutory force by being endorsed (via the RIBA majority) through the ARCUK Code — at the time an almost identical series of prohibitions imposed on all registered architects. The MMF required architects to charge minimum fees according to a sliding scale that related remuneration to construction value and building type. This ensured, at least theoretically, that no architect could undercut a fellow professional for undertaking similar services on similar projects, and that a potential client would therefore be left to select his/her architect solely on the basis of 'quality'. Looking back some 35 years later, and in light of the minefield that architectural procurement has since become, it might be thought that such a system had much to recommend it. However, regardless of NAM's interventions, the profession's fee cartel (as well as many of its other 'closed shop' conventions) was already doomed. Successive governments had looked with disfavour on what it regarded as a professional monopoly and in the late 1970s the Monopolies and Mergers Commission was tasked to investigate fee practices within the architectural profession. The de facto existence of a monopoly was easy to establish, amply passing the defined industry threshold, and was reportedly one of the most total monopolies the MMC had ever investigated — virtually every professional respondent acknowledging that they charged fees according to the MMF. The particular aspect of this that was of concern to NAM was the RI BA's defence of the MMF on the basis that it operated 'in the public interest' — when it quite clearly served primarily the interest of the profession. As a chartered (or registered) professional, it was claimed, the architect owed a special duty of care to the public which could only be ensured by maintenance of the MMF. The flaw in this argument seemed to NAM observers to go to the heart of the disingenuous relationship between the architect and his clients. If this, as was alleged by the RIBA lobby, was the subject of a special duty of care — ie. in effect an oath — it should logically be honoured regardless of considerations of money. If architects were to be trusted to serve the interests of their clients in the utmost good faith they should also be trusted to charge whatever fees were appropriate, without these being artificially fixed through a professional cartel. The MMC duly concluded that the MMF could not be justified under fair trading standards and the necessary orders were laid before Parliament to abolish it. In retrospect it might be suggested that the abandonment of the MMF — whether or not of benefit to the public - has done nothing but damage to the profession. Yet it must equally be acknowledged that the profession's subsequent readiness to cut and undercut its fees has exposed the flimsiness of the 'oath' of utmost good faith that was claimed as its justification. If the architectural profession deserved to be regarded as synonymous with a special quality of service (as compared with unqualified practitioners), then it could have maintained its solidarity and have demonstrated that this legitimately deserved a commensurate level of remuneration regardless of the MMF. Irrespective of NAM's interventions, given the advancing culture of deregulation (not just in architecture) and the proliferation of alternative modes of building procurement that began to accelerate in the later 1970s and 80s it is inconceivable that the MMF could have survived. At the time however it was the way in which it appeared to operate as another barrier between the profession and the public that attracted NAM's attention, and it is in this respect - in the context of the rise of 'community architecture' and other such secularizing programmes - that the ARCUK initiative (of which by virtue of the Code of Conduct the MMF issue was an intrinsic element) may be seen as an integral part of NAM's overall reforming aspirations. Regarding the other principal focus of NAM's interest in ARCUK, namely the move towards majority lay representation - which we regarded as only equitable for a body claiming to represent the public interest in relation to the profession — it may also be suggested that the objective was eventually achieved, albeit through the ARB (Architects' Registration Board) the statutory agency superseding ARCUK and established by the Architects' Act 1997. The Board comprises 15 members, of which 7 are architects and the remaining majority of 8 are lay persons. In this way the ARB may be seen to act as a 'secular' counterbalance to the RIBA, which remains a 'trade association' for architects and which despite repeated attempts to abolish, or take over, the functions of the registration body has (to date) been unable to do so. Indeed it may be suggested that the RIBA's prevailing stance of latent hostility towards the ARB now that the registration agency is no longer under its control is evidence of the discomfort that a public interest body continues to cause the professional establishment. John Allan, February 2015 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource J Allan Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/198fceb8c65d8770b4877dff3ae1ca52.pdf 1e76797c6df366b97d1ab268605c7e78 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Monopolies Commission Report Subject The topic of the resource NAM's evidence to the Government re. the Fee Scale Description An account of the resource Report of the New Architecture Movement to the Monopolies Conmission investigation into the supply in The United Kingdom of Architects t servi ces. THE NEW ARCHITECTURE MOVEMAT 14th May 1976 THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY FFÆS CONTENTS: INTRODUCTION 1 . THE HOLLOW mRGAIN THE FALLACIES AND THE FACTS PUBLIC INTEREST INTRODUCTION This report is submitted by the New Architecture Movement to the Monopolies Commission to assist in the investigation it is currently undertaking at the order of the Department of Trade and Industry. It is understood that the Royal Institute of British Architects is submitting its own report, "The Case for Mandatory Minimum Fees" , which claims to carry the support of all the other architectural bodies who were consulted. The New Architecture Movement (N.A.M. ) was not consulted, and does not support the R.I. B.A. t s case, and therefore is presenting its own arguments independently. The N.A.M. consists of a substantial body of professional architects and laymen who share a consensus of views on all aspects of architecture as well as the activities of the R.I. B.A. differing radically from the official orthodoxy. Since, however, the Conmission t s terms of reference relate specifically to the question of the fee scale and the public interest, N.A.M. has sought to confine its submission to those matters germaine to the Connnission t s enquiry. This report may therefore be read alongside that submitted by the R.I. B.A. and counter — arguments have been closely cross—referenced. N.A.M. 's report may be summarized as demonstrating that the current Fee System is not intrinsic in the system of architectural services but a gratuitous market device procuring unilateral benefits to architects; that the R.I. B.A. 's detailed argument contains serious contradictions and flaws; that the statistics and the resulting inferences have been misleadingly or incorrectly drawn; and that 2 the central concept of the 'public interest' on more searching analysis may be shown to be severely prejudiced by the fee scales t mandatory status. The recognition of the arguments made in this report entail action for change on the basis of the following descending hierarchy of priorities Abandonment of the mandatory minimum fee scale entirely. Retention of the fee scale as a recommendation only, but abandonment of its mandatory element. i i i) Retention of the mandatory fee scale but the establishment of a permanent independent agency to review the levels of the scale. Such agency to include at least 5(Y//o non— professional representation. It must however be noted in the context of (i) and (i i) above that since the R.I. B.A. has argued that any such changes to the present fee system would necessarily entail a wholesale review of all aspects of the system of architectural services, any recommendation by the Commission on these lines would place on the R.I. B.A. the onus of undertaking the review mentioned or of justifying its change of mind. N.A.M. trusts that this report will constructively contribute to the sum of material on which the Commission will formulate its reconmendations, and we would confirm our willingness to participate in any further debate which the Commission may wish to pursue. - 3 - PART 1 THE HOLLOW BARGAIN It is understood that the Monopolies Commi ssion has a duty to satisfy itself that arrangements restricting the competition in any given market for goods or services do not operate to the prejudice of the public interest. The market in question is that for archi— tectural services. These, as practised by architects, have for various historical reasons become assimilated into a closely defined system governed by the R.I. B.A., which is itself a body of architects, such that the purveyors and their practices have acquired the status of a profession. The definition of a professional differs widely depending upon whether one is referring to, say, golfing or surgery, but in the context of architecture it is proposed that the distinctive differen— tiating element is that of "disinterested counsel". The status of this undertaking to provide "disinterested counsel" is of central interest, since it is the constituent five assurances — the guarantees of this essential disinterest — which, we are told, are advanced to clients in return for their acceptance of the fee scale. (p. 3.2.5) The fee scale and the assurances are argued to be mutually inter— dependant, such that either connot stand without the other, and removal destroying the entire structure of the R. I. B.A. arrangements — code, conditions, registration, etc. A major portion of the Commission's attention will therefore be directed towards the status of the assurances, and the necessity/ dispensability of the linkage between these and the fee scale. For example, in demonstrating that the link is necessary it would have to be shown that clients may be confident of the fulfillment of the assurances by accepting the fee scale, and that architects by insisting on the fee scale are held to the assurances. If, however, the contrary can be demonstrated, then the proposition that clients should accept the fee scale in return for these assurances is in fact not a bargain but a deceit; there will be no necessary connection between the two; and architects will be seen to derive an unjustified market advantage at the expense of their consumers. Let us start with the first assurance. In what way does the validity of the promise of integrity require the support of the fee scale? The status of this assurance is more in the nature of an oath than a contract. The content of an oath is not a good or a service bought, with money. The reference is either to the familiar concept of good faith, which is a normal requirement of any parties entering into any sort of legal or commercial contract and thus not special to architects, or it is a promise of honour somewhat akin to the medical Hippocratic oath, which is. not a divisible commodity costing XO/b for a "high degree". In the latter case, the acceptance of the fee scale is of little avail to the client who has the misfortune to employ a dishonourable architect. Dismissal or censure is part of the policing function of the R.I. B.A. Conduct Committee who rightly seek to maintain the code — much as ABTA upholds certain standards of good conduct in the practice of travel agents. If, therefore, we interpret the first assurance as an oath, the Institute itself will administer the measures following its non— fulfillment; if we interpret it as simply the mens rea of a contract the client has recourse to the normal legal remedies following a breach of contract. Either way, the fee scale is neither necessary nor sufficient — it is a gratuitous element serving the interests of architects while securing no compensatory advantage to clients that are not already provided by other means. The second assurance is even more plainly dissociated from the fee scale. The provision that architects may not limit their liability is derived directly from The Partnership Act, 1890, (Section 9) which establishes the legal grounds of the most common form of architectural association. It is worth noting in this context that the legal definition of partnership (sec 1.1) as "the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of is somewhat at variance with the image of disinterest promulgated by the R.I. B.A., and that the failure to make such a profit may be construed by a court (sec. 35.e) as grounds for dissolution. In none of the other less common forms of association available to architects — unlimited liability companies, limited partnerships, consortia, etc — can the liability of principals be limited, so that the client who is dissatisfied with his architect's fulfillment of the second assurance has simply to seek legal remedy under the terms of the appropriate Act. But, apart from these inalienable legal provisions, it is well known that the concept of diligence being reinforced by unlimited liability is substantially modified by the universal practice of carrying professional indemnity. This ability to artificially defer personal liability is in fact normally taken as a criterion of whether a given architect's practice can be established or maintained. Similarly the third assurance, relating to competence, is also substantiated not by the fee system but by the legal requirements of the Registration Acts, Building Regulations, Planning Controls, etc, in addition to the abundant technical standards and recommendations published either by external agencies, such as D.O.E., B.R.S., and the British Standards Institution, or jointly with the R.I. B.A. itself, as for example in the case of the National Building Specification. Except for Registration, these are constraints upon any design agency working in building construction or related fields, and not simply upon architects; and the client achieves no additional advantage in the latter case by accepting the fee scale. 1 . 1 1 It is worth noting that, in view of recent reports of building failures since the war, projects involving architects have not fared noticeably better than those without, suggesting that clients may be ill—advised to take the third assurance simply at face value anyway. 1 . 12 The fourth assurance, insofar as it differs from the first, is a simple repetition of the cornmon laws of agency and contract in which it is generally not the agent but the employer who accepts liability for the actions undertaken. In other words, the assurance largely confers upon the client not an advantage but an obligation, to which the fee scale bears no relation. 1 . 13 Moreover, the architect's activities include several important tasks where he must actually refrain from making "his clients' best interests the dominating consideration", notably in the exercise of quasi— judicial functions under the building contract, to say nothing of the further dilution of the assurance entailed in the architect's retention of copyright of his work. . 14 The final assurance raises questions relating to the public interest at large involving supra—client matters beyond the terrrus of contract that are unenforceable on the basis of the fee scale and perhaps even at all. Further discussions of this assurance is included in Part 3. The summation of the foregoing arguments is that the client is currently invited to accept the fee scale in return for the assurances as though only by so doing can he be confident of their fulfillment. A deeper analysis, however, shows that he is being offered nothing to which he would not be entitled anyway, or for which effective means of reinforcement do not already exist; hence that the fee scale is simply a gratuitous market advantage to architects. The R.I . B.A. claims that the removal of the mandatory minimum fee scale cannot be accomplished without the entire remaining package being re—fashioned. NoA.M0 proposes that it may be removed, the remaining package staying invtact with market equity being thereby restored to consumers. If the Commission accepts any or all of N.A.M. 's arguments, then the onus is clearly on the Role B.A. to explain what wholesale changes it would propose. �PART 2 FALLACIES AND THE FACTS Through the process of developing the preceeding argument came the realisation that the entire rationale behind the professional ethos of the R.I. B.A. was either a kind of farce of muddy thought and disingenuous invention or an attempt to confuse the issues by an extravagant masquerade. Whether it is a farce of self—deception or a masquerade of deceit, it has lead us to be rather •circumspect of the detailed arguments presented in the R.I. B.A. text and to query the statistical evidence. That such evidence is effectively muted by qualification does nothing to dispel our doubts as to its use and inference. We therefore consider it advisable to examine closely the subject matter and to expose its more blatent inconsistencies. It caused little surprise and some amusement that the inconsistencies should expose three key issues, namely the structure of the fee scale, the notion of competition, and the abolition of the mandatory fee. 't In such circumstances (negotiation on a recommended fee scale) the effects of a change to recommended scales would be little different from the effects of abolishing the scale altogether". (Appendix 1.33, p. 11) "If the fluctuations in the demand for architects' services could by some means be eliminated, fees would no doubt settle down at something like their present level even without a mandatory scale". (7.4) The first statement implies that a recommended scale is really no scale at all, from which we can in turn deduce that a scale only has validity if it is a mandatory one. Were the second statement true, then the scale is valid per se and its mandatory element is effec Led through market forces. Thus we have incompatible notions of whac constitutes a mandatory scale — that the mandatory element is indispensable and that external market values effectively maintain present levels. 2.3 "The R.I. B.A. has not sought to limit the rate of entry into the profession". (3.12) "Concern with improving the quality of architects' training has been a feature of the R.I.B.A. t s activities from the early years and a major step forward was taken with the 1958 Oxford Conference and the introduction of the two GCE A—level entry requi rement t'. (6.10) The Institute may claim that it has no control over the supply of trained architects and yet by controlling entry qualification has the means and intention of doing so. "It is exceptionally difficult to measure technical efficiency (efficiency in production) in a profession which is characterised by sharp fluctuations in activity rates and whose output is so difficult to categorise 't . (6.9) "The R.I. B.A. believes that action following this report (The Architect and his Office) significantly improved the technical efficiency of the profession". (6.100 Does the R.I. B.A. wish us to believe that efficiency is measurable or not? Perhaps the yardstick is by the sale of the Handbook to offices that hadn't a clue, and the non—sale to offices that knew it all anyvay. 2.5 't In practice the result of cutting the design fee by a third would be a substantial rise in construction costs". (3.8) "Indeed, an architect's ability to reduce his client's costs is one of the most powerful competitive weapons available within an highly competitive framework". (5.2) We have a bald and boring argument throughout the report that the quality of work will decline as a result of fee cutting and with consequential poor cost control. Yet we are led to believe that the prime virtue of the professional service is effective .cost control. Are architects likely to trade in "a powerful competitive weapon" for a third of their fees? Are architects likely to cut their fees at the expense of their throats? 2.6 "The option has always been available to clients to choose a commercial form of architectural service". (2.1) "This low price elasti city (of demand) is a consequence of the absence of any substitute for the skilled design services which architects provide". (3.7) t The option t postulates that there is competition between the professional and the commercial services. t Low price elasticity' is a consequence of the absence of competition. For both statements to be true either the commercial service is not skilled (which is untrue) or the professional service is complementary rather than competitive. 