11 10 310 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/9bf3a5b39c27f700e66478408b9e0ebf.pdf 9de39cae66276ec0f6f650fd71422c46 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Design Group Description An account of the resource Argued that it was only through the public sector that the majority of people could have access to the land and resources needed for housing, education and other essential services. The task was therefore to reform the practice of architecture in local councils to provide an accessible and accountable design service. The Public Design Group proposed reforms to the practice of architecture in local councils to provide a design service accessible and accountable to local people and service users. The following 6 Interim Proposals were developed which were later initiated and implemented in Haringey Council 1979-1985 by NAM members. <ul><li style="font-weight:400;">Local area control over resources </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Design teams to be area based </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Area design teams to be multi-disciplinary </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Project architects to report directly to committee</li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Abolish posts between Team Leader and Chief Architect </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Joint working groups with Direct Labour Organisations</li> </ul> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Background Notes Subject The topic of the resource Background Notes following Hull Congress Resolution 1977 Description An account of the resource Background At its Hull Congress in November 1977, the New Architecture Movement decided to develop further its policies relating to the public sector. NAM's interest in this field had already been established at our first Congress in Harrogate in 1975 when the idea of a National Design Service was put forward. The National Design Service (NDS) proposals, based on a critique of architectural patronage, argued for a locally based design service directly accountable to tenants and users. It was suggested that Local Authority departments of architecture could provide the basis for such a service. Discussions on the NDS were continued initially under the auspices of the former North London Group of NAM, and a small issue group evolved. Further NDS papers stressed the view that any long term advance in architectural service to the public could only come through the public sector. By late 1977, it was considered that a more concentrated programme of research and action was required and following the Hull Congress an enlarged N.D.S. Group were mandated to carry out the work and to arrange this conference. Since November, the NDS Group evolved into the Public Design Service (PDS) Group. The Group, in addition to refining its critique of patronage and Local Authority working arrangements, has been studying the origins and present role of Local Authority departments of architecture and their relationship to the profession and private practice. Work has also been done on the party political context and on an analysis of Housing Associations. The results of this preliminary study are presented here as draft papers, interim proposals, and suggested areas of future work. For further information contact : PDS Group NAM 9 Poland Street LONDON. WI. Background through the public sector. this conference. PDS Group NAM 3 Poland Street LONDON. WI. At its Hull Congress in November 1977, the New Architecture Movement decided to develop further its policies relating to the public sector. NAM's interest in this field had already been established at our first Congress in Harrogate in 1975 when the idea of a National Design Service was put forward. The National Design Service (NDS) Proposals, based on a critique of architectural patronage, argued for a locally based design service directly accountable to tenants and users. It was suggested that Local Authority departments of architecture could provide the basis for such a service. Discussions on the NDS were continued initially under the auspices of the former North London Group of NAM, and a small issue group evolved. Further NDS papers stressed the view that any long term advance in architectural service to the public could only come By late 1977, it was considered that a more concentrated programme of research and action was required and following the Hull Congress an enlarged N.D.S. Group were mandated to carry out the work and to arrange Since November, the NDS Group evolved into the Public Design Service (PDS) Group. The Group, in addition to refining its critique of patronage and Local Authority working arrangements, has been studying the origins and present role of Local Authority departments of architecture and their relationship to the profession and Private practice. Work has also been done on the party political context and on an analysis of Housing Associations. The results of this preliminary study are presented here as draft papers, interim Proposals, and suggested areas of future work. For further information contact Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource John Murray/PDS Group Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource November 1977 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/ba391f8919d0a15ac4a7eec125c88376.pdf 0b9668d8db15913b91de7eceb545aa68 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Design Group Description An account of the resource Argued that it was only through the public sector that the majority of people could have access to the land and resources needed for housing, education and other essential services. The task was therefore to reform the practice of architecture in local councils to provide an accessible and accountable design service. The Public Design Group proposed reforms to the practice of architecture in local councils to provide a design service accessible and accountable to local people and service users. The following 6 Interim Proposals were developed which were later initiated and implemented in Haringey Council 1979-1985 by NAM members. <ul><li style="font-weight:400;">Local area control over resources </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Design teams to be area based </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Area design teams