2.7 "It is clear also that the two sectors are in competition with one another, for every public authority has to make a choice on each building project • (Appendix 1.12) "The Institute believes that the two sectors have different but complementary roles to play". (3.18) In fact the public and private sectors are complementary in very rare circumstances. The competitive act is supplanted by the complementary in a closed shop. 2.8 The presentation of empirical evidence exhibits simi lar fal lacies and distortion. Great play is made of the fact that due to extremes �of supply of new work, abnormal economic circumstances impinge on the provision of services. Curiously, a graph showing new commissions is used to demonstrate uneven revenue. Revenue is earned continuously throughout the design and construction process. Broadly one third of the income is earned at the design stage, one third at working drawings and one third at the construction stage. In fact the input by the office at large is decisively different at various stages of the job, and the arrival of new conmissions is arbitrary. Many, for example, are in the form of feasibility studies on which fees are payable even if abortive, and on which revenue is earned relatively quickly. The only true measure of the mythical cycle is one of revenue. This will be of a broadly similar profile to work certified. The revenue cycle of abortive commissions is high frequency, while the time scale of a commission fully achieved is a long one and the effect is the opposite to the trend that the original graph has attempted to show. 2.9 A similar falsification is to be found in the evidence of the R.I.B.A. that purports to show that architects do not earn monopolistic profits. The confusion in this instance results from substituting the earnings of the profession at large for the profits earned by principals in private practice. The earnings of 8(YÅ of the profession represent the cost of the provision of the service, not its profit. Profit would be represented by the partner earnings and drawings. We endeavour to show that the profit margin has continued to rise with the trend to larger practices. This deceit has been arrived at by using the interquartile range rather than the first quarter. The level of salaried architects' remuneration is set by the competitive price for labour in the public sector which is arrived at by collective bargaining. Such evidence and argument continues to portray the myth that architects as a group are one and homogeneous. The level of salaried architect' remuneration is independent and irrelevant to the profiteering revenue of private practice. 2.10 We believe that what has been presented by the R.I. B.A. is a masquerade which attempts to conceal a primary economic objective of. a price floor for prestigious architectural services. We interpret this as self—interest. The classic model of this enviable situation creates the following conditions: a guarantee of minimum revenue whether for good or bad services; the power to determine price and hence profit; the power to limit the public disclosure of financial evidence; a control over the level of service (only the purveyor of the service seemingly being able to qualify it); the power to determine and identify efficiency in its own terms (thus enabling real gains of efficiency to be returned as profit); and the power to immunise the market share of the building design from the vaguaries of the market, to the unfair advantage of competitors and to the detriment of allied professions, thereby retaining an otherwise vulnerable leadership of the building team. 2.11 We therefore pose a series of questions. i) Is there any validity of maintaining a price floor under anv circumstances? Clearly society does so in terms of, say food; but to extend such devices generally distort the free economy. Should such a device be extended beyond the provision of essential services? This would only be conceivable if society held that such a commodity or service was indispensible or very highly desirable. In such circumstance.s it would be tantamount to a fraud if the case was made by the interes Led party. We would consider that the case for architecture to be so treated would be invalid if it required architects to articulate the case. Should such a device be extended to the private sector? Only if by doing so the profits from such an enterprise were either controlled by society or used to society's benefit. Clearly the profits made by most architectural firms would not meet these criteria. What peculiar conditions of the market would justify the price floor? If there exists a crisis such that otherwise the service would collapse. Plainly if private practice ceased to function then the practice of architecture would continue in the public sector. The P. I . B. states that extremes of demand and supply constitute peculiar conditions. Do these conditions then affect the business of architecture? Only in as much as they effect the construction industry generally. The construction industry is broad—based and has high capital investment. It is likely that architecture which has low capital investment would survive periods of stagnation with a greater degree of flexibility. 2.12 We are constrained by the needs for clarity and succinctness to limit the exposure of these detailed fallacies in the R.I. B.A. t s evidence, and the resulting questions provoked. The basic alternative statis— tical interpretations are, by contrast, now explored further as follows. 2.13 THE TENDACY TOWARDS BIGGER PRACTICES Table 1 Distribution of Private Practices by size 1958—1972 Source: R.I . B.A. Submission to Monopolies Commission May 1976 From 1958 onwards there is a clear tendency for the percentage of small practices to decrease and for the percentage of larger practices to increase. In 1967 the National Board of Prices and Incomes found that medium and large practices, while forming only 38% of all offices, had an 81% share of all fee income. The tendency towards larger practices and the incomes shown in Table 2 are therefore indicative of the extent to which principals in private practice are, through the fee scale, reaping increasing profits for no measurable improvement in service, and the way in which such larger practices thereby distort the distribution of patronage . 2.14 LARGER PmCTICES YIELD GREATER PROFITS Table 2 Average Annual Income per Architectural Partner by size of Architectural Tea.m Sources : (i) National Board for Prices and Incomes Repoft• on Architects Costs + Fees 1968 Updating Factor — RICS Building Cost Information March 1976 Notes: Fees directly related to Building Costs Value of New Commissions in 1966 and 1974 comparable source i i Percentage distribution of practices by size approx. similar (Table 1) Definition of Income as per source i 2.15 SALARIED ARCHITECTS HAVE NOT FARED SO WELL Table 3 Average Salary of all Employed Architects in all Private Practices Source : Ibid Note: All tech. salaries in 1967 formed 34.5% of costs; R.I. B.A. Handbook suggests approx. similar figures. We have been unable to discover reliable data relating the income of salaried architects to size of office. The average salary used throughout will consequently be rather high for small practices which generally pay lower salaries than do larger practices (see 1968 NBPI Report). Nevertheless in small practices the actual difference in income between partners and salaried technical staff has remained fairly constant between 1966 and 1974. In 1960 of all salaried technical staff worked in medium and large offices although those offices formed only of all offices. (See The Architect and His Office: 1962 RIBA Survey) By 1972 the percentage of salaried technical staff working in medium and large practices had risen to while these practices still accounted for only 36.4% of all offices. And it is in those offices that incomes of principals and staff dramatic extent in offices with the increasing gap between the is most apparant, rising to a more than 25 architects. PART 3 PUBLIC INTEREST 3.1 The central element in the entire debate on which the attention of all parties is focused is "the public interest". Rightly, it is the talisman in any attempt to judge the degree of equity in professional activity. But what is the public interest? Who are the public? Who, if anyone, are not the public? How is their interest defined, and where and by whom is it represented? 3.2 The broad assumption, it appears, is that the public interest refers approximately to the "open market" — in this case the consumers or potential consumers of architectural services. Theoretically this should embrace the population at large, outside the architectural profession, which of course itself consists of men and women who are members of the conmunity. Even such a brief definition conjures up a vast aggregate of groupings, whether class—based or by colour, locality, occupation, etc., etc. — a heterogeneous mass of almost unimaginable diversity. It is difficult to see how any person or group in this mass could be legitimately excluded from the "public" if we are endeavouring to identify whose interest is to be safe— guarded; and the principle that could be formulated from this premise — that 'l a decent envirmment is a basic right of everybody" — would appear, in the context of this democratic free society, to be virtually self—evident. 3.3 Any assessment of the equity of a fee scale would clearly have to include the test as to whether the existence of such a scale introduced any kind of selectivity or discrimination into this mass of equally entitled potential consumers. - 3.4 How does the R.I. B.A. mandatory fee scale fare in such a test? The answer is not well. It is immediately clear that unlike, for example, the medical profession whose services are available to any— body simply on the basis of need, the "public interest" in architec— tural affairs is in fact a portmanteau term concealing two very different types of consumer — the client and the user. 3.5 The occasions when these two parties are in fact the same person or group are indisputably the exceptions to the rule. Indeed, it would be more reasonable to characterize the distribution of architectural services as a system in which the users are not the clients. In the field of council housing for example, perhaps the overriding priority building type, it is axiomatic that the residents cannot avail themselves of the services of architects. This anomaly pervades the whole of the market under scrutiny. In contrast with the medical profession whose services are available equally to of the population, the services of architects are purchased only by one fifth. This discrimination in the market is not of course solely due to the existence of the mandatory fee scale. Questions as to dominion over land, finding capital costs of construction, etc., are also to be invo Ived. 3.7 But it is not within the Commissio i s terms of reference to criticise the R.I. B.A. for elements within t e system over which it has no direct control (or opts to exert n direct influence ) . We are confined to studying only those a rangements that act or may acc as barriers to potential consumers o architectural services over which the R.I.B.A. does exercise contro thereby interfering with free market forces and the public interest. learly the fee system is such an arrangement; for by denying architects the option to charge less to those potential user—clients who would be less able to pay, and allowing them to find any necessary balance from other types of work, the fee system acts as a barrier to those architects whose capacity or conscience favour small scale initiatives in preference to the corporate or bureaucratic clients whose sectional interests at present totally bias the market. If the ratio of this bias was less disproportionate, this state of affairs might assume less significance; but the fact that user—clients currently include only the wealthy sponsors of private villas, while direct community architecture is practically non—existent, indicates that the "public interest" in the market for architectural services is only fractionally served. In the troika of medical, legal and architectural professions, the architectural profession is conspicuous in its failure to develop alternative systems of remuneration to prevent this sort of distortion. 3.8 In searching for the linkage of architectural services to this substantial "disenfranchised" sector of the market, one is reduced to considering assurance No. 5 of the R.I. B.A. package, namely that the architect will do his work within the framework of a set of social and artistic values so as to ensure that the interests of society — as well as those of his client — are served by the best architecture he is able to create". 3.9 In none of the other assurances exchanged for the fee scale does this majority of potential consumers appear. It is the fee scale, we are told, that safeguards the content of the assurances; but it is hard to see how this can be so with respect to assurance No. 5, since the party who is seeking the assurance is not the party with the power of withholding the fee. 3.10 Even if it could be argued that the exclusion of the majority of potential consumers from the market was legitimate — an absurd proposition — what residual safeguard to their interest is thus provided? And through what method of representation, what system of checks and balances, is this safeguard operated or maintained? How does, how can, even the diligent practitioner ensure that, in the absence of direct contact with the intended beneficiaries, he is working within the appropriate "framework of values" to ensure "service" to these social "interests"? 3.11 Clearly since it is their contention that the fee system does guarantee the assurance, it is for the R.I. B.A. to provide the answers to these questions: but in the meantime, N.A.M. ventures to suggest that not only is the link tenuous in the extreme, but that the bulk of the evidence from this majority, over let us say the past decade, as to their satisfaction with this derivative "benefit" of the fee system — the bulk of the evidence is not encouraging. 3.12 Indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the regard with which the profession and its products are held by the public at large (the true market for services) has seldom been at a lower ebb. The reason for this is neither the lack of architectural interest amongst the public, nor the want of imagination amongst architects, but the series of arrangements, of which the fee system is a part, which prevents the relevant interest being harnessed to the appropriate imagination. For the synopsis of the principle arguments covered, and N.A.M. 's conclusions, please refer again to the Introduction, parts and 5. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource JA/ DR Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1976 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/0c23d260704e0027d4327de384a61de7.pdf 8c32ed786bd2ff69086b9849b9d9808b Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Do not pass go - Do not collect 6% Subject The topic of the resource Different binding of Monopolies Commission Report Description An account of the resource There has not been any compulsory scale of fees fixed by the Institute and there never will bel! ..RIBA 1926 M A N D A T O R Y M I N I M U M F E E S " Report of the New Architecture Movement to the Monopolies Commission investigation into the supply in The United Kingdom of Architects services. NEW ARCHITECTURE MOVI+ffNT 14th May 1976 M A N D A T O R Y M I N I M U M Report of the New Architecture Movement to the Monopolies Commission investigation into the supply in The United Kingdom of Architects services. THE NEW ARCHITECTURE MOVEMENT 1 14th May 1976 THE CASE AGAINST bnN1)ATORY MINIMUM FEES CONTENTS: INTRODUCTION THE HOLLOW mRGAIN THE FALIACIES AND THE FACTS PUBLIC INTEREST INTRODUCTION This report is submitted by the New Architecture Movement to the Monopolies Commission to assist in the investigation it is currently undertaking at the order of the Department of Trade and Industry. It is understood that the Royal Institute of British Architects is submitting its own report, "The Case for Mandatory Minimum Fees" which claims to carry the support of all the other architectural bodies who were consulted. The New Architecture Movement (N.A.M.) was not consulted, and does not support the R.I. B.A. t s case, and therefore is presenting its own arguments independently. The N.A.M. consists of a substantial body of professional architects and laymen who share a consensus of views on all aspects of architecture as well as the activities of the R.I. B.A. differing radically from the official orthodoxy. Since, however, the Commission's terms of reference relate specifically to the question of the fee scale and the public interest, N.A.M. has sought to confine its submission to those matters germaine to the Commission's enquiry. This report may therefore be read alongside that submitted by the R.I. B.A. and counter — arguments have been closely cross—referenced. N.A.M. t s report may be summarized as demonstrating that the current Fee System is not intrinsic in the system of architectural services but a gratuitous market device procuring unilateral benefits to architects; that the R.I. B.A. t s detailed argument contains serious contradictions and flaws; that the statistics and the resulting inferences have been misleadingly or incorrectly drawn; and that 2 the central concept of the 'public interest' on more searching analysis may be shown to be severely prejudiced by the fee scales' mandatory status. The recognition of the arguments made in this report entail action for change on the basis of the following descending hierarchy of priorities:— Abandonment of the mandatory minimum fee scale entirely. Retention of the fee scale as a recommendation only, but abandonment of its mandatory element. Retention of the mandatory fee scale but the establishment of a permanent independent agency to review the levels of the scale. Such agency to include at least 500/0 non— professional representation. It must however be noted in the context of (i) and (i i) above that since the R.I. B.A. has argued that any such changes to the present fee system would necessarily entail a wholesale review of all aspects of the system of architectural services, any recommendation by the Commi ssion on these lines would place on the R.I. B.A. the onus of undertaking the review mentioned or of justifying its change of mind. N.A.M. trusts that this report will constructively contribute to the sum of material on which the Commission will formulate its recommendations, and we would confirm our willingness to participate in any further debate which the Commission may wish to pursue. PART 1 THE HOLLOW mRGAIN It is understood that the Monopolies Commission has a duty to satisfy itself that arrangements restricting the competition in any given market for goods or services do not operate to the prejudice of the public interest. The market in question is that for archi— tectural services. These, as practised by architects, have for various historical reasons become assimilated into a closely defined system governed by the R.I. B.A., which is itself a body of architects, such that the purveyors and their practices have acquired the status of a profession. The definition of a professional differs widely depending upon whether one is referring to, say, golfing or surgery, but in the context of architecture it is proposed that the distinctive differen— tiating element is that of "disinterested counsel". The status of this undertaking to provide "disinterested counsel" is of central interest, since it is the constituent five assurances — the guarantees of this essential disinterest — which, we are told, are advanced to clients in return for their acceptance of the fee scale. (p. 3.2.5) The fee scale and the assurances are argued to be mutually inter— dependant, such that either connot stand without the other, and removal destroying the entire structure of the . B.A. arrangements — code, conditions, registration, etc. A major portion of the Commission's attention will therefore be directed towards the status of the assurances, and the necessity/ dispensability of the linkage between these and the fee scale. For example, in demonstrating that the link is necessary it would have to be shown that clients may be confident of the fulfillment of the assurances by accepting the fee scale, and that architects by insisting on the fee scale are held to the assurances. If, however, the contrary can be demonstrated, then the proposition that clients should accept the fee scale in return for these assurances is in fact not a bargain but a deceit; there will be no necessary connection between the two; and architects will be seen to derive an unjustified market advantage at the expense of their consumers. Let us start with the first assurance. In what way does the validity of the promise of integrity require the support of the fee scale? The status of this assurance is more in the nature of an oath than a contract. The content of an oath is not a good or a service bought with money. The reference is either to the familiar concept of good faith, which is a normal requirement of any parties entering into any sort of legal or commercial contract and thus not special to architects, or it is a promise of honour somewhat akin to the medical Hippocratic oath, which is not a divisible commodity costing XO//o for a 'thigh degree". In the latter case, the acceptance of the fee scale is of little avail to the client who has the misfortune to employ a dishonourable architect. Dismissal or censure is part of the policing function of the R.I. B.A. Conduct Comnlittee who rightly seek to maintain the code — much as ABTA upholds certain standards of good conduct in the practice of travel agents. If, therefore, we interpret the first assurance as an oath, the Institute itself will administer the measures following its non— fulfillment; if we interpret it as simply the mens rea of a contract the client has recourse to the normal legal remedies following a breach of contract. Either way, the fee scale is neither necessary nor sufficient — it is a gratuitous element serving the interests of architects while securing no compensatory advantage to clients that are not already provided by other means. 