to be multi-disciplinary </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Project architects to report directly to committee</li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Abolish posts between Team Leader and Chief Architect </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Joint working groups with Direct Labour Organisations</li> </ul> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NDS Group Subject The topic of the resource Names and Addresses of NDS Group (plus others) Description An account of the resource Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource John Murray Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1977 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/aff2be56dfda55d240d8d385a8f3f3bc.pdf 4949ba400b48fdc8823cd0ae7133df7b Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Design Group Description An account of the resource Argued that it was only through the public sector that the majority of people could have access to the land and resources needed for housing, education and other essential services. The task was therefore to reform the practice of architecture in local councils to provide an accessible and accountable design service. The Public Design Group proposed reforms to the practice of architecture in local councils to provide a design service accessible and accountable to local people and service users. The following 6 Interim Proposals were developed which were later initiated and implemented in Haringey Council 1979-1985 by NAM members. <ul><li style="font-weight:400;">Local area control over resources </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Design teams to be area based </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Area design teams to be multi-disciplinary </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Project architects to report directly to committee</li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Abolish posts between Team Leader and Chief Architect </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Joint working groups with Direct Labour Organisations</li> </ul> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NDS Subject The topic of the resource NDS Group preliminary steps recommendations to 3rd Congress 2pp. 3 copies Description An account of the resource leave DYNCMDLs cervecertraetrenUeMaligationof foboifcrmiuirntaralppprsionaoe deaviiesof puspleynndefter,lonheCele ‘lateexciltpualyWML? arclidiae ovetved ar an Allonolive meas Weaiy by phich.profleeatMAHI. FavetiwwrachunrePers Public <fituctibionk Md a shdf ofresources fags publeesect srfotepruyele,partecularttyn beisng nae housing Rehab iliteahor. ; a Pitin)fdas afCourseatnddy anchiA22t0atfftayeudneted,16 a /yate praclich hie Sora C0_ LL fale of contolHotes idl gp sn aN 2'ln4 (o (ohesottrite prluae |EBS 1tall hn “ae eA reelsteetecledel nsarvdtele prpanalé fisLa Nabael chetigen SomeaebasedmwAcuque€pectic lathinagpsSti 4k ffeck on archukechnal sernce tp te public jarclufacts anamapninksandee ee fouart. 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Was by dszall be ath tuinboingAesiguofficerXe20talallel, thepeel a megetCalaullouty Ara stopAn torlang fourrde tia goals Le Third WAI Cugnnr aclepted te fallawing tes an! “ThinCeguencostes)Mototbynary recervary 8developflies I frites Nitds avanr ~ te Ppublia sectv. To Ler Lud yf wavdals aneelNratiornaldBésiy.d.sloysiceGpoufpee ae Lebar 0 a rnponen cor, werden,tra foclovatiaAnAS\Hferopriale(hakeuninS~# AlalociedvGebratirs Ie: f Md: A Wabioral Design Sennen”, P 2 CA7L Bw 3 ea, 3 Sts Anedtalole 5 NAM, 2 Pland Shet london SI. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource NDS Group John Murray Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource November 1977 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/0f2c1c68c26711f8a6c70b4b9aa84a5b.pdf 54c633382f7d7af4dde43951d54e6457 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Design Group Description An account of the resource Argued that it was only through the public sector that the majority of people could have access to the land and resources needed for housing, education and other essential services. The task was therefore to reform the practice of architecture in local councils to provide an accessible and accountable design service. The Public Design Group proposed reforms to the practice of architecture in local councils to provide a design service accessible and accountable to local people and service users. The following 6 Interim Proposals were developed which were later initiated and implemented in Haringey Council 1979-1985 by NAM members. <ul><li style="font-weight:400;">Local area control over resources </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Design teams to be area based </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Area design teams to be multi-disciplinary </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Project architects to report directly to committee</li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Abolish posts between Team Leader and Chief Architect </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Joint working groups with Direct Labour Organisations</li> </ul> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NDS 1975-77 Subject The topic of the resource Draft papers about NDS, Tenant Coops, A Ladder of Citizen participation, proposed research project Description An account of the resource THE UMGO ARcWMWTeTURE ALO0EHGUT. $ WOeTH Cewror) GLOUP» A NATIOMAL ICEIGN SGLUICE t. fou 2 BAAlpiod Nav 1G, leasfaneotsnft tntdeceniloned vile heasonS torn acluficine fa controled by Qa pahenagg a)(te Inbroouchan + , mum ord], and bows Tey txoral thir ety ooM Luds began loya |te elfacts om te yes, hemes ad phryrteal a a \ Yardy » We ang eel [= a natal ALsigy senuce luck ural be accoulable toavd canholladby tu propledn AS Ipcalily » de Qmcluded lint tighloeurhoock based scat auultoudy Asay. affucss shautofae aca At Preset toemt fdsse offuces aut enrhaliacd pand buraucmlic Shuctures,SteminalyLnsensitso&Ceroyfhofle,frecass 4 thon is lwited t the ounce Sfunding Aapa Arnel comer oy thom is vested Wn tanmulee Chetimnen. 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Studien te Donelefimnent of Gppctalionn .4. Doblo .(Esp: Chaplet B,Y . 2. Vawour Commumiley bvilebwut Reports \partieculaedy “iscal Gavewmont Becomer bg busine ~ ‘Profs Agamat House ecard F eutt corning Gaweetsto rot m local tndcluclral decline bbeplan 97), % Hs bund TENANT CO-OPS Government Con-t rick or A Force for Tenant Power ? with the help and advice of the other workers from the Islington Co-ops. C7 March 1977 Written by: Richard Crossley Lucy de Groot Alison McLean INTRODUCTION concerned. For the past six months a group of workers from the five co-operatives in Islington have been meeting every few weelks to discuss issues of common interest. We decided to write this article in order to look at the role of co-ops within the whole field of housing policy. The government is encouraging housing co-operatives at a time when it is also making severe cuts in public sector expenditure including cuts in the housing budget. Recently the Housing Corporation's Co-operative Housing Agency was opened with the specific purpose of promoting and advising housing co-ops. There is clearly a lot of support from the housing establishment for co-ops while other forms of public housing are continually being criticised and attacked. This has led to a lot of suspicion amongst people involved in the tenants' movement as to the role of co-operatives, their relationship with the rest of the public housing cector, their potential elitism, their popularity with the government, the standards and methods they will operate and their real potential for changing the control of public housing. It is important to clarify that the Islington co-ons, which we work for, have emerged-out of tenants' struggles to get access to and control of decent housing. We believe that it is only in this way thas tenant co-ops (and other tenants’ organisations) can represent the needs and wishes of their members. The recent moves by come local authorities, to institute co-ops from above without any direct initiative coming from tensats' g-ovps themselves, clearly contradicts the whole concept of texents' co-ops beirs the basis for tenants taking control over their hotsing. It is this latter concept with which we are We feel that it is very important to look at ihe issues which are at the centre of the debate about co-ops - ownership, finence, membership, selection. These are also the crucial areas for tenant control. In discussing these issues we have drawn on our own specsfic experience as workers for the different Islington co-ops. We Go not claim to have a complete solution to all the questions whicn have been raised about co-ops. We hope, however, that this article will explain some of the problema, clarify the issues and encourage a wider discussion and a better understanding of the role of tenant co-ops in the tenant movement as a whole. | | I. OWNERSHIP The argument about the ownership of housing by tenant co-operatives is often very confused. within the existing political and economic structures and they are therefore It is important at the outset to recognise that co-ops operate »necessarily limited by those structures. been a central demand of radical activists Public ownership of housing has is only a first step in the struggle for a socialist housing system. a crucial condition for equal distribution, proper planning and higher standards for any of these in housing but it is not of itself a sufficient condition demands. The public sector, as the present economic crisis emphasises, is controlled by the politicians and officials who dominate the political system. The DoE, Treasury, all developments and policies in public sector housing and, of course, over for Over a century. However, it It is and leaders of the government have the final control over the subsidising of private housing. the important role that housing plays in the economic and political maneouvres Unless we recognise this and understand we will fail to confront the real problems of governments in capitalist Britain, No Real Option Many people (including most tenants) think that they will only really control with which both private and public sector tenants are faced. their housing when they individually own a home of their own. They are also concerned to have a capital investment which they can pass on to their children and which they can realise by Selling at any time. For all but a Minority, however, the ideal of a home of their own can never be more than a pipe dream in a market situation where the cost of housing has escalated way beyond the Public Ownership :Tenant Control reach of ordinary working people. Massive government expenditure is essential if vitally needed housing is to be made available and it is only right that some form of government control should follow. In principle, we think that all freeholds should be socially owned, but with the greatest possible power and effective control in the hands of the tenants living in the housing. In other words, we feel there is an important need for a different form of public ownership and control whereby tenants have all the advantages (and responsibilities) normally thought to derive only from owner-occupation, without having to make any capital investment, and where the government retains the final control and recall on the property. The control vested in the tenants would normally take the form of a lease held by the tenant OO exercised in any other way. e housing doesn't arise. Public and Frivate Sector Co-ops Tenant co-ops have developed in both the public housing sector, on estates and in areas of local authority development (eg. Charteris Road), and in’ the private *Where the public sector co-ops are concerned, the issue of We feel that there is no perfect blueprint for co-operative housing and that the response of tenants in different Situations will vary. The type of solution co-op collectively. But this option is not always going to be politically or tactically viable for a tenant co-op - (most local authorities baulk at the thought of such innovations!) so it is Sometimes necessary for a co-op itself to own the freeholds. This type of co-operative ownership should not be confused with equity sharing or co-ownership schemes, where members have a stake in the capital value of the property. The Islington co-ops are all "par-value! co-ops where members have a nominal and equal share in the co-op (normally £1 per member) which is not redeemable. They have no individual stake in the property owned by the co-op nor can the co--op as a body sell any of its houses. Thus, the type of ownership enjoyed