1.4 If, however, the contrary can be demonstrated, then the proposition that clients should accept the fee scale in return for these assurances is in fact not a bargain but a deceit; there will be no necessary connection between the two; and architects will be seen to derive an unjustified market advantage at the expense of their consumers. Let us start with the first assurance. In what way does the validity of the promise of integrity require the support of the fee scale? The status of this assurance is more in the nature of an oath than a contract. The content of an oath is not a good or a service bought with money. The reference is either to the familiar concept of good faith, which is a normal requirement of any parties entering into any sort of legal or commercial contract and thus not special to architects, or it is a promise of honour somewhat akin to the medical Hippocratic oath, which is not a divisible commodity costing XO//o for a 'thigh degree' . In the latter case, the acceptance of the fee scale is of little avail to the client who has the misfortune to employ a dishonourable architect. Dismissal or censure is part of the policing function of the R.I. B.A. Conduct Committee who rightly seek to maintain the code — much as ABTA upholds certain standards of good conduct in the practice of travel agents. If, therefore, we interpret the first assurance as an oath, the Institute itself will administer the measures following its non— fulfillment; if we interpret it as simply the mens rea of a contract the client has recourse to the normal legal remedies following a breach of contract. Either way, the fee scale is neither necessary nor sufficient — it is a gratuitous element serving the interests of architects while securing no compensatory advantage to clients that are not already provided by other means. - 5 - The second assurance is even more plainly dissociated from the fee scale. The provision that architects may not limit their liability is derived directly from The Partnership Act, 1890, (Section 9) which establishes the legal grounds of the most common form of architectural association. It is worth noting in this context that the legal definition of partnership (sec 1.1) as "the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit" is somewhat at variance with the image of disinterest promulgated by the R.I. B.A., and that the failure to make such a profit may be construed by a court (sec. 35.e) as grounds for dissolution. In none of the other less conmon forms of association available to architects — unlimited liability companies, limited partnerships, consortia, etc — can the liability of principals be limited, so that the client who is dissatisfied with his architect's fulfillment of the second assurance has simply to seek legal remedy under the terms of the appropriate Act. But, apart from these inalienable legal provisions, it is well known that the concept of diligence being reinforced by unlimited liability is substantially modified by the universal practice of carrying professional indemnity. This ability to artificially defer personal liability is in fact normally taken as a criterion of whether a given architect's practice can be established or maintained. Similarly the third assurance, relating to competence, is also substantiated not by the fee system but by the legal requirements of the Registration Acts, Building Regulations, Planning Controls, etc, in addition to the abundant technical standards and recommendations published either by external agencies, such as I).O.E., B. R.S., and the British Standards Institution, or jointly with the R.I. B.A. itself, as for example in the case of the National Building Specification. - 6 - Except for Registration, these are constraints upon any design agency working in building construction or related fields, and not simply upon architects; and the client achieves no additional advantage in the latter case by accepting the fee scale. 1.11 It is worth noting that, in view of recent reports of building failures since the war, projects involving architects have not fared noticeably better than those without, sugges ting that clients may be ill—advised to take the third assurance simply at face value anyway. 1 .12 The fourth assurance, insofar as it differs from the first, is a simple repetition of the common laws of agency and contract in which it is generally not the agent but the employer who accepts liability for the actions undertaken. In other words, the assurance largely confers upon the client not an advantage but an obligation, to which the fee scale bears no relation. 1 . 13 Moreover, the architect's activities include several important tasks where he must actually refrain from making "his clients' best interests the dominating consideration", notably in the exercise of quasi— judicial functions under the building contract, to say nothing of the further dilution of the assurance entailed in the architect's retention of copyright of his work. . 14 The final assurance raises questions relating to the public interest at large involving supra—client matters beyond the terms of contract that are unenforceable on the basis of the fee scale and perhaps even at all. Further discussions of this assurance is included in Part 3. The summation of the foregoing arguments is that the client is currently invited to accept the fee scale in return for the assurances as though only by so doing can he be confident of their fulfillment. A deeper analysis, however, shows that he is being offered nothing to which he would not be entitled anyway, or for which effective means of reinforcement do not already exist; hence that the fee scale is simply a gratui tous market advantage to architects. The R.I. B.A. claims that the removal of the mandatory minimum fee scale cannot be accomplished without the entire remaining package being re—fashioned. N.A.M. proposes that it may be removed, the remaining package staying im tact with market equity being thereby restored to consumers. If the Commission accepts any or all of N.A.M. 's arguments, then the onus is clearly on the R.I. B.A. to explain what wholesale changes it would propose. �PART 2 FALLACIES AND THE FACTS Through the process of developing the preceeding argument cane the realisation that the entire rationale behind the professional ethos of the R.I. B.A. was either a kind of farce of muddy thought and disingenuous invention or an attempt to confuse the issues by an extravagant masquerade. Whether it is a farce of self—deception or a masquerade of deceit, it has lead us to be rather circumspect of the detailed arguments presented in the R.I.B.A. text and to query the statistical evidence. That such evidence is effectively muted by qualification does nothing to dispel our doubts as to its use and inference. We therefore consider it advisable to examine closely the subject matter and to expose its more blatent inconsistencies. It caused little surprise and some amusement that the inconsistencies should expose three key issues, namely the structure of the fee scale, the notion of competition, and the abolition of the mandatory fee. 't In such circumstances (negotiation on a recommended fee scale) the effects of a change to recommended scales would be little different from the effects of abolishing the scale altogether". (Appendix 1.33, p. 11) 't If the fluctuations in the demand for architects' services could by some means be eliminated, fees would no doubt settle down at something like their present level even without a mandatory scale" (7.14) The first statement implies that a recommended scale is really no scale at all, from which we can in turn deduce that a scale only has validity if it is a mandatory one. Were the second statement true, then the scale is valid per se and its mandatory element is effected through market forces. Thus we have incompatible notions of what constitutes a mandatory scale — that the mandatory element is indispensable and that external market values effectively maintain present levels. 2.3 "The R.I. B.A. has not sought to limit the rate of entry into the profession". (3.12) "Concern with improving the quality of architects' training has been a feature of the R.I. B.A. t s activities from the early years and a major step forward was taken with the 1958 Oxford Conference and the introduction of the two GCE A—level entry requirement" . (6.10) The Institute may claim that it has no control over the supply of trained architects and yet by controlling entry qualification has the means and intention of doing so. 2.4 t' It is exceptionally difficult to measure technical efficiency (efficiency in production) in a profession which is characterised by sharp fluctuations in activity rates and whose output is so difficult to categorise 't . (6.9) "The R.I. B.A. believes that action following this report (The Architect and his Office) significantly improved the technical efficiency of the profession". (6.100 Does the R.I. B.A. wish us to believe that efficiency is measurable or not? Perhaps the yardstick is by the sale of the Handbook to offices that hadn't a clue, and the non—sale to offices that knew it all anyway. 2.5 t' In practice the result of cutting the design fee by a third would be a substantial rise in construction costs" (3.8) "Indeed, an architect's ability to reduce his client's costs is one of the most powerful competitive weapons available within an highly competitive framework" . (5.2) We have a bald and boring argument throughout the report that the quality of work will decline as a result of fee cutting and with consequential poor cost control. Yet we are led to believe that the prime virtue of the professional service is effective cost control. Are architects likely to trade in "a powerful competitive weapon" for a third of their fees? Are architects likely to cut their fees at the expense of their throats? 2.6 "The option has always been available to clients to choose a commercial form of architectural service' • (2.1) "This low price elasti city (of demand) is a consequence • • of the absence of any substitute for the skilled design services which architects provide". (3.7) t The option t postulates that there is competition between the professional and the commercial services. 'Low price elasticity' is a consequence of the absence of competition. For both statements to be true either the commercial service is not skilled (which is untrue) or the professional service is complementary rather than competi tive . 2.7 "It is clear also that the two sectors are in competition with one another, for every public authority has to make a choice on each building project (Appendix 1.12) "The Institute believes that the two sectors have different but complementary roles to play" . (3.18) In fact the public and private sectors are complementary in very rare circumstances. The competitive act is supplanted by the complementary in a closed shop. 2.8 The presentation of empirical evidence exhibits similar fallacies and distortion. Great play is made of the fact that due to extremes of supply of new work, abnormal economic circumstances impinge on the provision of services. Curiously, a graph showing new commissions is used to demonstrate uneven revenue. Revenue is earned continuously throughout the design and construction process. Broadly one third of the income is earned at the design stage, one third at working drawings and one third at the construction stage. In fact the input by the office at large is decisively different at various stages of the job, and the arrival of new commissions is arbitrary. Many, for example, are in the form of feasibility studies on which fees are payable even if abortive, and on which revenue is earned relatively quickly. The only true measure of the mythical cycle is one of revenue. This will be of a broadly similar profile to work certified. The revenue cycle of abortive commissions is high frequency, while the time scale of a commission fully achieved is a long one and the effect is the opposite to the trend that the original graph has attempted to show. 2.9 A similar falsification is to be found in the evidence of the R.I. B.A. that purports to show that architects do not earn monopolistic profits. The confusion in this instance results from substituting the earnings of the profession at large for the profits earned by principals in private practice. The earnings of 8(Y/b of the profession represent the cost of the provision of the service, not its profit. Profit would be represented by the partner earnings and drawings. We endeavour to show that the profit margin has continued to rise with the trend to larger practices. This deceit has been arrived at by using the interquartile range rather than the first quarter. The level of salaried architects' remuneration is set by the competitive price for labour in the public sector which is arrived at by collective bargaining. Such evidence and argument continues to portray the myth that architects as a group are one and homogeneous. The level of salaried architects' remuneration is independent and irrelevant to the profiteering revenue of private practice. 2.10 We believe that what has been presented by the R.I. B.A. is a masquerade which attempts to conceal a primary economic objective of a price floor for prestigious architectural services. We interpret this as self—interest. The classic model of this enviable situation creates the following conditions: a guarantee of minimum revenue whether for good or bad services; the power to determine price and hence profit; the power to limit the public disclosure of financial evidence; a control over the level of service (only the purveyor of the service seemingly being able to qualify it); the power to determine and identify efficiency in its own terms (thus enabling real g@ins of efficiency to be returned as profit); and the power to immunise the market share of the building design from the vaguaries of the market, to the unfair advantage of competitors and to the detriment of allied professions thereby retaining an otherwise vulnerable leadership of the building team. 2.11 We therefore pose a series of questions. i) Is there anv validity of maintaining a price floor under any circumstances? Clearly society does so in terms of, say food; but to extend such devices generally d.istort the free economy. Should such a device be extended beyond the provision of essential services? This would only be conceivable if society held that such a commodity or service was indispensible or very highly desirable. In such circumstances it would be tantamount to a fraud if the case was made by the interested party. We would consider that the case for architecture to be so treated would be invalid if it required architects to articulate the case. �Should such a device be extended to the private sector? Only if by doing so the profits from such an enterprise were either controlled by society or used to society's benefit. Clearly the profits made by most architectural firms would not meet these criteria. What peculiar conditions of the market would justify the price floor? If there exists a crisis such that otherwise the service would collapse. Plainly if private practice ceased to function then the practice of architecture would continue in the public sector. The P.I.B. states that extremes of demand and supply constitute peculiar conditions. Do these conditions then affect the business of architecture? Only in as much as they effect the construction industry generally. The construction industry is broad—based and has high capital investment. It is likely that architecture which has low capital investment would survive periods of stagnation with a greater degree of flexibility. We are constrained by the needs for clarity and succinctness to limit the exposure of these detailed fallacies in the R.I. B.A. t s evidence, and the resulting questions provoked. The basic alternative statis— tical interpretations are, by contrast, now explored further as follows. THE TENDENCY TOWARDS BIGGER PRACTICES Table 1 Distribution of Private Practices by size 1958-1972 Source: R.I.B.A. Submission to Monopolies Commission May 1976 From 1958 onwards there is a clear tendency for the percentage of small practices to decrease and for the percentage of larger practices to increase. In 1967 the National Board of Prices and Incomes found that medium and large practices, while forming only of all offices, had an share of all fee income. The tendency towards larger practices and the incomes shown in Table 2 are therefore indicative of the extent to which principals in private practice are, through the fee scale, reaping increasing profits for no measurable improvement in service, and the way in which such larger practices thereby distort the distribution of patronage . 2.14 LARGER PmCTICES YIELD GREATER PROFITS Table 2 Average Annual Income per Architectural Partner by size of Architectural Team Value of New Commissions in 1966 and 1974 comparable source i i Percentage distribution of practices by size approx. similar (Table 1) Definition of Income as per source (i) 2.15 SALARIED ARCHITECTS HAVE NOT FARED SO WELL Table 3 Average Salary of all Lnployed Architects in all Private Practices Source: Ibid Note: All teéh. salaries in 1967 formed 34.5% of costs; R.I. B.A. Handbook suggests approx. similar figures. We have been unable to discover reliable data relating the income of salaried architects to size of office. The average salary used throughout will consequently be rather high for small practices which generally pay lower salaries than do larger practices (see 1968 NBPI Report). Nevertheless in small practices the actual difference in income between partners and salaried technical staff has remained fairly constant between 1966 and 197%. In 1960 of all salaried technical staff worked in medium and large offices although those offices formed only of all offices. (See The Architect and His Office: 1962 RIBA Survey) By 1972 the percentage of salaried technical staff working in medium and large practices had risen to 81% while these practices still accounted for only 36.4% of all offices. And it is in those offices that the increasing gap between the incomes of principals and staff is most apparant, rising to a dramatic extent in offices with more than 25 architects. PART PUBLIC INTEREST 3.1 The central element in the entire debate on which the attention of all parties is focused is "the public interest". Rightly, it is the talisman in any attempt to judge the degree of equity in professional activity. But what is the public interest? Who are the public? Who, if anyone, are not the public? How is their interest defined, and where and by whom is it represented? 3.2 The broad assumption, it appears, is that the public interest refers approximately to the "open market" — in this case the consumers or potential consumers of architectural services. Theoretically this should embrace the population at large, outside the architectural profession, which of course itself consists of men and women who are members of the community. Even such a brief definition conjures up a vast aggregate of groupings, whether class—based or by colour, locality, occupation, etc., etc. — a heterogeneous mass of almost unimaginable diversity. It is difficult to see how any person or group in this mass could be legitimately excluded from the "public" if we are endeavouring to identify whose interest is to be safe— guarded; and the principle that could be formulated from this premise — that 't a decent envirmment is a basic right of everybody" — would appear, in the context of this democratic free society, to be virtually self—evident. - How does the R.I. B.A. mandatory fee scale rare in such a test? The answer is not well. Tt is immediately clear that unlike, for example, the medical profession whose services are available to any— body simply on the basis of need, the "public interest" in architec— tural affairs is in fact a portmanteau term concealing two very different types of consumer the client and the user. 3.5 The occasions when these two parties are in fact the same person or group are indisputably the exceptions to the rule. Indeed, it would be more reasonable to characterize the distribution of architectural services as a system in which the users are not the clients. In the field of council housing for example, perhaps the overriding priority building type, it is axiomatic that the residents cannot avail themselves of the services of architects. This anomaly pervades the whole of the market under scrutiny. In contrast with the medical profession whose services are available equally to 1007/0 of the population, the services of architects are purchased only by one fifth. This discrimination in the market is not of course solely due to the existence of the mandatory fee scale. Questions as to dominion over land, finding capital costs of construction, etc., are also to be involved. But it is not within the Commission's terms of reference to criticise the R.I. B.A. for elements within the system over which it has no direct control (or opts to exert no direct influence ) . We are confined to studying only those arrangements that act or may act as barriers to potential consumers of architectural services over which the R.I. B.A. does exercise control thereby interfering with free market forces and the public interest. Clearly the fee system is such an arrangement; for by denying architects the option to charge less to �those potential user—clients who would be less able to pay, and allowing them to find any necessary balance from other types of work, the fee system acts as a barrier to those architects whose capacity or conscience favour small scale initiatives in preference to the corporate or bureaucratic clients whose sectional interests at present totally bias the market. If the ratio of this bias was less disproportionate, this state of affairs might assume less significance; but the fact that user—clients currently include only the wealthy sponsors of private villas, while direct community architecture is practically non—existent, indicates that the "public interest" in the market for architectural services is only fractionally served. In the troika of medical, legal and architectural professions, the architectural profession is conspicuous in its failure to develop alternative systems of remuneration to prevent this sort of distortion. In searching for the linkage of architectural services to this substantial "disenfranchised" sector of the market, one is reduced to considering assurance No. 5 of the R.I.B.A. package, namely that the architect will do his work within the framework of a set of social and artistic values so as to ensure that the interests of society — as well as those of his client — are served by the best architecture he is able to create". In none of the other assurances exchanged for the