by co-ops is very restricted, and is of real importance only in so far as it creates control which cannot at presentb.e sector where tenants have fought to get bad housing in an area improved. ownership has already been won in principle; what the co-op will be concerned to gain is an extensive and powerful agreement with the local authority covering selection, Maintenance and all aspects of management. Although an ordinary tenant association may be interested in exercising this sort of power and control, all too often their energies are taken up with battles against a large, anonymous, uncaring "public landlord' and the Se for real control over “In the case of co--ops working outside the public sector, tenants' anxiety to make sure that bad housing is acquired, improved and made available to them usually leads to the demand for control over the acquisition and development of housing as well as future management. must be based on the needs of the tenants concerned. Whether the local authority Access to Money and Houses as the way it is managed. Money Gives Control going to live. III. MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTION - ARB CO-OPS ELITIST? The problem of possible elitism has been raised by many people who are unsure Legally, the only way'at present that a group of tenants can gain access to finance in order to buy from the private market to oust the private landlord and therefore to ensure the improvement of their housing conditions, is to register with the Housing Corporation as a Housing Association and thus be eligible for HAG. In the case of PPNC where tenants forced the declaration 5f a Housing Action Area, the co-op has been instrumental in bringing additional finance into areas of severe housing need. Long term, it is only with increasing municipalisation by local authorities that a major impact will be made on the private landlord. It is still the case, however, that for many tenants in the private rented sector, to be a member of a co-operative which is buying and converting in their area is firstly their only hope of access t> decent housing and secondly, but perhaps more crucially, the only way in which collectively they can control the type and standard of housing that is provided as well Our experience in Islington has shown that the effective transfer 0f control to tenants demands the transfer 2f financial control. In the case of co-ops in the public sector who are concerned with control over the allocation and management of their houses, tenants have demanded a direct allocation 9f the full amount spent by the local authority on management, and complete control over the budgeting of these amounts. Where tenants want to control the acquisition and conversion of houses in their area the only way to do so is to be directly eligible for HAG. Thus, tenants directly control the decisions made by the professionals employed to produce housing (eg. the surveyors, valuers, architects) and the tenants themselves can decide the speed and priorities of the acquisition programmes and the standards of the houses in which they are of the role of tenant co-ops, and afraid that the nature of co-ops will pre-select a certain type 9f tenant. The question, "Who becomes a co-op member and why" raises the issue of whether co-ops are in reality open to working class, badly housed tenants who are trapped in the worst conditions with no real options open to them or whether they simply attract the articulate, the middle class, people for whom other options exist. It als» raises the question of the co-7p's relationship with the established local authority waiting list. Where Do Members Come From? Most co-ops, and certainly those in Islington, have been formed in response to the bad housing of their area. So their initial membership and foundation has been amongst tenants in the most acute housing need. New members come to the co-ops because they hear from friends about the co-9p, because they live in the area and can see things happening, or because they have been referred by law centres, housing aid centres, 2m the basis 9f their housing needs. In the early stages some co-ops may restrict their membership to a specific area, for example, PPNC which is based entirely in a Housing Action Area, but most of ~ the Islington co-ops are open to any tenant in bad housing, living in the borough. The tenants wh> come to the co-ops for help do not do so because 9f some prior commitment to 'the principles of co-operation', but because the co-9%p offers some hope of a solution to their housing problems. Clearly, the initial membership of a co-op is crucial since it will determine the style and direction of the co-op. People will stay as active members and become involved with the co-op's struggle t> improve housing conditions if they identify with the way the co-op works. An Ever Open Door? It should be noted that over time, keeping an open door t2 all those in housing need can present problems for co-9ps, not least the problem of size. Also it may be necessary t2 discriminate positively in favour of specific groups, such + as elderly people who don't easily launch into tenants' meetings, or families with language problems, and in some cases to discriminate against others. In the belief that co-ops should not attempt to become all things to all people, HTC recently took a decision t>2 consciozusly exclude any 'middle class' applicants and to preserve its working class neighbourhood base. Young professionals, students and other groups have the resources to produce solutions to their %wn problems which may involve setting up their own co-op as Islington Community Housing have done for young single people. The Waiting List this entails. Selection in Action Sa are usually looked at: personal %pinions. One of the most crucial and most controversial areas 9f control fought for by tenant co-ops has been that of selection, the right of tenants to decide for themselves who should have priority in rehousing. In Islington this demand arose because of the council's own failure to operate a fair allocation system. (Tenants saw that the council's points system in effect reflected the supply of housing and was totally insensitive t3 people's actual housing needs.) Also where tenants are being permanently rehoused by a co-op, it is important that they are aware and willing to accept the responsibilities and commitment that Islington co-ops each have an elected committee which visits and interviews members, discusses each case and comes to a collective decision. Three criteria ae Council criteria »f housing need (ie. points on waiting list) b. Wider criteria of housing need (eg. size and conditionof rooms, tenants! emotional and medical problems, harassment) This is a difficult task and committee members can find themselves under moral and emotional pressure t> rehouse a member which might »verride »bjective criteria. The struggle to resolve these problems and answer for the decisions taken constantly challenges members 9f any co-op. Committee members are often sbliged to publicly speak out in meetings and thus confront their own prejudices and necessitates constant discussion and debate amonst members to determine what the c. participation in the co-op. It is probably true to say that the selection process is the most sensitive area within any co-op. The decisions taken have always to be seen t> be fair and unbiased. This has to be in the first instance to the co-op membership as a whole. There is tremendous pressure on committee members to be consistent and to avoid creating unfair precedents. In return, the co-ops demand of their membership an understanding of what's possible; they cannot tolerate unreasonable demands or expectations; nor can they be susceptible to pressures from either the more desperate or more unscrupulous members. Yet at the same time the co-ops must operate a more sensitive, humane and sympathetic allocation policy. Treading the delicate line between these various requirements is often difficult and right decisions, morally, ethically and politically should be. Public Accountability In the final analysis the co-ops are, and: should be, accountable to the wider- public through the local authority. In Islington, the council has 100% veto powers on all selections of the Charteris Road Co-op, and 75% of HIC's allocations. This ensures that co-op tenants are always people in the greatest housing need. The council's veto powers have never presented a real problem since co-op members have in practice always had very high points and have had more than the full residence requirements, All members have to be registered on the council's waiting list. In fact, the check which Islington council has kept 2m selectishs within the co-ops has confirmed the fiarness of their selections. But it is an important safety valve to ensure that the co-ops continue t> guard against possible abuses and t> emphasise their continued accountability ts the public at large. The co-ops have a responsibility t> the homeless, and sthers in housing need who live in the borough and are not members of the co-9p. ~ IV. TENANT CONTROL : THE PROBLEMS So far we have looked at some 9f the basic political, legal, and institutional issues which co-ops raise. We need to consider now the actual problems of tenant control. How do tenants take decisions and are these any better than the decisions taken by more conventional bodies like the council? What are the mistakes that have been made and why have they happened? A tenant co-operative provides an organisational structure which allows tenants to take control sxver their housing. The actual form that this takes will always be rooted in the particular history and circumstances in which a tenants' group develops. Tenant t> Co-operator In Islington, tenants got together to fight bad landlords and to struggle collectively to gain access to better housing. This was the crucial basis 2 which they built strong commitment to each other and to the co-%p as their organisation. However, this pattern of struggle and conflict with outside agencies can easily remain, so that even when rehoused by the co-op, tenants still see themselves as the 'victims'.- The landlord tenant relationship dies hard. The co-op as a collective landlord, controlled by its members, is for many tenants co= perative to be largely problem orientated. Democracy Tenants as Employers A further major issue emerges when full-time workers are employed by the tenants. The whole relationship between the members of the co-op, like those of sther tenants' organisations, join voluntarily and people therefore get involved with it om top of their other family and work commitments. The workers are around the co-op, seeing people and discussing issues every day. They have regular involvement with the members, the funding bodies, the statutory authorities and so inevitably they know more about the details of a situation than most co-op members. There is a permanent 'dynamic' tension between the workers and the members, who both employ the workers and are also dependent on them for their full-time services and expertise. a purely abstract concept. Roofs still leak, builders are slow and incompetent, the rent, rates and other bills still have t> be paid. People (and houses) do not change o%vernight just because they have become involved in a co-operative. Problems continue to arise and in some ways the co-»ps can become an added focus for complaints because they are m2 open. As one member of HTC put it, "if we had to take a 6p bud ride to tell you, you wouldn't hear about most of the problems you get in this office." The co-op office is local and the atmosphere friendly and receptive s>) it is easy for communication between individual tenants and the Democracy does not come easily in any organisation. It has to be fought for and repeatedly reaffirmed. The mechanisms for decision making are often more complex than individuals would like. Quick, instant decisons, sr answers to problems, are not produced by going through well-developed democratic procedures. This is part of an ongoing educational process which tenants have t> understand. More importantly, it also comes as a salutory warning to 2.utside bodies (eg. local authorities, central government) that democracy does not provide easy answers 2r instant responses to problems. The co-»ps have faced real difficulties over certain aspects of their work. The clearest example is that of selections where it is extremely easy for committee members to take decisions under severe emotional pressure without looking at the longer-term implications >f the decision. However, the important aspect of this is that the co-ops learn by their own mistakes. They are not the passive recipients »f other people's