fee scale does this majority of potential consumers appear. It is the fee scale, we are told, that safeguards the content of the assurances; but it is hard to see how this can be so with respect to assurance No. 5, since the party who is seeking the assurance is not the party with the power of withholding the fee. LWen if it could be argued that the exclusion of the majority of potential consumers from the market was legitimate an absurd proposition — what residual safeguard to their interest is thus How , the absence of direct contact with the intended beneficiaries, he is working within the appropriate "framework of values" to ensure "service" to these social "interests"? Clearly since it is their contention that the fee system does guarantee the assurance, it is for the R.I. B.A. to provide the answers to these questions: but in the meantime, N.A.M. ventures to suggest that not only is the link tenuous in the extreme, but that the bulk of the evidence from this majority, over let us say the past decade, as to their satisfaction with this derivative "benefit" of the fee system — the bulk of the evidence is not encouraging • Indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the regard with which the profession and its products are held by the public at large (the true market for services) has seldom been at a lower ebb. The reason for this is neither the lack of architectural interest amongst the public, nor the want of imagination amongst architects, but the series of arrangements, of which the fee system is a part, which prevents the relevant interest being harnessed to the appropriate imagination. the and 's to 20 flow the absence of direct contact with the intended beneficiaries, he is working within the appropriate "framework of values" to ensure "service" to these social "interests"? Clearly since it is their contention that the fee system does guarantee the assurance, it is for the R.I. B.A. to provide the answers to these questions: but in the meantime, N.A.M. ventures to suggest that not only is the link tenuous in the extreme, but that the bulk of the evidence from this majority, over let us say the past decade, as to their satisfaction with this derivative "benefit" of the fee system — the bulk of the evidence is not encouraging. Indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the regard with which the profession and its products are held by the public at large (the true market for services) has seldom been at a lower ebb. The reason for this is neither the lack of architectural interest amongst the public, nor the want of imagination amongst architects, but the series of arrangements, of which the fee system is a part, which prevents the relevant interest being harnessed to the appropriate imagination. the and t s to h �20 flow the absence of direct contact with the intended beneficiaries, he is working within the appropriate "framework of values" to ensure "service" to these social "interests"? Clearly since it is their contention that the fee system does guarantee the assurance, it is for the R.I. B.A. to provide the answers to these questions: but in the meantime, N.A.M. ventures to suggest that not only is the link tenuous in the extreme, but that the bulk of the evidence from this majority, over let us say the past decade, as to their satisfaction with this derivative "benefit" of the fee system — the bulk of the evidence is not encouraging • Indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the regard with which the profession and its products are held by the public at large (the true market for services) has seldom been at a lower ebb. The reason for this is neither the lack of architectural interest amongst the public, nor the want of imagination amongst architects, but the series of arrangements, of which the fee system is a part, which prevents the relevant interest being harnessed to the appropriate imagination. the and t s to h Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource JA/DR Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1976 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/54dd5a0ccd2a100c7b67050df07fd085.pdf 6e256ce05d728da4d7eb86ee0778aa22 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource End Architects' Fixed Fee Scales Subject The topic of the resource Marked up text with comments from Alan Lipman Description An account of the resource Parties have sought Ate off British Architects huncil, U.K. (ARCUK) , t architect' must be •n in the mid—60 t 3 In April 1967 the to the National {ay 1968 the ending review body to prepare ne eventually made , cil also controls tse and Industry referred infirmed the exist ence nade _ recommendations rt was accepted by the 1977. WÆfter gil months of discussion with the Office o? Fair Trading (OFT?) the RIBA and ARCUK have failed to comply with the Commission's and the Government's demands. Meanwhile detailed proposals for an alternative fee system which assimilates these demands, have been prepared by representatives o? the "Unattached Archi— —tectg and submitted to the We believe that thig report 't VIay Ahead" now republished may form the basis for a new and equitable system of architects' fees. * Report No. 71: "Architects' Costs and Fees n s Ctand. 3653. "Architects' Services — A •Report on the Supply o? Architects t Services with Reference to Scale ?eeg 't, ordered to be printed by The House o? Commons, 8th November, 1977 • END ARCHITECTS I FIXED FEE SCALES ! Synopsis of WAY AHEAD, a report by representatives of "Unattached Architect s t' on the architectg•t fee gystem NISTING ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY ARCHITECTS CHARGE MANDATORY MINIMUM HAVE CONDEMNED BY CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR SHOULD BE ABANDONED IN FAVOUR 0? A SYSTEM. BACKGROUND Over the past fifteen years governments o? both major parties have sought to end the fixed fee scales published by the Royal Ingtitute off British Architects (RIBA) and made mandatory by the Architects Registration Council, U.K. (ARCUK) , th•e statutory body which all entitled to use the style t architect' must be registered. Government investigation of architects' earningg began in the mid—60 t g with the Inter—DepartmentaL Committee om Professional Fees. In April 1967 the Government referred the level o? architects t eogtg and fees to the National Board for Prices and Incomes (11B?I) which recommended in May 1968 the ending o? mandatory gees and the establigtlment of an independent review body to prepare a new fee Although minor changes to the scale were eventually made, the RIBA — which through its voting majority in • ARCUK Council also controls this "public interest tt body — resisted the NBPI requirements. In September 1973 the Conservative Minister for Trade and Industry referred the matter to the Monopolies Commission, whose confirmed the existence o? a monopoly operating against the public interest, and made . recommendations similar to those of the NBPI a decade earlier. This report was accepted by the Minister for Prices and Consumer Protection on November 9th 1977. WÆfter six months o? discussion with the Office o? Fair Trading ( O.qxr) the RIBA and ARCUK have failed to comply with the Commission's and the Government's demands. Meanwhile detailed proposals for an alternative fee syst.em which assimilates these demands, have been prepared by representatives ot the "Unattached Archi— * Report No. 71: "Architectg t Costs and Feest% Cmnd. 3653. ** nArchitects' Services — A •Report on the Supply o? Architects t Services with Reference to Scale pees", ordered to be printed by The House o? Commons, 8th November, 1977. HAY AHEAD Our report "Way Ahead" exarhines the failure of' the existing fee sygtem and proposes criteria for a satisfactory alternative. The present 'ad valorem t scale (i.e. the more costly the building, the greater the fee) fails to meet the public interest' in showing whether value for money is obtained. —Woreover provides architects with an incentive to increase the fee irrespective o? building quality. "Way Ahead" accepts the Monopolies Commission t g recommendations, and proposeg a voluntary fee system in which architectg t charges are related to their costs. Thus standardised fee tenders would indicate cost rates for labour, overheads and profit for agreed services based on the building type, size, complexity, degree of repetition, etc., and the experience, capacity and location of practices. Ranges showing upper and lower norms for these variables would be prepared by the Independent Committee recommended by the Monopolies Commission for the guidance o? clients, principals and galaried star, etc. Such a gygtem would be easily operate , and has much: in common with contractors t compe itive tender procedures, which of course are already familiar to allwith the building industry. We algo agree that an Independent Committee should be established to determine the new non—mandatory fee system, and that it be appointed by Government • We accept the Commission t g view that the committee should not include representatives of those directly involved in charging and paying for architects t services, i.e. principal architects and clients. Rather the membership should represent the interests of those affected by the fee scales. but who are not party to the negotiations between client and principal in addition to a Government observer, advisors appointed to assist the c6mmittee should be selected to reflect the divergent interests and groups within the profession. Finally the report includes detailed proposals for modificat •on of the existing professional codes to enable the mandatory scale to be in the interim period before the new fee system ig introduced. The suggestion that interim jUStified by the present depression hag hag been noted by the Commission and others that a mandatory scale is insignificant in mitigating the difficulties o? reduced demand. tite therefore now urge the Minister and M. P. t 3 of all parties to take the necessary gtepg to bring thig restrictive practice to an end. WHO ARB ? In thig country architects are define • by being entered on the Register administered by ARCUK and by no other meang. Joining other professional associations BUCh ag the RIBA, is a gratuitous choice made by some architects but all. Those who choose to practige gimply as architects, and who are not memberc o? any of the bodies listed in Schedule I of the 1931 Architects Registration Act (some of which are now defunct) are degignatéd by the Act ag "Unattached". Apart from Government appointees and representatives of other building professions and the industry itselff, the ARCUK Council is composed o? the nomineeg of the councils of the professional associations in Schedule I, plug the elected representatives of the Unattached Architects. number 4120, almost of the profession, and form the largest group after the RIBA%, (19,618). those published by the RIBA by virtue of• the latter's votin rxty in ARCUK Council. We consider that this example of a poly fee scale, which hag been condemned as prejudicial to the pu interest, being itself imposed by a "public interest tt body highli e urgent need to review the ARCUK constitution and ammend the glat ion accordingly. We consider a more open and representative would be beneficial to public and profession alike. We there ge that the opportunity ig taken to reform the constitutiorz and r sen a Ion The Unattached Architects have no fee scaleg but are obliged to observe those published by the RIBA by virtue of the latter's voting majority in ARCUK Council. We consider that thig example of a monopol fee scale, which has been condemned as prejudicial to the public interes% being itself imposed by a "public interest" body highlights the urgent need to review the ARCUK constitution and ammend the legislation accordingly. (It may be noted that o? the present Council memberghip o? 68, 51 are members of the RIBA.) We consider a more open . and representative ARCUK would be beneficial to public and profession alike. We therefore urge that the opportunity is taken to reform the constitution, and introduce majority lay representation in ARCUK Council. THE PROFESSIONAL MAJORITY THE ARCHITECTS' REGISTRATION COUNCIL PREVENTS IT OPERATING AS A PUBLIC BODY, AND SHOULD REDUCED TO ALLOW MAJORITY LAY REPRESENTATION. END THE ARCHITECTS I MAJORITY ON A.R.C.U.K. COUNCIL ! Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated, c. 1977? https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/d96e0bc0a898f0fc3d67b94f33e85d54.pdf e63bf3bb8257368160f2660a54603426 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Architects' fixed fees attacked Subject The topic of the resource Cutting from The Guardian Description An account of the resource By Judy Hillman, The fixed fee system applied body. However, Mr Roy Hatters- ley, Secretary of State for | Prices and Consumer Protec- tion, has already asked the Dir- | ector General of Fair Trading by architects should be ended because it works against the public interest, the Monopolies Commission reported yesterday. to discuss the necessary action It also criticised architects for preventing competition for jobs. The report suggests that an independent committee should fix fee leyels which would not, |however, be binding and would leave architects free to fix their own price The Royal Institute of British with the professions—the sur- |; veyors have been covered in a second report—to change their present practice. The RIBA said the commmis- sion, by over-emphasising price competition, had made recom- mendations which could lead to a drastic reduction in quantity |4 Architects immediately de- and quality of xervices. unced the conclusions and it intended to fight the for an independent review The report does not agree. “We would expect the client always to be concerned with obtaining value for money in exi his choice of architect but not| tral | always to choose the cheapest, Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource J. Hillman Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10.11.77 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/0f879ac0f84c22fe8738787a8a4c7571.pdf 25ba8bd3420a66a9181fe2725c24747a Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Way Ahead Subject The topic of the resource 27pp. Draft Report to Office of Fair Trading marked up by K. Thorpe Description An account of the resource INTEODUCTION At a meeting of representatives of the "Unattached Architects" with the Office of Fair Trading on the 21st. December, 1977 it was confirmed . that the Director General's tasks following the Monopolies Commission Report fell into two areas . arrangements for the interim period, that is ammending the existing rules and codes of the relevant professional associations so as to permit competitive fee quoting by architects, and ensuring that the pubuc could be fully aware that the existing scales are no longer mandatory. The Commission also prescribed the procedure that should be adopted in the immediate future before the new agency brought forward its proposals, (parae 286, (vii)), and we therefore also include in Part 4 a brief timetable -of developments with draft cover notes disclaiming mandatory fee _ status on the relevant professional documents. looking further ahead , the Betting up of an independent committee to determine new recommended scales of fees for architects and surveyors services . These areas of action are derived directly from the MonopolieR Commission's Reeommendations, (M. C. Report, "Architects' Services} parae 286, (i) —(v) and (v) sub. para (b) and (vi). The structure of our report therefore corresponds with this two part brief, Part 4 suggesting anmendments to the Codes entailed by the Commission' s conclusions, and Part S • proposing criteria and form of the new fee system and the composition, terms of reference and financing of the new agency that will determine recommended fee scales. In our discussions at the Office of Fair Trad it wag made clear that the Director's mandate was necessari confined to acting on the specific recommendations of Monopolies Commission, and that wider questions for the p ssion raised by the Report which —ere not directly ent ed in tasks 1 and 2 noted above could not be considere rt of the Director's brief. This limitation is of c Tse recognised by the representatives of the Unattach rchitects. � SUMMARY The principal recommendations of this Report may be summarijed as follows : The present mandat ory minimum fee scale m st be brought to an end by 1st June, 1978. After th ab v date all professional documents referring to the fee scale m t indicate that it need no longer be applied, that clients and architects are free to negotiate fees, and that an archit ect may quote a fee in competition with other architects. The professional associations are responsible for ensuring that information about the new arrangements is made widely available to the profession and the public, also clearly announcing the date from which they will apply. In the short term, Easter 1979) the present ARCUK and RIBA Codes of Conduct p.dst be ammended to be compatible with the operation of negotiable fees. •The changes and ommiBBions thug entailed will clearly make it necessary in the longer term for the profession to reconsider the status, content and objectives of the Code in its entirety. The present fee system based on percentages off construction costs fails to relate architects t revenue to the cost of providing the service, prevents the consumer from checking whether value for money is being obtained, and hence should be scrapped. Any new scale of charges should meet the criteria of : voluntary status, manifest fairness, and simplicity of: operation. should also provide for clients advance knowledge valid despite inflation, e B elf—polici , of commissions. The independent committee recommended in the Monopolies Commission Report (parae 286. v & vie) should be appointed by 1st June 1978, or as Boont as possible thereafter, to determine recommended scales of charges based on the costs of providing architects t services. meet the above criteria. Further to the Comynissionlt s recommendations, the independent committee should not contain representatives of principals or clients, or chief officers), but should comprise, inter alia, representativeg of all parties affected by fee scales who are not party to the bargain between principal and client. The independent committee should present its draft proposals to The Office of Fair Trading, to whom it should be responsible, by 31st December 1978. The approved recommended scales should supersede the Interim, Arrangements by Easter 1979, but the independent committee may continue to review the situation for a further three year period provided its membership continued to exclude representatives of principals and clients. 4-14-3M 2 The independent committee should formulate new fee scale systems bo.th for architects and surveyors, and should be financed in part or whole by a levy on principals in all practices employing ten or more persons. The profession should tak this opportunity of initiating a wide—ranging review of bow successfully it serves the public interest, witw a view to establishing a majority lay representation on ARCUK as a permanent check against the operation of professional self—interest. o 401k INTERIM By the 1st. June, 1978 nearly seven months will have passed since the Monopolies Commission Report was published and the profession will have had ample time to assimilate the immediate implications . We therefore • tat A period of some months — but in no circumstances more than a year — will then necessarily elapse after the conclusion of the p+esent negotiations before the independent committee has presented its new recommended scales of charges In this Interim Period t it' will still be necessary for architects to adopt the precepts of the Monopolies Commission Report and drop the mandatory element of fee charging irrespective of any conclusions which the indepen— dent committee may arrive. Since the mandatory status of the present fee scale is derived from its inclusion in the ARCUK Code of Conduct, which all regist— ered persons are enjoined to observe, it follows that all references to it must be omitted, and the Code amended accordingly. In the immediate short term this is simply a process of textu%al editing — but we would emphasise our view that the profession as a whole after thus satisf in the O minimurn re uirements take the opportunity to review the ob.iectives, contents and status of the entire Code. However before even an amended (as distinct from recreated) Code can be produced, clients and the public at large must be made fully aware that architects' fees are freely negotiable. By 1st June 1978 therefore we recommend that the ARCUK, RIBA Codes, the RIBA Conditions of Engagement, Memorandum of ARE FREE SLVTTLE FEES WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE SCALE, AND AN ARCHITECT MAY A FEE IN WITH ARCHITECTS. There remains the tasks of bringing the above alteration to the notice of all relevant parties and 'mopping up t the copies of the Code and Conditions etc. already in service or in store with practitioners. The professional associations should place prominant advertisements in the principal technical journals and national newspapers stating the content and date of inception of the new arrangements, and inviting all who. -require them to send for copies of the B ticker for use on existing documents. A note on programme. As the Monopolies Commission Report made clear (parae 52 p. 18) the process of establishing the shortcomings of the existing architects' fee system has extended over more than a decade, After the ComissioRs clear recommendations it would be quite improper to allow the present system to prevail much longer. It has unfortunately already become cle however, that certain sections of the profession, whose i erests are well served by the present system, will wish to elay* implementation of the Monopolies Commission's reco ndations for as long as •possible — quite probably until th ikely forthcoming General Election when a change of polit• al climate may interrupt the whole train of the current disc sions. * For example the Reaistrar, Mr Fordor as written (ARCUK docum— ent 4/78 included in Appendix ) a a note to parae 4(b) of the letter from the Deputy Director Ce ral of the "This reflects parae 286 (vii) (b) of the Repo Note that both this provision and that in 4(a) would not b ut into operation until such time �as agreement has been reached between the 0 and the profession on changes that are to take place. 