decisions. ee The Individual v the Co-9sp Control *rules and management policy. structure for this balance t> be fought for and maintained. For tenants who are members of a co-op the issue 9f control will involve the *selection and allocation of tenants for the houses; *development; “financial control over all aspects of the housing programme; *membership}; “democracy within the co-op; Obviously some of these issues are more easily dealt with than others. The co-ops in Islington have shown a clear and fierce determination t> fight cuts in There is also a continual conflict between the needs and desires 3f individual members (eg. for improvements do their house) and the sverall need of the co-9p collectively. T> thrive, the co-op must remain spen and responsive t> wider housing issues but for the individual membér this may seem irrelevant or remote. On the other hand, if the co-op merely services the rising expectations 7f individual tenants, it will in the long-run degenerate not just financially, but socially and politically. The co-ops are therefore confronted with keeping a constant delicate balance between individual needs and collective responsibility. What is so important about tenant co-ops is that they do actually provide a V. CONCLUSION a It is clear then that the central issue for tenant co=9peratives is control. This control does not come easily, it needs t> be Fought for on a number of different fronts; within the co-op, locally with the council, architects and builders, nationally with the DoB and the government. The continuous battles a co-op has to fight in all these areas are very important, not just for the particular co-op involved but for the tenants' movement as a whole. In Islington the co-ops have frequently joined with other tenants’ groups to fight against the Section 105 cuts on money for council rehabilitation, to challenge the council's policies on homelessness and allocations, and to assert the needs of Single people. standards imposed by central government and to ensure that reasonable allocation The Members and much debate. Realising Potential Power eg ee 5f funds is made for their programmes. The very fact of being an organised group with a definite purpose gives the co-ops great political strength in relation to both the local authority (eg. Charteris Rd's fight over the management and maintenance allowances), the Housing Corporation (eg. HTC's demands for an allocation of development finance involving costs the co-2p considers reasonable) and the Do (eg. Pooles Park and HTC fighting over standards for the conversions). Internally, the co-ops provide the opportunity for tenants who have previsusly had no control over their housing to take major decisions and to take responsibility for those decisions. In a co-op, tenants collectively have to deal with problems of rent arrears, difficult members, disputes, individual personal and family problems and with the whole issue of directly employing full-time workers to deal with these things on a day-to day basis. This obviously creates difficulties All the co-ops which have developed in Islington are multi-racial and their memberships are made up of some of the most deprived communities in Inner London. Members have low incomes, little security of employment, work long hours and experience the whole range 2f urban stress created by living in areas with few facilities of any sort. However, in the work of the co-ops they are consistently challenged by other people with similar problems. All the prejudices that people feel individually have to be confronted in an open organisation like the co-op. Race, culture, attitude, life-style are all different and potentially antagonistic. Under the pressure of having real decisions to make collectively about urgent problems which affect everyone (including, in the final analysis, oneself), members are continually forced to rise above their individual prejudices. The continuous learning process that the co-ops in Islington have created is probably one of the most outstanding features about them. Black, white, Irish, Mauritian, young, old, single parent families and childless elderly couples, are brought together because they have a common need and increasingly because they have developed a common involvement and commitment to the aims of the co-op. Many people in the housing establishment as well as in the 'alternative' housing establishment, have expressed strong opinions about what co-%ps are or should be. Much of what has been said comes from genuine ignorance of any actual co-ops in Cuyi costs and to solve their management problems. Tenant co- ps need to be - control over housing. operation; much also reflects preconceived prejudices. There is obviously a danger that tenant co-ops will be used by local authorities to divide tenants, aware of this and to ensure that it is the tenants themselves who decide the pace for a co-op and not the council. Tenant co-2ps do not claim to be the solution to the crisis in housing but they do have a real role to play in the tenants' movement. They create an important base from which tenants become aware 9f their potential power and begin to exercise real power in the immediate context of their housing. 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Lis /:iLU 7 ) Sr CusGretl G Q QLUGsCo Sr ' '| =z , e -_ 4 L) —~ —-— a . x aeeSe oe —COTES : oy,STASQh at 6)Boxeo) Eee Ss A NE : 7? C4/Pa. y)WQS Ca Ox | Bey 6S QCSaeweAW | ' CN ee AD AQ —\ OS =e een Ow Tee. ,97A,QkKG { yi . Sts 77 = Air? SA Oa Riser Dau /s wre YAK7% “: pee ey > a 4|OL PeNe GIQS ~| ( os Om & Vax, \ awe T°FOrn >VJ Q re P=QQ bO5-Ofc,) ge a me | Sherry R. Arnstein is Director of Community Development Studies for The Commons, a non-profit research institute in W ashington, D.C, and Chicago, She is a former Chief Advisor on Citizen Participation in HUD's Model Cities Administra- tion and has served as Staff Consultant to the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of HEW, and Washington Editor of Current Magazine. you parjicipule . - - They profit. 