't This åns that no changes may take place until all changes are a d: which looks suspiciously like a recipe for (intentional) delay Also note Andrew Derbyshire's ar ent that the profession has a fighting chance of maintaining e mandatory fee scale — if it wants to, (A.J._ 25 Jan. 1978- 151 ) . It may be true that if the heads of all ostriches are ried in the sand the practice becomes invisible — but only to o er ostriches. We are therefore concerned that the new committee as later proposed should be appointed in May 1978 when the Office of Fair Trading reports to the Minister, in order that they may familiarize themslves with the situation and commence their tasks at the earliest opportunity ( 1st. June 1978, preftered). We would anticipate its being possible to produce a draft submission for discussion along the lines we propose by, or shortly after, the end of the year so that implementation of the Recommended Pee Scale System may take place by Easter 1979. In the interim, as the Monopolies Commission also made clear (parae 286 (vii)), the professional associations should meet their obligations to drop the mandatory element from the existing fee scales, and we trust that the Minister will take the necessary steps to ensure that this is done, directly the O. F. T. report back in May. Needless to say the same profess al lobby that is opposed to the Commissions overall find • s, may be expected to argue that the status quo must be ma • ined until the new committee produces the new Recommended Fee ystem. Such an interpretation clearly runs counter to the opolies Commission's proposals, and we have no doubt that the igter will give it short shrift. The Code : Running repairs AB confirmed above, the existing ARCUK Code, which makes application of the mandatory minimum fee obligatory for all registered persons, requires considerable modification in order to be compatable with the concept of negotiable and competitive fee charging. The follow— � Rule 2.6 In the light of the suggested re—wrat of rule 1.1. this rule can remain intact, since it only ref rs to those architects who receive a salary from their emplo erg. It docs not refer to those architects whose remuneration dependent on the maintenance of a fee scale, whether mandat or recommended. We regard retention o this rule as important, since it asserts the principle of re xprocity between employer and gnployee for the maintenance of t code of conduct. This is a principle which should be mai ined by all architects, whether principals or salaried. Principle 3 In our opinion the whole of this Principle needs re—thinking. The Principle itself clearly requires immediate revision since in a non—mandatory fee situation, in addition to ability and achieve— ment, an architect may also rely on his competitiveriess. Rule 3.1. The word "discount" should be deleted and the rule re—written as follows, "An architect shall not give commissions, gifts or other improper inducements for the introduction of clients or work. Rule 3.2. This rule is unnecessary and should be deleted since the commit— ment to apply the recogiised Conditions of Engagement •has already been made in Rule 1.1. Rule 3.3. We suggest this be amended to read, "Architects may work for any fee, or for no fee, as agreed with their clients. Our re—wording of 3.3. does not appear to affect the holding of architectural competitions. However, any regulations which it may be necessarsr to establish for the promotion and conduct of competitions should be drawn up by ARCUK and not imposed unilaterally by individual constituent parts of the Council. Rule This rule should be deleted. Improper attempts to secure a commission (i.e. the reprehensible ingredient of t supplanting') are prohibited in Rule 3.1. Rule 3.5. We suggest this be amended to read, "A principal in private practice, on being approached or instructed to proceed with work upon which he knows, or gan ascertain by reasonable inquiry, that another architect is or has been engaged by the same client, shall notify the fact to such architect. Likewise, a salaried architect, on being approached or instructed to proceed with work upon which he or she knows, or can ascertain by reasonable inquiry that another architect is or has been instructed to undertake by the same employers, shall notify the fact to such architect. Rule 3.6. We suggest this rule should be re—written as follows, "Architects shall not solicit either commissions or engagements for themselves or business for their clients or employers, but may make known their or their practice's availability or experience, including their proposed fee, by Riving information which in substance and in presentation is factual, relevant, and neither g nor creditable to the profession, response to a direct request. However it is evident from the discussions WI and ARCUK that the main anxiety occaisioned by the Commission' g recomnendations to drop mandatory minimum fees, is the possible outbreak of "fee—cutting" • If architects are to be permitted to rely also on the competitiveness as a means of advancement (see above under Principle 3.) , clearly they must also be permitted to include information about their proposed fee in the material that may be made available in response to direct requests. Hence the suggested revision to Rule 3.6. The anxiety about fee—cutting ste from wrongly connecting this ammendment with the assumption t architects are henceforward bound to know what fees are einR quoted by their competitors in answering requests to te er for prospective commissions. Even usually level—headed uarters of the architectural establishment apparantly believe most architect to be a fgarful squad of unscrupulous mafiosi at heart w are currently only constrained by the mandatory element of e old fee scale, ( 'What will happen to you if the fee scale go s? t A.J. Editorial, 15/2/78 p. 278) Leaving aside the polemical attractio to those opposed to change there can be little substance in ese arguments if architects are prevented from knowing de Is of fees being quoted by their competitors. The significanc of this simple principle vis—a—vis Rule 3.6. is that architec should be prohibited from quoting a fee for a prospective co ission prior knowledge of fees quoted by compet ors. We the following additional provision to the revised Rule 3.6. , as follows "An architect shall neither accept an invitation, nor proceed to quote a fee for a prospective commission in knowledge of quotations al read" offer—d or to be offered by another architect or architects. This re—draft is intended primarily to cover the interim period, after which the adoption of our main proposals for a revised fee scale system would introduce methods current rules governing selective tendering. in th ARCUK Council meeting, . F. T. , thou#l withheld from the course consider it necessary to question Section 2 We would not at present wish to dissent f m the view that the principle of professionalism should no be sacrificed. The fact, �however, that the views expressed the (RIBA dominated) ARCUK leade ship prompts the question whether their professionalism and the datory fee this submission and those of differ in all other respects minds the principle of scale are synon$mous Needless to say one of the central questions which architects wo d have to decide in the code debate urged above, ig whether the • profession was to be governed by the maxim of "caveat empt or "uberrimae fidei t'. Subsections (1), ( 2) , ( 3) We agree that the proposals of the independent ommittee should be realistic if they are to invite general a ption. However it does not follow that the professional ass iations should be represented on it, nor that the proposa s require anybody' g "stamp" of approval except the Minis r' s. Item and item 2(4) We likewise agree that the CUK was established by statute to function as a public terest body. The 500/0 non—architect feature of the Discip ne Committee, from which incidentally the Unattached represe atives have been excluded, and which the Chairman mentio with evident pride, alas hag no parallel in ARCUK Council tself, whére the overwhelming ma jority of representa ves of constituent bodies has effectively prevented ARCUK f ctioning as a public interest body since its inception. (A rief essay, t'ARCUK — The Sheep in Wolf f B Clothing", offering alternative history of ARCUK, is appended for the general interest of the O . F . T — Appendix Vil ) • n o tuation where competitive quotations are invited fo rofessional services, it is clearly essential that estimates are prepared on like bases to enable valid comparison to be ma by the given client. Standard clauses getting out the services an architect may provide are therefore to be prepared, in much the same manner as a standard building specification go that 1 e copies , with the relevant sections deleted, may be used for competitive fee quotation. I t emg and 5(c) would be covered in a separate d ent from item 5(b), are likewise analagous to the bui ding contract in which are Bet down the rights and duties of gig-xatorieg, and appended to which is normally a flysheet givin etails of the contract gum' (i.e. agreed fee), 'penalty clauses' (i.e. incentive agreement) etc. Thé detailed operation o$"hig system is explained further in the of preparing the Item 7 It is possible that the RIBA leadership is the section of t profession most familiar with the practice of 'touting' — In view of their recent vigorous campaign to alter Code Rule . and abandon restrictions on individual advertising. Th egistrar however now recommends (ARCUK ref 4/78 Annexe B parae 7 , 3.6, Appendix 11 ) that no change is called for an t has indeed to be admitted that "making one 'B practice's ilablity or experience known by giving information wh in substance and in presentation is factual, rel nt and neither misleading nor unfair to others nor d • creditable to the profession in response to a direct r uest. n has none o the onomatopoeiac disadvantages of the word "tout" . Item 8 The Office of ir Trading may wish to note that at a vote taken at ARCUK C cil on 15/3/78 to accept Annexe G Representatives of Unat ched Architects unanimously voted against. WAY AHEAD In this section of the report we address ourselves to the second task entailed in the Monopolies Commission t g Recommendation' s — that is the formulation of proposals for the establishment of an independent committee to determine new goal es of recommended charges . In the sense that we must now propose how this committee will shape the future method and scope of architects' pricing, as distinct from merely adjusting the current rules to erase the mandatory element of the existing fee system, this second task is clearly the more fundamental of the two. However before it is possible to propose membership, financing or even terms of reference of such a committee it is necessary to reconsider the failings of the existing fee system which have led to its rejection, and hence the essential requirements of any new one. Failure of the Existing Fee System The present fee scale had its origins in the eighteenth century when the principle of charging a percentage of construction cost for government work was first established. The figure commonly agreed was surprisingly close to the present norm considering the then restricted range of building types and the very different role of the architect. This principle has remainad althouæh the ad valorem percentaæes have been increased and numerous amendments have occured such that a criticism of som clients is that the appIication of the scales is now so complex s to render consist€pt interpretation very difficult.4 As the importance of the construction industry as a major elernent of the national economy has increased, and also doubtless owing to the fact that it is now the prime purchaser of the industry's products, the Government has for some time evidently felt that the way and the amount that architects are paid for their contri— bution to this vast commitment, is a matter too important to be decided by architects Of the many shortcomings of' the present fe n system that might be cited, the following are probably the most serious, The linkage between building costs and professional costs ig tenuous and in many cases simply false with the result that there iB no way of checking whether the public interest or even value for money is assured or not. The system is based on the t ad valorem t principle, which whether abused frequently or not, leaves only the inconsistent asset of competence to determine whether architects' in fact control costs. a...ecep4-e.e(Ü The degree of taper • g for larger jobs is clearly inadequate when judged alongside of overseas fee systems Other ræ.%en procedures are inadequate both in relation to rep&ition and in recognition of the technical contribution often ma e by corporate clients. The existing system is vulnerable to inflation, and never more BO than at present when the increased costs claimed under fluctuat— ing contracts add substantial unearned revenue for fee receivers at final account stage. The RIBA may attempt to justify such excesses by asserting that they balance out peaks and troughs, though such a claim — even if true — can be small comfort to those clients subsidisinR the troughs. Either way the inherent disadvantage client uncertainty as to his final fee outlay remains. The existing fee scale system was severe criticised by the N.B. P. I. in their report, 'Architec Costs and Fees' , •Cmnd. 3653, May 1968, which is paraphrased i some detail by the Monopolies Conmission (parase 58 - 62) . e O . F.T. will doubtless have noted the fact that the RI . suæeded in holding out against all the major N.B.P.I. re endations) . None of the criticisms mentione ave been satisfactorily resolved and we therefore consider i ime to dispose of the present anti— quated patchwork fee sy em and allow architects to demonstrate if they are able, that their claim to g • e a better service iB both real and worth rewarding accord to cost. Equally the us erg of such services must be enabled t commission one architect instead of another if the first can demons rate that an equal service can be provided more cheaply. It is our view that the way architects are paid should not only be in the public interest but be mnifestly seen to be so. We aim to show that the new fee system here proposed comes as close as is reasonably feasable to satisfy this hidi standard. Criteria of a satisfactory fee system It is proposed that the criteria of a satisfactory fee system should include the following, (i) It must be non—mandatory. (i i) It must enable the users of ar itects t services to ascertain whether they are getting value for money, and likewise enable the supplier to cover his costs and make a working profite It should prospective user of architects' services as to t the service will cost before a commission is placed. /KO.•J It should be simple to operate both from an architects and a clients point of view. It should be self—policing. (i.e. enable all affected parties to check that what is promised is what is provided.) It must not be vulnerable to out—dating by inflaGion, should not contain or refer to real monetary values. It should in nomal circumstances discourage the practice of ringing contracts (commissions) . It should lend itself to use as an office planning tool, and encourage the integration and co—operation of employer and employee. It should embrace the full range of variables that influence costs, namely building complexity, practice size and capacity, contract type etc. A new fee system to satisfy criteria. There are several fee systems which could be explored ae alterna— tives to the existing, thouül they tend towards two kinds depending on whether they are based on capital costs or service costs. Those in the former category are susceptible to the game criticisms affecting the present 'ad valorem t system. The principal features of the new system pro oged may be listed as follows, The system is based on the costs incurred by the suppliers of services. Costs are grouped under two headings — "labourtt and "overheads" while a third element — "profit" represents what will hereafter be termed" the fee". The three elements may together be referred to as "the price", but are expressed separately in a standard form of fee quotation. Labour cos s are expressed in terms o time, a concept which is dicussed more fully below. Time is related to the complexity of the given project which is itself a function of a number of variables — building type, floor area, degree of (sub— divided into buildings, elements, assemblies and components e) , type of contract, stage in the programme of work, and degree of consul tant involvement. The computation of the variables iB expressed as a "complexity quotient". (This will be illus trated in detail in Appendix I ) . Overhead costs are a matter for investigate further but clearly it ranges of typical orders of cost may ascertain whether that portion otherwise. the independent committee to will be possible to determine such that the prospective client of his outlay is normal or Profits or fees are expressed separately, revenue and surplus, and obviously along with overheads will be the main area in which competitiveness will be manifested. we.-ee-.fZ.4..e F. Architects may quote in competition for a prospec i ve comnission in response to direct requests provided they have no Imowledge of the quotations to be presented by their competitors. Once a comm— ission has been awarded, details of the successf tenderer t may be announced. This practice assists the self—policing function ag employeeg In the engaged firm may be satisfied that their contribution to the service provided is rewarded at the levels promised in the quotation. These points may be embodied in a revised Code as discussed earlier. It is immedietely clear that the above features have much in common with the methods by which building contractors prepare and present their quotation for construction projects — a system with which the architectural profession ig of course entirely familiar. The conspicuous feature of the old scale of charges which fails to meet criterion (ii) — the need to demonstrate whether value for money is being obtained — is the basing of fees on a percentage of construction costs. It is the bland application of a percentage figure to the capital budget which hag inter—alia led the Monopolies Commission to doubt whether the existing fee scale operates in the public interest. The inherent difficulty of relating principals' profits to overall fee reve%nue has been hiül— Iiälted throughout the entire history of Government negotiations, by the old Interdepartmental Cormittee on Professional Fees of the mid 1960s, the N.B. P. I. and the Monopolies Commission itself (Report, parae 52 ff. & para 15.) . It must be appreciated by all parties involired in the current discussions that this difficulty can never be solved providing the existing ad valorem t system is retained. In other words the independent committee cannot begin to perform a useful task unless the new price charging system has been accepted. It is for this reason that the new stem — a prerequisite for any real advance from the prese position — takes as its starting point the principle that an chitect'B price is related to his costs, �/ Eis a social concept dependent on place and time Its definition iB elusive and open to debate, yet its achievement has been the central concem of architectural practice for centuries. It is the promise of quality in aesthetic and technical performance which is the basis of the architects' bargain with society. quantity of time taken to achieve quality in a given piece of wörk will vary from individual to individual what is beyond doubt is i, the fact that there will exist a minimum time. If less than this is expended, loss of quality follows. Average times may therefore be calculated for different complexities of work. office anninr may be extended by harnessing the diverse hurna.n resources of most practices to the variety of tasks a prospective com-mission offers and pricing accordingly. This is not to say that tiine spent guarantees quality, but that quality can only be diieved when a certain amount of labour has been exoended on the product. Time spent may be said to be the only reasonable means whereby the conditions Imder which quality can be achieved can be quantified. In a service industry such as the supply of archotects services time is the quality element in any pricing system. the three components described above. Hence in future a clie Tho has inv#ed competitive price quotations may know how mu he will pay for the service, how much for the overheads enta• d in providing it and how much is prof— essional profit. Such a system will reflect the essential value of the professional service, by basing an architect's price not on the clients costs, but on his own costs. Criterion (iii) iB simply satisfied, the first part by the normal legal requirement of contract that an offer to perform services for a price has been mutually agreed an advance, a.nd that a tenderer agrees to stand by his price. Criteria (iv), (vi), and (xi) will be satisfied by the manner in which the independent committee presents its material. Criterion (vii) may be seen to be fulfilled by ana10ör to existing codes of procedure on selective tendering. Herex it is widely recog•aised to be in the client's interests not to inform comp— etitors of each others identity in order to prevent 'ringing' of the contract. Other expedients such as inviting non—local quotations are also in common use. The practice of architects themselves tempting to ring comm— issiong may be frustrated by such pedients, and as a residual safeguard by a new Code provi one As habitually fastidious supervisors of the tende g procedure governing contractors however, it seems un ely that architects will immedietely forsake these well tried res in their own field. The remaining criterion, (viii) on which further comment may be useful, refers to the use of the new pricing scales as an office planning tool. This iB encouraged by the nature of the costing system which bases labour costs on the function of time. One of the fundamental arguments for a price system bag is that it brings to the fore front the relati broader basis. This may be described as comprising consurner interests, the interests of workers within the relevant industries, and those of the electorate ag a The Comnission considered it necessary to recommend specifically that architects— (by which we infer the subjects of their invest— igation, namely the fee paid principals), and users of architects' services (i.e. clients, as distinct from users of the products of their work, building users), to recommend that these parties were not represented on the independent committee. ( M.C. Report: 281 & parae 283) • � bodies as the Consumers Association, National Federation of Tenants and Residents Associations, NFHA, a representative of the Office of Fair Trading on behalf of the Govemment; the Building Industry (but excluding professional interests, owners of firms and emplo e and salaried technical and administrative staff in t e desiga industry At least one member of the committee should xcial of a trade union. 7 e basis of the pricing sy tem as proposed above should b confirmed by the Office o Fair Trading in advance of the independent cormnittee'.s ception, in order to enable the empirical tasks of gat ring statistical material to be identifie without delay. By t s establishing the new system as one of th guiding terms of re erence the O. F. T. will save the committee andcompl exi ties. The new conmi ee, drawn from t se groups we have outlined above will perforce be appointed di ctly by the Government as recomm— ended by the Monopolies Co • Ission (M.C. Report, parae 283 & 286 (vi)) In principle we have some misgivings about form of appointment 4.4 on the grounds that governments have frequently failed in like exercises of appointing Royal Commissions, by selecting represe— ntatives insufficiently diverse in experience and background. The Office of Fair Trading may wish to consider as a generally successful example the appointments made in establi— shing the Price Commission — which included for instance house— wife's representatives. agency. As indicated in our explanat• n of the proposed new fee system, it will determine ran s of time ,generally applicable in the provision of all catego es of architects' services, comp— arative indices of office ov heads and guidelines as to the relative levels of worki plflt, in the appropiate sectors of the desi&l service in try. Further illustration of tasks entailed in determining the rst and most distinctive of these three elements is inc ed in Appendix I. The bulk of the actual research involved ould be carried out by the Office of Manpower Economics, e role of the committee itself being to supervise the rese ch, liase and consult with external parties including rep entativeg of ligers of services and the professional associ Ions. Advice whiéh the latter might us efully contribute wo include views on presentation technique 91 ikely exte of any non—observance and — in the case of the profession — guidance on the form of any new Code provisions arising out of t nature of the new recommended scales. A Note on Financing The public has already been put to onsiderable expense through government investigations to e mine whether or not their interest has been prejudice In similar cicumstances in a court of law, the unsuccessful itigant would be required to pay costs. The profession should therefore ontribute some or all of the cost of financing the new commit e both as recompense, and as earnest of good intentions. Clea y this should be in the form of a levy on principals in priva practice — who as the fee receivers, have been shown to be off ding the public interest. The form of the levy is open to di sgion, but as an initial suggestion the O • F. T. may care consider a levy at 0.1% of fee tumover per annum raise from principals' profit revenue affecting all practices e loying ten or more persons and excepting offices wit an annual turnover of less than €50,000. In conclus ion of the main t t of this report we would refer readers again to the s ry of proposals on pages 6 and 7. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource JA/DR Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15.3.78 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/e9295a20acb175a49b97dd161ffd0ad0.pdf 3ac3103298559f52e4baeea7d7407a94 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Next Step Subject The topic of the resource 6 pp. part of larger (missing) document re. fee scales, with proposal for lay-controlled ARCUK Description An account of the resource 2. THE NEXT STEP The Comnission's recomendations are unequivocal and demand immediate action. The Minister, Mr Roy Hattersley, has already asked Mr Gordon Borrie, the Director of Fair Trading, to discuss with those bodies now required to change their rules how to give effect to the Cornmission'B proposals. The first priority is to ensure that in devising the new system for the payment of architects all constituencies within the profession, and not just the discredited RIBA, are properly represented. This clearly means that the professional focus must now shift to ARCUK, the true 'parliament' in the government of the profession. Likewise, the argument for the mandatory fee scale being now entirely discredited, attention must move forward to consider our opposing viewpoint out of which will be created a new fee system. The honorary officers of ARCUK, all of whom belong to the dominant constituent body (RIBA), and acting without authority of ARCUk Council, have seen fit to issue (at great cost) a statel lent to all registered architects — which in effect supports the RIBA t s rearguard action to discredit the Report. We urgently hope that nobody will be deceived into seeing this as a proper or democratic action. Many observers may still be unaware that ARCUK has already established a sub—committee of Professional Purposes to review the Code following the advertising debacle. A motion put forward by the Unattached representatives that this conmittee should contain lay—representation was, alas, defeated. Now that the terms of this corrmittee are widened immeasurably by the monopolies issue, it is even more vital that its composition reflects our recommendations . The Comnission, aware of the RIBA's dominance of ARCUK, has suggested that an independent agency be established, (para 286, vi) cons iB ting of a small number of government appointees. '(hi1st agreeing with the Commission's feeling that the profession cannot now be left to concoct its own new fee system (para 281), we find the above proposal insufficient because it misses the opportunity of establishing a new and equitable 'parliament' with majority lay—representation and reviewing all aspects of professional services, which would have placed the present enquiry into its proper context. We are convinced that an equal if not majority representation of lay—members is needed if this process is not simply to become another group of professionals legitimising their own interests. It would be patently absurd for the public now to be denied a presence in a body supposedly to set up to procure and protect their interest. We believe that the draft proposals for a reconstituted ARCUK published in November 1976 by NAM North London Group in its Private Practice Report and appended hereto, would provide a suitable starting point to this debate. The essentials, however, are clear. Prom now on it will not suffice for architects to assure the public that their promise' will be kept. The public must manifestly see it to be so. 3. EXTRACTS FROM THE MONOPOLIES COhff1SSION REPORT i) Chapter Seven : The views of bodies representing architects 214: The New Architecture Movement does not support the RIBA t s case, and therefore submitted its own arguments independently. [ihe substance of the Movement' g case iB that the current goale fee system is not an essential ingredient of the provision of architectural services, but is a market device procuring unilateral benefits to architects. Th e Movement criticises arnurnents and statistics supporting the RIBA's case, and considers that the public interest is severely prejudiced by the fee scale's mandatory B to tug . It proposes changes to the system based on a t descending hierarchy of priorities' as follows : abandonment of the mandatory minimum fee scale entirely: retention of the fee scale on a recommended basis: retention of the RBndatory fee scale, but with the establishement of a pemanent independent agency to review the levels of the scale; such agency to include at least 50 per cent non—professional representation. Chapter Eight, IV : Recommendations 286: (i) The requirement of the ARCUK Code of Professional Conduct that an architect shall not contract with his client except on the basis of Conditions of mgagement and a scale of charges published by one of its constituent bodies should be abolished. The rules of ARCUK should be amended so as to permit an architect fræly to quote a fee in competition with other architects and so as not to prevent competition for business on the basis of fees. The RIBA and other associations of architects (and associa— tions of architects and members of other professions) should cease to require architects to comply with scales of charges for the supply of architects' services. The rules of the RIBA and other associations of architects (and the rules of associations of architects and members of other professions) should be amended so as to pemit an architect feely to quote a fee in competition with other architects and so as not to prevent competition for business on the basis of fees. (v) The publication by the RIBA and other associations of architects (and associationg of architects and members of other professions) of scales of charges for architects' Bervices should be pemitted provided that: they are not mandatory; they have been deterrnined by an independent committee; and all documents in which the scales are published state prominently that the scales are not binding in relation to any particular transaction, that architects and clients are free to settle fees without reference to the scales and that an architect may quote a fee in competition with other architects. ( vi) The cornmittee referred to in recommendation (v) should consist of a chaiman and three or four members appointed by the Govemment on a personal basis and not as representatives of architects or clients. The same committee miült conveniently perform similar duties in relation to recommended scales of charges for surveyors' services to the extent recommended in our report on the supply of surveyors' services, (vii) Until the independent com•tittee which we recomend has been set up and has had time to determine scales, the publication of the existing scales by the RIBA and other architects' associations (and associations of architects and members of other professions) should be permitted provided that: the scales are not mandatory; and all documents in which the scales are published state prominently that the scales are not binding in relation to any particular transaction, that architects and clients are free to settle fees without refemce to the scales and that an architect may quote a fee in competition with other architects. APPENDIX Draft Proposal for a more Representative, Lay-Controlled ARCUK Assuming 60 members of ARCUK, should represent the "profession" end 55%, the "lay" public. D? the 27 architectural representatives, 2 should be chosen by students of architecture and 3 elected by architectural technicians and assistants. The remaining 24 should be elected by registered architects. Each of the four groups of architects listed below would be apportioned seats on ARCUK in direct relation to its share of the total number of architects. Each group would then directly elect the required number of representatives from among its own number. The four groups are, architects who employ three or more people, other self-employed architects, salaried architectural management: chief architects and their deputies in public practice and private industry and architects with positions of a comparable level in architectural research, education, etc., architectural workers: all other salaried or unemployed architects. The "lay" contingent would be open only to anyone not eligible to be elected to the "architectural" group. Of these 33, 14 should be trade unionists nominated by the T.U.C. No more than half of the 14 should be union officials. At least 4 of the 14, likewise split into officials and "lay" trade unionists, should be from the construction industry. The other 19 lay members, for lack of e better system, could be nominated by the Secretary of State for the Environment, as follows: 1 . Five of these should be elected politicians, including two m. p. t s and three local councillors. Of the three locals, one should be from the GLC or a London borough, one from another urban county, and onn from a rural county. Atleest one of these three should be from Scotland and another from Ida les, unless ARCUK is to be devolved into ARCE, ARCS, and ARCW. Two ghoul d be chosen from tenants' associations. Two should be chosen from self-managed housing associations. Two should be chosen from voluntary associations. Two should be chosen from industrial and trade (employers) associatione. Two Should bp chosen from among building control officers, district sur— vevors and public health officers. 7. Four should be chosen from other professions (e. Q. , engineering, law, medicine, planninq and surveying), giving preference to those profession. not already represented. These 19 should be nominated after the other 41 have been selected and accordinq to the f n l ] owinn conditions. The 19 nominations must he used to redr ø se the balanr.e in the total council of 60 to ensure, as far as possible, 1 1 that. the followinq groups are not under—repreeentgd on the Council in proportion to their percentage of the population of Britain: 1 . women, (non-management) employees, and people under the age of 45. Although all this mey seem complicated, the principles are simple: lay control of the profession and a Council as democratically—representative as possible of the various interest groups within the profession and within society as a whole. ARCIJK t s education and admissions committees should be constituted to agous princirl n s. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource JA/DR Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/550de2f492bcf3eaf63a6e8879bd0765.pdf 5e5f87a49757334049c4d36796beb9b5 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Clean Up ! Subject The topic of the resource 40 pp. Report to ARCUK on improper constitution of the Council Description An account of the resource How seats on AKCUK should be properly apjo:1 tioned in accordance with the architects kKegistration Act 1951 The Architects kegistration Act 1951 requires the Council to be constituted in accordance with the First Schedule of that act. The ScbhBaule provides for appointment of members by various bodies and Gov't. winisters as well as for the direct election by architects of architect members. There is no explanation of the intention of the constitution, no systematic approach. The members may, however, be broken down into 5 groups: (1) Those appointed by the Councils of a number of named organisations presurea to have architect members, in propoition oi one appointee ior every 500 (or part thereof) ot some kinds of their architect members. Appointees may, but need not, be architects. See Par. 1 (i-vi) subject to: 5a-e); (2) Those elected by sone architects not considered by the Act to be some kinds of architeet members of the above organisations, again on a 1:5U00 basis. Those elected must be architects. See Par..1 (vii) subject to 5 (a-c). (S) One member appointed by the Council of another organ- isation of architects, who may, but need not, be an architect. See Par, 4 Gili ).. (4) Five members in total appoi:ntea by various Gov't. entities, who may, but neea not, be architects. See Par. -Cix). (S) Une member appointed by the Council of each of 7 organisations connected with the building industry, who way not be architects. See Par.2. [Doe.18] Although seats eaKhuen NyTp toe > appear to be on a basis of 1 seat per 50U people, the Act clearly does not establish a consistent system of 500 architects = i AkGUK wember. Note for example that: ka} as below, some architects are not to be represented (a) (b), some architects are to be represented more than others (c)(d), only some architects must he represented by architects (c), and some architects are to be uirectly they are nmenbers (f). (e) The "anomaly" of (3) above. represented and not represeited by the body(s) of which (a) Account is to be taken only of "fellows, associates & licentiates" of the bodies citea (ii) but no such gualitication in Par 1(i) and appiies to the bodies (b) Account is not to be taken body cited in Par l(iv) but no applies to the bodies cited in (c) Architect members of more than cited in (i-v) are taken account of which they are members. (According figures as of 31-i0-7S, there are architects reckoned for the purposes be members of the boaies citeu totals ada up to 22196, thus 792 (d) Honorary, corresponding or bodies citeu in (i-v})kuxxKBK are of under (vii) and not under (i-vi). although ARCUK's Regs. refer to account of under (vii) as "unattached", be members of one of the hodies of stuaent members of the such qualification (iii) (v) and (vi). one of the bodies of in all the bodies to ARCUK'S 21406 individual oi the Act to in (i-V), but seperate multiple memberships.) retired members of the to be taken account Par 3(c). E.G.» those architects taken they may well cited in (i-vi). (£)The.varyingqualiiicationsiorSpmeiie architect or not under (1) (2) and (3) above. (g) Only architects ordinarily resident in the UK are to be taken account of although the appointing -Councils of the bodies cited in kar 1 (i-vi) pre- sumably represent architects resiuent abroad as well as non-architects, it may be of interest to note that the wording, and thus the meaning, on the ofiicial notice calling for nominations sent out to "unattached" architects by AkCUK departs trom the Schedule in some ways. E.g., the Schedule under Parl(i) and (ii) states “...architect members... being fellows, associates or licentiates," white the Notice reads "Corporate embers (including fellows, associates and licentiates)." The notice ces makes no distinction between the bodies cited in (i-vi) regarding (a) ana (b) aiscussed above. (see attached documents) it shouid also be noted that the Act definitely gives no special importance to any Councillors as opposed to- any “others: -Alt-ere-equal.The model-ofARCUK's constitution aspropounded by the kIBA---and even AKCUK (see "Composition" on p.3% of peach-coloured AKCUK info. booklet published larch 1976, attached, and note total absence of elected Councillors. See also "adverts" on p.24-25.)