216 Bale 64. EMPTY RITUAL VEKSUS BENEFIT There isacritical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process. This difference is brilliantly capsulized in a poster painted Jast spring by the French students to explain the student-worker rebellion? (See Figure 1.) The poster highlights the fundamental point that participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frus- Fiala pNPYOcessuGe poe eee Itallows the power- holderstoclaimthatallsideswereees but Takes it possible for only some of those sides to benehtt. It maintains the status quo. Essentially, it is what has | | | oa | political | i | | \ | There have been many recent speeches, articles, and books * which explore in detail who are the have-nots of our time. There has been much recent documenta- tion of why the have-nots have become so offended and embittered by their powerlessness to deal with the pro- found inequities and injustices pervading their daily lives. But there has been very litle analysis of the content of the current controversial slogan: “citizen participation” or “maximum feasible participation.” In short: Wat is citizen participation and what is its relationship to the social imperatives of our time? A LADDER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION . The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you. Participation of the gov- erned in their government is, in theory, the corner- stone of democracy—a revered idea that ts vigorously applauded by virtually everyone. The applause is re- duced to polite handclaps, however, when this princi- ple is advocated by the have-not blacks, Mexican- ‘Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos, and whites. And when the have-nots define participation as re- distribution of power, the American consensus on the fundamental principle explodes into many shades of outright racial, ethnic, ideological, and opposition. AIP JOURNAL JuLy 1969 Amencan Lx stitute of Plannéxs Towra! $1077 R.Arnstein Citizen Participation is Citizen Power Because the question has been a bone of political conten- tion, most of the answers have been purposely buried in innocuous euphemisms like “self-help” or “citizen involvement.” Still others have been embellished with misleading rhetoric like “absolute control’’ which is something no one—including the President of the United States—has or can have. Between understated euphemisms and exacerbated shictoric, even scholars have found it difficult to follow the controversy. To the headline reading public, it is simply bewildering. My answer to the critical what question is simply that citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen The heated controversy over “citizen participation,” “citizen control,” and “maximum feasible involvement of the poor,” has been waged largely in terms of ex- acerbated rhetoric and misleading cuphemisms. To encourage a more enlightened dialogue, a typology of citizen participation 1s offered using examples from three federal social programs: urban renewal, anti- poverty, and Model Citics. The typology, which is designed to be provocative, is accanged in a ladder pattern with cach rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power in determining the plan and/or program. power, It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in thefuture.Itisthestratbyewghiychthehave-notsjoin in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources areallocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled Out. In short, t is the means by which they an induce significant social reform which enables them to “share in the benefits of the affluent society. —_—_—_——_ FIGURE 1 French Student Poster. In English, 1 participate; you parjicipate; be participates; we participate; e | {| LIMITATIONS OF THE TYPOLOGY The ladder juxtaposes powerless citizens with the powerful in order to highlight the fundamental di- visions between them. In actuality, neither the have-nots nor the powerholders are homogencous blocs. Each group encompasses a host of divergent points of view, significant cleavages, competing vested interests, and splintered subgroups. The justification for using such simplistic abstractions is that in most cases the have-nots really do perceive the powerful as a monolithic “sys- tem,” and powerholders actually do view the have-nots as a sea of “those people,’ with little comprehension of the class and caste differences among them. It should be noted that the typology does not include an analysis of the most significant roadblocks to achiev- ing genuine levels of participation. These roadblocks lie on both sides of the simplistic fence. On the power- holders’ side, they include racism, paternalism, and resistance to power redistribution. On the have-nots’ side, they include inadequacies of the poor community's v Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with tions among ghem, Furthermore, some of the character- increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens istics used tq jiJystrate each of the eight types might be 6 ? Delegated power Degrees we «=f Citizen control i Portnership 6- 6 4 Eon Placation Consultation 7 Informing 3— 2 < 1 FIGURE 2 Therapy wal Manipulation Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Partici- pation citizen power Degrees tokenisn — Nonperticipation —d they lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. When participation is re-| political socipecanomic infrastructure and knowledge- stricted to these levels, there is no followthrough, no “muscle,” hence no assurance of changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation, is simply a higher level tokenism because the groundrules allow have-nots to advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide. base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable gitizens’ group in the face of futility, alienation, and distrust. : Another caysign about the eight separate rungs on the ladder: In the rea} world of people and programs, there might be 15Q rungs with less sharp and “pure” distinc- ARNSTEIN 217 can enter into a (6) Parinership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional powerholders. At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making scats, or full managerial power. Obviously, the cight-rung ladder is a simplification, but it helps to illustrate the point that so many have missed—that there are significant gradations of citizen participation. Knowing these gradations makes itpossi- ble to cut through the hyperbole to understand the increasingly strident demands for participation from the have-nots as well as the gamut of confusing responses from the powerholders. Though the typology uses examples from federal programs such as urban