---is that ARCUK is composed of architectural "constituent bodies" (a term of ever-changing meaning which appears nowhere in the Act or hegs) of which the RIDA 1s “the leading constituent body’ -(see p.15, trait AKCUK Annual Keport for 1979-80) if not the only one of any Signilticance. (Note that despite AkCUK kegs lo and 14, menbers oi AKCUK appointed under Far.1(ix) and 2 are never Wo 35] electea te the Council's important Finance & General Purposes ana Frofessional Purposes Com ittees.) When the Council was iirst constitutea in harch 1932, of 42 menbers there were 12 appointed by the KIBA, 15 by other "arch." bogies, 5 “representing unattached architects," 5 appointed by gov't. and 7 appointed by other construction industry organisations. (see attached). By March 1940, by which time the 1936 Act had made regis- tration mandatory for architects, the figures had changed to 15 RIBA, 15 other “arch.” hodies, 2 7 “unattached"TM, with the remaining unchanged. (see attached). The only ways in which the Act appears to treat one architect differently from another are (1)that any arch. i who is a member of any boby reierreu to in the Schedule (not merely oi the so-callea "arch. constituent bodies") nay have a member oi that body apvoiuteu to a viscipline Comiittee of AKCUK hearing a case oi "disgracetul conduct" against him or her and (2)that those for the purposes of the First Schedule to be menbers of one: of: the bodies referrred to-in Par.) (i-vi): may eleet members of AkCUK. Finally. it should be noted that in no way does _the Act suggest that AKCUK should be composed largely of itects. archs. not considered [Dv 36 architects, should be controlied by organisations with architect menbers, or shoulda serve the interests of arch- How AiCUK is improperly constituted (1) than called for by the Archs. Keg. Act 19351. wembers of that Institute, being fellows, associates or licentiates thereof." (our underlining) “About ten years ago the kIBA amenaeda its hoyal Charter (with brivy Council approval) to create a single class of “Corporate Member" ( a tern not found in the AGt) and eliminated all "fellows, associates and licentiates." Although the Act seems clear that only architect members of the KIBA who are fellows, associates ofr licentiates shoulu be taken account of under Par.1 (i), ARCUK, igncring the change in the kiba's Charter, takes account of architect members oi the KkibA under Par.1(i) who are not fellows, associates or licentiates. it should be noted that at-a similar -time, the -RIBA also amended its Charter to eliminate the class of ketired Members. ketired members Since then have been classed as "Corporate Members". (Figures supplied by the kIBA to an kIbA member contirn that the KhIBsa now has between 1000 and 1500 such retired members classed as Corp. members who pay reduced sunscriptions because they are retired.) Although the Act is very clear that Ketired Members are not to be considerea as architect members of the FIRA but should be taken account of under Par.1(vii) as "unattached" architects, AKCUK has ceasea to do this since the change XK 7 The electea Councillors believe that AkCUK is allowing the xx&@WK RIBA Council to appoint more members of AKCUK (LL) ~. The First Schedule, Par. 1(1), of the 1941 Act proviaces tor AkCUK to include "one member appointed by the Council of the RIBA in respect of every 500 architect ee in the kiBA's Charter. : Et may also be noted Peat although the Nat. Ped. of Building Traues Operatives (nore recently known as the Nat. Fed. of Construction Unions) is entitlea to appoint a Council member under Par.2, since it dissolved (although its member unions still exist) its seat has remained vacant, Annual Keports of AkCUK indicating "Not entitled to nominate" rather than “not nominating.” The elected Councillors believe, thereiore, that according to the Act, (1) The RIBA Council has at present no right to appoint any AkCUK Councillors (and should not have been allowed to do so since it changed its Charter to elininate feliows, associates anu licentiates). (2) Those architect members ot the kiba who are ordinarily resident ip the UK aud who are ueened not to be architect members of kIBA because they are honorary, cori esponding or retired members—-and only these--should be taken account of by AKCUK under Par 1(vii) and be "represen- tea" accordingly as "unattached" architects, (vi) and (vii) excludes trom reckoning members ot the kIBA, not merely those who associates or licentiates eit iee. oi course proviso in Par 3 (¢)). (3) The Act should be applied to Par 1] (ii-vi), other organisations with architect menbers, in the same way as it should be appliea to (4) Assuming that ii the K1BA were not the kIBA. alloweu to appoint meubers of AkCUK as per (1) above appropriate changes in its Charter it would nake to make such as Par.1] all architect are lellows, to the covering appointments again legal, action should also be taken Dacs. SbF to insure that at that time seats on ARCUK are appor- tioned strictly in accordance with the act. There is good reason to believe that AKCUK at present considers as members of the KIBA many archs. who are not RIBA menbers and considers as "unattached" fewer architects than required,. The consequence o1 this is that there would still be more kIBA-appointed Councillors than called for by the Act and too few "unattached". The evidence tor be- lieving this is presenteu below, JI-Jil-IV. [2.34] { How AkCUK is improperly constituted (11) Implications of survey responses In response to a questionaire published in the Architects Journal of 30-1-80 (see attached), 28 (that is, 25%) of the 112 architects who said they were "unattached" and answered the question whether or not they had received official nomination papers from ARKCUK (as all "unattached" architects should) said they had not. (Obviously, 112 architects responding is a small sample of the presunably over 5000 unattached. There is no leason on the tace of it to believe, however, that the sample is necessarily biased regarding the giestion.) : Of these 28, 16 gave their names on the questionaire and the elected councillors have checkea their staterents against AhCUK records. Oi these .16, ALCUK records showed 6 claimed by one o r more oi the bouies cited in First Schedule, Farl (i-v) including 5 claimed by the kIBA. Three were claimed by no body but were not included in the unattached total (!). Une was listea as unattached but was not shown on the list oi unattached voters It has not yet been possible to ascertain whether he has been incluaed in the total oi unattachea usea tioning seats on AKCUK. The other 6 are as being unattached (presumably a postal problen). Thus, ot 16 traceable, 9 or 10 can be considered confirmed not heing considered by ARCUK as unattached, a confirmation rate of 60%. Applying this rate to the total said they had not received papers, suggests tor appor- indicatea by AkCUK of 2& who that t6.6 Of Ci): as the 28 might be confirmed, e.g. 15% of the xXx 112 responding. This implies that rather than there being now 4381 "un- attached" archs. as clainea by AKCUK, there may really be775nore, or5154. NL18 43%| - Atthesanetime,otKheigite traceable, 9 were attributed to the RIBA, a confirmation rate of 31.25%. Applying this rate to the 28 ot 112 who said they had not received papers suggests that 8.75 might be confirmed. Thus, ARCUK may be attributing &.75 to kIBA for each 16.8 it may be wrongfully denying the "unattached." This implies that rather than there being 20090 RIBA nembers on the kegister (for lst Schedule purposes), there are only 19719. The implications for the apportionment of seats on ARCUR Of this alone ts that 2b, 10t- 9, ee should be elected and 40, not 41, appointed by the RIBA. It should be noted that the kegistrar oi aiCUK has pointed out that 406 ou. ine 4381 Supposedly sent nomination papers in Nov.'79 returned them (as requested on the form) because they were menbers of one oi the relevant boaies and were thus mistakenly considerd unattached. Assuming that AKCUK considerea then only 4315 (allowing for 66 mistakes) as unattached, the above figures would be nodified to 5076 unattached, 19790 KIBA. No change in inplications lor seats on AkCUK. It should also be noted that in addition to those responding to this questionaire, ciliors know personally architects some of the elected coun- who claim they resigned from the kIBA several years ago by ArCUK as kIBA. They also occasionally who say AKCUK regards then as never been members oi the kiba. (One case is David Heath, a ana are still classified meet architects KIBA althoush they have an [e.6] \ still regarded as hIBA by AKCUK even though he has never been a KibA member and has written.expressly to AkCUK to Say so apa to ask to be properly consiuerea as "unattached". ) The tegen included here ot people wrongly classi- fied by ARCUK could include some of the architects who eae peer expelled by the KIBA, or resigned, after the Oct. 31 ARCUK "cut-off" but before the jan/Feb 1980 Survey date. See(Id) for how KIBA uses Regs. loophole by admitting and reinstating members just before 31 Oct. and expélling members just after. The figures would not include people who still considerea themseives K1BA wenbers, aespite not having paid their subscriptions, perhaps for several years, because they had not bee expelled by the KIBa. See CZF) (WV) How AkKCUK is improperly constitutea (111) Use of AkCUK Regs. "loophole" by kIBA (Gct.31 date) One reason why the RIBA Council has been allowed by AKkCUK to appoint more members than the Act calls for is that the Regs. of ARCUK (made under Sec 13 of Act, by kh1iBA-controlled AkCUK, with Frivy Council approval) call jor the membership submitteu to AkCUK to be that on a Single day only, 51 GUctober annually. the k1BA Council conveniently admits new members ana reinstates ex-members annually just before that date but expells members annually just after that date. Thus, once a year’:at Oct.d1 the nembership ot the RIBA for AKCUK purposes is higher than during the rest of the year. For the past three or four years these expulsions have averaged about 750 per year. As about 76.3% of the RKIBA's corporate membership is consiuered by AKCUK to be architects resident in the UK, one may assume that of those 750, x 76.5% or 570, are credited by ARCUK to RIBA. The figure which AnCUK uses to apportion seats for appointment by the kI#A Council thus ought to be 19520, not 20090, on this assumption alone. Fresumably twost (95%, or 545) otf these 570 should be adaed to the total ot those considered by AKCUK to be “unattached," with the retsinder still members appoint members of AKCUK under the kIBA Council considered that employed this device. Apparently, it had by error not the "true" menbership i ot another body enabled to Ist Schedule, Par 1 (ii-v). It was pointed out by the kegistrar that in 1977 was thus for once reported to ARCUK. AKCUK's figures for the "unattached" reflect this: in 1975, 2757; in 1976, $128; in, 197%, AL205. in 1978... 40h, 2 3§ 4) 8Lin) «taBe re ke wydey -sbey, oulyenyory)LeRe Evens ralag : ASAA ory “Ay NGYvy IDs es. 4-42| [Doe 33] |Die 38) coc. 38] How AkKCUK is improperly constituted (IV) ARKCUK purposes?: the question of RIBA arrears. / bDocunent @) When does an RIBA member cease to be a member for Having heard continued stories of architect members of the RIBA resident in the UK who had not been expelled by the RIBA despite long subscription arrears, the elected councillors were also struck by what appeared to be an annual discrepancy between the number of corp- orate members claimed by the RIBA and the subscription inconie actually received from those menbers. According to the RIBA's treasurer, this apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that many RIBA members pay subs at reduced rates, thus accounting for the apparent Shortfall in subs income (compared to the total to be expected if all corporate members paid full sub). In recent years this apparent discrepancy has been the equivalent of 550U members (approx.) not paying any sub out ot a total ot 26500 if the remainder paid full sub. It is difficult to find out the numbers of menbers at full and reduced subs and in arrears. KIBA refuses to give such info to non-members and even members have found it so far inpossible to secure the info from the RIBA. From seme figures recently supplied by the RIBA to a member, account can be taken ot those who pay reduced subs and the apparent discrepancy described above brought down to a more realistic figure. kIBA full sub for 1979 was £50. An assumed apparent discrepancy of 5500 menbers (it was 5811] in 1978) would account for a shorttali of £275,000. 4275 ,000 -{63925 =4191,075 still to account for It is known, however, that ot the RIBA's approx. 5500 overseas corporate members (5522 in 1978), those in KEC countries are expected to pay tull sub and all others, half. we have not been able to obtain a breakdown into these categories from the kIBA, but examination of several pages selected at randow trom the kIlbA Directory of Members suggests that roughly 9 (say, 500) are from other EEC countries, principally Hire. An examination of RIBA membership figures at the time (1970-71) when Eire members ceased to be shown in RiBA's UK figure and began to be shown in the overseas figure confirms this estimate. Thus another 5000 nenbers must be reckoned at a reduction of £25, accounting ror £125,000. £191,075 (from above) -{125,000 =£66,075 still unaccounted for. This could be accounted for if 1322 members on full sub were completely in arrears, e.g. haa not paid any of 1979 sub. But members at full sub are expecteu to account for only 82.6% of the total expected sub incone. So it is really more likely that there are 1601 members in arrears, if arrears are assumed spread evenly among all members regard- XESS is: 333 newly-qualitiea members © reduction 1026-—" : 2 . 53 "semi-retired" overseas members & " 219 retired menbers © of 25.00 = 8325 12.50 =12825 39.50 = 2094 39.00 = 8601 43.20 = 39850 25.00 = 12200 922 "fully retired" 488 "semi-retired" " - . {83925 less of sub level they are on. li these arrears are then distributed proportionally among those KIBA nembers on the Kegister of Avchivects and resident in the UK (76.3% of total), and those who are not, one can assume that 1222 are people whom ARCUK counts as RIBA members for the purpose of apportioning seats on AKCUK. However, it is probably correct to assume to assume that this figure should be higher, for two reasons: (1) It can be assumed that a higher percentage of the people being kept on as members despite arrears are on the Register and resident in the UK since the RIBA has little to gain by keeping others on as “mewbers." (2) Fresunably, some people have paid Sone part ot their sub, so the total number of people in arrears must be increased to account for the same shortfall in income. s we think it safe to assume that of the architects whom ARCUK presently counts as hiBA members for the purpose of apportioning seats on AkCUK, approx. 1500 ot 20090 are in arrears and that the great najority of these, 9540 or 1425 (since less than 5y of hIBA menbers so counted by AkCUK are also members of one, of the. other bodies mentioned in the Ist Scheaule, par 1 (i-v}), should be consiuered as "unattached." li this were done, on these grounds alone the kIBA Council shoula get 38 (not 41) seats on AKCUK and 12 (not9) councillors should be elected. It is possible that there may be another explanation for the discrepancy in the RIBA's membership and sub income described above. It could not, however, be fully accounted > for by short term (one year) arrears, since tre sub income from members in arrears one year would be largely compensated for by nenbers paying off their arrears of the previous year. There seems to us to be only two logical conclusions: (1) as described above, that there are tiany members in long-term arrears who never pay off their arrears, e.g., "terminal" arrears, or (2) the number of people in short-term arrears is already very large and is growing at an ever-increasing rate so that those paying off their arréars can never make up for the ever larger numbers just going into arrears. This seens inplausible. The — stehstical Up lication ot ola ee (Youments d-F+« Pecunent (So “How PRREUK. teprepeesy Comrie ”) A. “netached “architects |. Totat according PARCULK 31-10-74 = 4331 subsequerilly av trmad 0sshadud” byROK =45. ) 43264 1336 2, (Lb Assuming Actws %aneoteyeesPesociales EST. REAL yeTAL “ANATTACHED = F326 heeatihes=Lop.Ee butL164 “retired”tual ac ‘unattached” OF3!uUKassumeYeomRagu =565 | :(IZ)Adda ane (TH) Add because () Regs:Pop “SYS Deduct est.240 for -249 “entra “ as {OOo +3[0 +595 EEA elves A (2030 | Z44O THIS SUGGESTS “UNatAcHED " SHouLD BE ENTITLED To 15" CouNciLrees PRESENTLY AADC ATED, ) ELECT (NOT 4 AS ae seatsonCU. l,Toteswal abl AROUK 3(-10574= 22090 assumed Su cnuftrmad BRiBA b MCU tO ZO\e = a(2) ae prenous 3, (fe)? un e 545 -300 fee eo oe 870 Deduct est. [Fofe- ~Ito ‘werlap”ofTactIl Foo|-.Foo . (1) Subbeef oh tn GnneaxS ~/$500 | suetereyr 2765 2 16s, Esy, REAL yetac “Bie” = 17365 AUS CATED) B. RIGAMeunberthfotrs5 = THiS SUGGETS ARCKK SH8ULO APCPORTION 35 SEATS APPOINTMENT BY The RIGA Fee CounvcAL.. (NOT 4) AS PRESENTLY [Poe. 13] impartial body to administer the apportionment of seats PoARCUK,PARCUKjiselfrapes+itapdomay+hecontroddeaby why is AkCUK not properly constitutea? Four possible reasons. (1) There is no outside agency to insure that AkCUK really is the ARCUK aescribed in the First Schedule of the 1951 Act. No person or body is held responsiblfoer so ensuring. ARCUK, under Sec 15(1)(f) may make kegs. "generally for carrying out the purposes of this Act," but apparently is not obliged to. It should be noted in passing, however, that the ist Schedule did provide for such a responsible agency for the first constitution oi the Council (the Secretary of State and a committee appointed by him), and that kegs. made by ARCUK must be approved by the Privy Council and that "any person aggrieved by the kemoval of his name appeal to the High Court "order shall be final." (Sec 9). (2) The Regs. (43-45) prescribe the manner Ist Schedule Par l(vii) seats on AKCUK are apportioned AGt or may even tena fai In a nunber of ways, follow the Schedule definition of “unattached"TM (b) The use of one day determining the relevant provides a loophole properly implemented. preventing the ist Schedule (see IIT) fron being (c) The kegs do not proviae for an outside and from the ees acepslceke. or Court ot Session, may whose made by ARCUK under of the election of members are not adeguate to in accordance with the to prevent their being hegs 45-45 do not strictly (eg, compare Par 3(b) in Keg 45). and(c) to as a reference point members of various organisations the Act to under insure that so apportioned. for those with a vested interest in the outcome oi the apportioument--i.e., their control of sAhCUR. (d) In oraer to determine the numbers. of "unattached" archs. and elected councillors---and, in practice but not according to any keg., coincidentally the number of ee Councillors to be appointed by bodies in Par 1(i-vi)--- keg 45 allows for, but does not require, those bodies to supply the Clerk otf the Council with a list of their members. In the case of those lists not being supplied, the Clerk is to use the “last published list" of such body. Ata time when the relevant UK merberships of all these bodies are apparently declining, while the "unnattached" are increasing in nunber, this provision is Clearly insarlicient Co Carry out the Act. <i any case, there 1S no provision in the kets as to bow the Clerk is to use or interpret these lists in determining the nuiber of unattached archs. (e) No keg proviues explicitly tor determining the number of AKCUK members which each of the bouies cited in Par 1 (i-vi) tay nominate. (f) The kegs provide that the only iniormation to be used to determine the number of votintg archs. under Par 1 (vii) shall be provided by the bodies cited in (i-vi), rather than allowing for or providing that info be supplied by the individual architect regarding his or her nembership ot such bodies. And when ALCUK has asked individual erchs. for anfo (40m. keport 71/772,. par 27. attached, and attached Form A), it has only asked "unattached" architects whether they wight be attached, without asking attached archs. whether they might be unatt, a De.43] [poe. 22 ‘here is no mechanism for retuting a claim by one of these bogies that an arch is a member. The system is clearly one-sided and open to abuse. (g) There is no system for determining the validity of such membership claims by such bodies. ‘ (h) The lists of members called tor by the Kegs are not required to specify the class of membership, thus giving AhCUK insufiicient info, to apportion seats or aeterniine the number of "unattached" as per the Scheaule. (i) There is no explanation oi who (AKCUK or the body concerned) is to agetermine what ior the purposes oi the Act constitutes being a member ot such an organi- Sation and on what grounds that determination shall take place. For example, the ketention Fre which each arch. must pay ARCUK under Sec. 13 (1)(a) is due Jan. 1 of each year in advance and AkCUK normally sirikes off the kegister the following VLecenber 31 all those who owe any ae _tee. The various bodies cited in Par 1 (i-vi) may keep members in arrears om their rolls ior varying amounts of time. axCUK aoes not appear to question any claim by a body that an arch. is a member oi that body for any reason. Like AKCUK, KIBA memb. subs. are due Jan 1 annually in advance and the kista's Charter allows it to expell wenbers after only 7 nionths in arrears. that the kIBA claims for AkCUK in long-term, terninal arrears and or were never members at all claims. (It may be noted that the & Surveyors, seePar. 1l(iii), currently claims as menbers for AhCUK purposes only"those whose subs. were fully paid 2 It appears to us (see IV) purposes many architects others who have resigned and that AlCUK accepts theese Faculty of Architects and with whon we were in contact." See attached document.) It is also open to question whether the purpose of the Act can be servea when seats are apportioned to appointing bodies based on memberships totals which those bodies can inflate (gaining extra seats on AkCUK) with architeets who are members under duress. Employee architects probably comprise at least 75% of those on the kegister resiaent in the UK. Although the RIBA publicly claims to be a voluntary body (see attached), many employee architects are members of the KIBA -only because their employer requires them to be So, in violation of the Employ. Protect. Act and TULRA, as the KkIBA is not an independent trade union (being enployer-aominatea) and because kIbA menbership is in no way a higher gualitication than kegistration with A}:CUK. te estimate that 4000 oi the #Kis kIBA's UK arch. members are required by their employers to be hiba wembers, ana it is probably sate to say that at least ZOUU are probably KIBA members for that reason only. 1t should be notea that many other arch. members of the kKIbA who are employees are "encouraged" to join the kIBA by their employer, usually an hIBA member, paying their KIBA sub. This is probably as wicespread as invol- untary membership. It should also be noted that inland }evenue permits xke kIBA subs to be an aljowance against income (eg, public subsiay of kiba) but woes not co this in respect of all the bogies in lst Schedule Par l(i-vi) who are entitled to appoint nembers of AKCUK on the 1:500 basis. Act, apparently used. (3) frouen AhCUK'S kegs are clearly totally inadequate to ensure that the Council is properly constituted in accordance with the Act, it appears also that they are not being properly implemented. Thé lists provided for in keg 45(1)(b) are not being supplied to the Clerk. Nor are the "last published lists", as required by the (4) we believe that human error and fraudulent intent have been given free rein because of (i)(2) ana (3) above. Given the political complexion of ARCUK as it is presently, ana apparently wrongly, COnSstituted, it is very unlikely that this AKCUK will make ana inplemant any kegs which coulu ensure that the Council is properly constituted. For the sane reason, it is also very unlikly that theklbA & ARCUK will proauce and make public the info which would indicate exactly to what extent the Council is wrongtully constituted. - Proposed system to ensure properly constituted ARCUK ARCUK for what at present pretends to be ARCUK) needs to be obliged by some outside aeeney to amend its kegulations under Sec.13 of the 1931 Act, as well -as taking equivalent short-term measures despite its present kegs., to, (1) require apportionment of seats on ARCUK in accordance with the First Schedule of the 1931 Act to be the responsibility of an external, impartial, lay (non- (2) -architect) agency which would each year tell ARCUK what its constitution would be for the following year. define membership of the bodies cited in Par 1 (i-vi) of the lst Schedule to discount menbers in arrears (5) longer than ARCUK itself permits and to discount members who affirm that they are members only because they are obliged to be as a condition oi employment. plug up the "one day of the year" loop-hole so that membership tor AkCUK purposes is a realistic repre- sentation of the organisation's membership. consider an architect not to be a relevant member of one of the bodies cited in Par 1 (i-vi) unless confirmed annually by the architect (not the body) that he or she is a member of such a body in accordance with the definition of membership in (2) above and in full accordance oth the provisions of the Ist Schedule. (4) and (5) (ARCUK already writes to every architect twice a year.) if (4) is not acceptable for any reason, require bouies cited in Par 1 (i-vi) to furnish ARCUK such information at it requires in order to ensure that the Council is constituted in accordance with the First Scheaule, in absence oi which alleged mewbers for whose *oaee! the ILO. 168 CenuiIred Would De Cons Tier ed "unattached" ana voting. Furthermore, in the tirst instance, we propose that it be required 68) that persons improperly appointed to the Council by the RIBA Council be immediately removed from the Council, (7) that any election by the Council of persons to serve on the Board of Arch. Education, Admissions Cttee, Discipline Cttee, F&GP, PPC, other Council boards, panels, delegations etc. as well as the Council's and their chairpersons, and Councii appointments, be considerea void ii held while the Council is improperly cousituted ana provision be mage tor new elections ang appointnents by the properly constituted Council. , (8) that as soon as practicable a special election be held to elect additional councillors so that there is the proper nunber of ekected councillors (9) that those bodies, incl. AkCUK and RIBA, which have information which could clarify the extent of mal- apportionemént of seats on AKCUK should make freely available that info. , Go) that the legality of acts of the Council carried out while it was improperly constituted be clarified. LOSS AND DETRIMENT SUFFERED BY ‘UNATTACHED' ARCHITECTS AS A RESULT OF THE IMPROPER CONSTITUTION OF A.R.C.U.K. 1.01 It was clearly the intention of The Architects Registration Act 1931 to provide equal rights ofrepresentatiom to all those persons who, though registered, choose not to become members ofthose bodies referred to in Schedule I, 1. (i) - (vi), and that such persons should enjoy equal benefits and likewise be equally subject to the Council's disciplinary powers as provided im respect of all registered persons. 1.02 To the extent that correct representatioomf registered persons under Schedule I, 1 (vii) is currently not acheived, both the spirit and the letter of the Act are being thwarted. To be denied their due representatioinn the Council's affairs in itself constitutes a fundamental grievance of this category of registered persons. = 270i The primary functions of A.R.C.U.K. as enshrined in the Architects Registration Act 1931 are the establishment ofa Register of Architects (1,(3)), the admissioomf names thereto (1,(3)), and the removal of names therefrom (1,(3a & b),% &11). The recognition and holding of examinations suitablteo qualify successful candidates for admission to the Register is made the explicit duty of The Board of Architectural Education to. recommend to the Council, (5, (2a & b)). Inthisway,throughtheirrepresentonaCtoiunocimlytunattached' architects were intended to participate in the determinationo.f entrance qualifications. as "a wide ranging assemblage of educationalists ... called together / 2.02 However, by its undue dominance of the Council, the R.I.B.A. has removed the exercise of this duty out of A.R.C.U.K. into its own system of Visiting Boards, imwhich BsA.E. representation (invariably by: R.I.BeAe members) is merely a token gesture. (See A.R.C.U.K. Annual Reports 1974/5 (1021/2), 1975/6 (49), 1976/7 (71), 1977/8 (62), 1978/9 (60/ 61). NB. the latter Report in which the B.A.E. is actually referred to LOSS AND DETRIMENT /2 at considerable public expense for a mere formality.") The ‘unattached! architects have thus been denied their due part im establishitnhge quality of those eligible to enter the Register. 3.01 In the matter of removals from the Register, the Discipline Committee is appointed (1931 Act, 7(2)) to examine cases where a registered person may have been guilty of conduct disgraceful to him in his capacity as an architect. The criteria employed in considering such cases are as embodied in the A.R.C.U.K. Code of Professional Conduct. 3.02 However, the disproportionate representatioomf the R.I.B.A. on Council has enabled the Institute to extend the applicatioomf its own association rules beyond its own membership to all registered persons. This illegitimate extension of R.I.B.A. control is clearly evident in the content of the A.R.C.U.K. Code, which is substantially identical to that of the R.I.B.A., and indeed is published with the R.I.B.A. Notes appended. 3-03 In this way '‘unattached' architects may be disciplined to the detriment of their livelyhood for breaches of a code not freely determined in their own Council, but emanating from a private associatiotmo which they do not belong. 4.01 Equally, this illegitimate protection of the R.I.B.A. Code by the identical A.R.C.U.K. Code curtails the freedom of non+R.1I.B.A. architects to practice in ways which the Registration Acts do not prohibit. 4.02 Thus ‘unattached' architects are, for example, obliged by Rules 1.1 and 3.2 of the 'A.R.C.U.K. Code’ to apply the ‘recognised' Conditions of Engagement of bodies listed in Schedule 1, 1 (i) — (vi). (A.R.C.U.K. Code of Professional Conduct. p.5, footnote.) 4.03 These Conditions of Engagement (in fact those promulgated by the R.I.B.A.) require that am architect's fees are charged in accordance with a fixed Scale of Charges, thereby denying ‘unattached' architects their proper freedom under the Acts to enhance their livelyhood by quoting fees in competition with other architects. The degree to which A.R.C.U.K. is thus improperly controlled by the R.I.B.A. is evident in the Council's continued defence of the Conditions of Engagement in defiance of the <2 LOSS AND DETRIMENT /3 Monopolies & Mergers Commission's conclusions and recommendations (accepted by the present and previous Governments) that such fixed Scales of Charges be abandoned in the public interest, (See "Architects" Services — A Report on the Supply of Architects! Services with Reference to Scale Fees", The Monopolies & Mergers Commission, H.M.S.0., 8th Nov. 1977, paras. 285 & 286.) advantageous forms of practice. 5.01 Likewise an ‘unattached! architects freedom to carry on. his practice in the form of a limited liability company which is not proscribed by the Registration Acts is nevertheless denied by Rule 2.4 of the (R.1.B. As surrogate) A.R.C.U.K. Code of Professional Conduct. In this way the R.I.B.A. has improperly used the 'A.R.C.U.K.* Code to protect its own members from what ‘unattached' architects may consider to be more 6.01 Another constraint in the manner of practice that the R.I.B.A. is at liberty to impose on its own members, but which is extended to all registered persons by means of its improper inclusioimn the "ARC. +Ke! Code, is the prosription ofadvertising. (Rule 3.6) In this case, moreover, while through A.R.C.U.K. the R.I.B.A. prohibits ‘soliciting by registered persons, it simultaneously engages in vigorous advertising on behalf of its own members. Here again the improper constitution of A.K.C UK. has prevented 'unattached' architects in their enjoyment of equal rights in pursuing their means of livelyhood. 701 Lastly, and again by virtue of illegitimate R.I.B.A. representation: and dominance in Council, the equal opportunities in obtaining employment that are envisaged in the Act's Single level of registered persons — (i.e. equal qualification conferred by entry to the Register) - are prejudiced by the the Widespread imposition of R.I.B.A. membership as a pre-requisite for job applications, Although A.R.C.U.K. has frequently been advised of this practice it remains negligent in informing employers of its injustice. (R.I.B.A. membership entails no higher qualification.) 8.01 In sum, through the improper constitution of A.R.C.U.K., ‘unattached! architects are seen to suffer loss and detriment in the equal treatment and right to livelyhood to which under The Architects Registration Acts they are entitled. Docs. W-31 Docs, 1-3! with one or two exceptions. / Document (12) Some notes on the politics of AkCUK as it is now constituted (b) 6 persons appointed by the Councils of certain other bodies because they have architect members (1) 6 non-architects appointed by certain other boacies involved in the construction Those under a, b, d and e need not be architects but invariably are and are with at most one or two exceptions per year, members of the KkIBA as well. Since 1977, nearly all of the elected councillors have been employee-architect wembers of the New Architecture Movement, a group aiming to make the piorocsion more accountable to the public ana more aenocratically con- trolled at ali levels. These NA. members elected as councillors are all members oi the relevant trade union, TASS or NALGO as the Although probably 75% of its own (non-retired) UK member- ship are employee architects, the h1BA Council regularly appoints 90% management architects to AlhCUK. The KIBA Council and its committees are similarly dominated by employers, whose interests the kIBA is widely seen as pursuing. xcept for the elected members, other AkCUK councillors generally rally behind the kIKA appointees' position, case may be. industry ARCUK at present (1979-8U) consists of 66 members, (a) 40 persons appointed by the RIBA Council (c) 9 architects electea by architects (d) one person appointed by the Council of the hoyal Society of Ulster Architects (part of RIBA) (e) 5 persons appointed by gov't entities Cl ° ~! 6. Previous to the passage of the architects hegistration Act 1931, the KIBA had sought trom on the use of the title "architect" Parliament a monopoly for its own members. When Parliament refused this Register instead, the RIBA Council to control AKCUK (see Loc. 46) as an RIBA puppet in its own interes and to prevent its independent, public interest body. The present situation can be compared to a classic "banana republic" (ARCUK), with the United Fruit Co. (iIBA) with little attempt to apply all the usual procedures of a tin-horn dictatorship or one-party state. (see voc. 14). ; The administration of AkCUK and his staitf. The present Sees best interests of the profession. jae and set up ARCUK and the apparently resolved proper functioning as an manipulating the puppet a veneer of derocracy over is carried out by a hegistrar kegistrar was selected in secret by a committee oi RKIBA members, sone of whom were no lounger members of AKCUK, and presented to the Council for reatitication only, two years ago. The RIBA's UK membership, after increasing for many years, has been in decline since 1975, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of UK architects. The nurber of UK architects in other bodies entitled to appoint persons to AKCUK on that basis is also ceclining. A recent survey published in the Architects Journal (see boc. 37) indicated that 7U% of 294 k1BA members responding (ana 99% of 153 "unattached" architects) thought that RIBA control of AKCUK was hot in the best interests of the public. 66% of the KIBA members (and 95% of the “unattached") also thought it was not in the 257, et +H NZ ito res ARCUK Council elections 1980/81 ‘Evidence of disenfranchisement of "unattached" architects. In response to a questionnaire to the profession published in the ARCHITECTS JOURNAL of 30 January 1980, 21% of a sample Of 150° “Iinattached’” architects claimed not to have received nomination papers for the 1980/81 Council elections. If representative this indicates a massive disenfranchisement of ARCUK -11St, of "unattached". The loss to the "unattached" would be made worse if these 21% were attributed az 2 Ib Of the 7 @& respondents(14%) gave their name and address so that the elected councillors were able to check their statements against ARCUK records. The results of this check are as follows:— A. JS. Dodd 37 Braemar Road Worcester Park Surrey - AG Drysdale Zoe ts 37555 42688 AA RIBA RIBA RIBA . David Heath Levitt Berstein Assoc. 30 Oval Road London NW1 Ian Redford Lowden 101 Turnbert Avenue Ardler Dundee iS — she Named (ndindvar Cates of +o The. "unattached" architects and a loss of at least 2 qves turn seats on council if these 21% are excluded from the iserntranchsenenrt of “nattachoA ’Acchtcels by ARCUK to one of the 6 nominating bodies thereby increasing their representation on Council at the expense of the "unattached". ‘Registered architects considering themselves "unattached" but listed as a member of one or more of the 6 nominating bodies. Name & address Registration No. Body Dept. of Architecture & Civic Design Guildhall Portsmouth Hants (De 4) sent nomination papers. P.Lowendon 31348 Dept. of Architecture and Civic Design Civic Offices Guildhall Portsmouth PO1 2AT Bl. Patet Dept. of Architecture and Civic Design Civic Offices Giuldhall Portsmouth PO1 2AT M.G.Watts Directorate of Architecture Telford Development Corporation Priorslee Hall Telford Martin Goodwin 38515 RIBA Dept. of Architecture London Borough of Southwark L.Tek Ong 41849 RIBA Architects Dept. London Borough of Hammersmith Roger Thompson White Cot Bayleys Hill Sevenoaks Kent W.J.Wintle Dawn Dartington Totnes Devon TQ9 6HE 30144 AA RIBA “never has been, amember of the RIBA. L.Tek Ong, Sp1op 182 ONT 38665 RIBA The RIBA has informed ARCUK that these architects are their members. ARCUK accept this despite at least one written request to ARCUK (from David Heath) to be listed as unattached. David Heath is not and Roger Thompson and Martin Goodwin resigned from the RIBA in 1978. Sworn statements to this effect can be obtained. Registered architects not attributed to any of the nominating bodies and yet not included on the list of "unattached", and therefore not C. Registered architect listed as "unattached" but not included in mailing of nomination papers. 1. D.W.Olden 35906 28 Bell Place Edinburgh EH3 5HT The One is on he Eon itect to inform the Registrar of any change of address and failure to do this may account for those sent to old addresses. No explanation was given by the Registrar for groups A,B,&C above. This short investigation was only possible because a sample of names waS available and the elected councillors were prepared to devote their time to checking them. It is alarming that this should reveal 12 architects wrongly disenfranched and the fear is that there are many more as yet undisclosed. There is at present no-intention within ARCUK to carry out a thorough scrutiny , nor to allow an independent scrutiny ofmembership status. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource JA/DR Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Mar-80 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/741f72381abf86048b136e0918a06ea6.pdf c9ba4a9cf1e2b8670d2bb3fbfc2bb559 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Architects' prices work against public interest Subject The topic of the resource Article in Daily Telegraph Description An account of the resource By JOHN PETTY, Commercial Correspondent A RCHITECTS and surveyors are working a price ring against the public interest, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission said yesterday after a four-year investigatio The Government immediately ordered Mr Gordon Borrie, Director General of Fair Trading, to take action. But the Royal Institute of rchitects said i not accept mgs and would instruct meÄbers to go on charging fixed minimum fees. "We will fight every 9tep of the way." said' Mr Gordon Graham, R I B A president. The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors said it was surprised and disappointed by the findings. Abolition of a fixed scale of fees would work against the public intcrest. Free competition Commission produced separate reports on the two rofessions. Each ran to more t an 200 r free tion in pricing. But the Commission suggested- the Government should appoint a small independent committee to draw up a list of recommended prices as guidance to the public- Mr Hattersley, Prices an mer Protection Y, said he e findings of the Commission. His Minister of State, Mr Fraser, said Mr Borrie would meet leaders of the professions with a view to getting them to change their rules. n Mr Borrie will be given six Il months to report back to Mr r. Hattersley. 8' with regard to present circumstances in the construction industry." One of the main RIBA d objections is that the Commission stopped taking evidence nbout 18 months ago and there has been a marked collapse in the building business since then. It claims mandatory minimum fees are vital to carry the profession through slump periods. d Mr Graham said: Architects compete on quality and service, not on price. The report is pathetic." d Architects were depressed at the report's lack di clarity. reason and logic. It appeared to be further debasement of the quality of public debate in favour of dogmas. He said the Commission had Is failed td answer the main case d put forward by R I B A for maintaining the fee scale. R IBA had every confidence that it would be able to persuade Govt ernment that the Commission was wrong. Architects and surveyors both !d said that the bulk of evidence 10 presented to the Commission by v clients was in favour of retain• d ing a fixed-fee scale. On new works. architects It work on a sliding fee scale, with a minimum of 10 per cent. on contracts up to 22,500 in value and a minimum of 5 1 2 per cent. ts on contracts worth El ,750.000 or more. Minimum fees vary from 10 per cent. to 13 per cent. for work on existing buildings. th • • Survev•Or'•r,-ht• teo• Service'" each E2•85. BRIBERY 'VITAL IN EAST' 'LISSION to secure overseas sales were " absolutely necessary " in some Middle Eastern countries, the Old Bailey corruption trial was told yesterday. Sir LESTER SUFFIELD. former head of the Defence Ministry's defence sales organisation and at one time With British Leyland. said, however, that there would never be any question of a British firm paying commission to the British Government to further sales. Lt-C01 DAVID RANDEL, 40. of the Royal Signals, Aldershot, GEOFFREY WELLBURN. also 40, of Woodside Road, Beaconsfield Bucks. and FRANK NURDON. 60, of Barnet Road, Arkley, Herts, all ny corruption charges. ellburn was managin di ector of Racal B CC, o W mbley, which specialises in el onic and communication e ipment. Nurdon was the es director. The prosecution alleges that Randel took about 25,000 in bribes to ensure BCC radio equipment was bought and installed in Chieftain tanks sold to Persia. Secret contents Sir LESTER SUFFIELD said he was unaware of any payments made to officials of foreign countries by the Crown agents, lillbank T chn:cal Services. ogtent' o wh ged, he sa #reement on e to pay comrmssion so th was •not unknown in the M dle East for commission to be paid to officials of foreign co ntries, but the recipients re not necessarily in the in ustrial field. e believed agents were mmees paid their " commission " i cash in the United Kingdom. Ithough he had never been •rectly involved himself in oing it he knew the practice ent on. It was 'i more than likely " at a commission payment uld appear in company Ix)0ks, It not the name of the recipit because it was normal comercial practice to protect ents if thev requested it. In the Chieftain radio contract t e interests of his department d Racal were the. same and e also the country's interest. ndel had a duty as part of t team to further that object. ! would have been practically ssible for Randel while in P sia to have blocked the sale. e trial was adjourned until ersian knight Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource J Petty Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10.11.77 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/5d5608350b085d890021ca24008fa0de.pdf c56ac8adbf43e83a25ba01cc2dbafb69 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Architects' fee scale slammed in report Subject The topic of the resource Article in Daily Express Description An account of the resource By Jeremy Gates THERE was a slap in the face yesterday for Britain's 27.000 architects who are already facing one of the worst recessions in history. For a massive 200 - page report from the Government's Monopolies and Mergers Commission claimed that their scale fee system of charges was against the public interest. The report is publi.shed at a time when 1,000 architects are already on the dole—with forecasts that 7,000 more may join them in the next 12 months it the industry remains in the doldrums. The Commission found that charges on 99 per cent of the architect's workload were fixed by scale fee. The report called for the architects-to scrat) the scale tee system — and to quote competitive rates for every job. A spokesman for the Royal Institute of British Architects said last night : " 'l'be scale fee plays an important role in maintaining proper standards of service in both public and private practice." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource J Gates Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JA Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10.11.77