renewal, anti-poverty, and Model Cities; it could just as easily be illustrated in the church, currently facing demands for power from priests and laymen who seek to change its mission; colleges and universities which in some cases have become literal battlegrounds over the issue of student power, or public schools, city halls, and police departments (or big busi- ness which is likely to be next on the expanding list of targets). The underlying issues are essentially the same —"“nobodies” in several arenas are trying to become “somebodies” with enough power to make the target institutions responsive to their views, aspirations, and needs. been happening in most of the 1,000 Community Action Programs, and what promises to be repeated in the vast majority of the 150 Model Cities programs. Types of Participation and “NomParticipation” A typology of eight Jevels of participation may help in analysis of this confused issue. For illustrative pur- poses the eight types are arranged in a ladder pattern with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power in determining the end product.® (See Figure 2.) The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipula- tion and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of “non-participation” that have been contrived by some 2 substitute for genuine participation. Their real ob- ijective is not to enable people to participate in planning |or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to |"educate" or “cure” the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 'progress to levels of “tokenism’’ that allow the have- nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing and (4) Consultation. When they are proffered by power- holders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But under these conditions Characteristics and Illustrations It is in this context of power and powerlessness that the characteristics of the eight rungs are illustrated by examples from current federal social programs. 1, MANIPULATION In the name of citizen participation, people are placed on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of “educating” them or engi- neering their support. Instead of genuine citizen par- ticipation, the bottom rung of the ladder signifies the distortion of participation into a public relations vehicle by powerholders. This illusory form of “participation’” initially came into vogue with urban renewal when the socially elite were invited by city housing officials to serve on Citizen Advisory Committees (CACs). Another target of ma- nipulation were the CAC subcommittees on minority gcoups, which in theory were to protect the rights of Negroes in the renewal program. In practice, these subcommittees, like their parent CACs, functioned mostly as letterheads, trotted forward at appropriate times to promote urban renewal plans (in recent years known as Negro removal plans). At meetings of the Citizen Advisory Committees, it was the officials who educated, persuaded, and advised the citizens, not the reverse. Federal guidelines for the ticipation, should be an the Jowest rung of the ladder renewal programs legitimized the manipulative agenda because it is both dishonest and arrogant. Its adminis- by emphasizing the terms “information-gathering,” trators—mental health experts from social workers to “public relations,” and “support” as the explicit func- _psychiatrists—assume shat powerlessness 1s synonymous tions of the committees.® with mental illness. Qn this assumption, under a mas- This style of nonparticipation has since been applied querade of involving citizens in planning, the experts to other programs encompassing the poor. Examples of subject the citizens ty clinical group therapy. What this are seen in Community Action Agencies (CAAs) makes this form of “participation” so jnvidious is that which have created structures called “neighborhood citizens are engaged ip extensive activity, but the focus councils” or “neighborhood advisory groups.” These bodies frequently have no legitimate function or power.® ‘ The CAAs use them to “prove’’ that “grassroots people” are involved in the program. But the program may not have been discussed with “the people.’” Or it may have been described at a meeting in the most general terms; “We need your signatures on this pro- posal for a multiservice center which will house, under one roof, doctors from the health department, workers from the welfare department, and specialists from the employment service.” : ; 218 Aig JOURNAL JULY 1969 In some respects group therapy, masked as citizen par- 2. THERAPY The signators are not informed that the $2 million- per-year center will only refer residents to the same old waiting lines at the same old agencies across town. No one is asked if such a referral center is really needed in his ncighborhood. No one realizes that the contractor for the building is the mayor's brother-in-law, or that the new director of the center will be the same old com- munity organization specialist from the urban renewal agency. After signing theic names, the proud grassrooters dutifully spread she word that they have “participated” in bringing « new and wonderful center to the neighbor- hood to provide people with drastically needed jobs and health and welfare services. Only after the ribbon- cutting ceremony do the members of the neighborhood council realize that they didn’t ask the important ques- tions, and that they had no technical advisors of their own to help them grasp the fine legal print. The new center, which is open 9 to 5 on weekdays only, actually adds to their problems. Now the old agencies across town won't talk with them unless they have a pink paper slip to prove that they have been referred by “their” shiny new neighborhood center. Unfortunately, this chicanery ts nota unique example. Instead it is almost typical of what has been perpetrated in the name of high-sounding rhetoric like “grassroots participation.” This sharn lies at the heart of the deep- seated exasperation and hostility of the have-nots toward the powerholders. One hopeful note is that, having been so grossly affronted, some citizens have learned the Mickey Mouse game, and now they too know how to play. Asa result _ of this knowledge, they are demanding genuine levels of participation to assuge them that public programs are relevant to their needs and responsive to their priorities. of itison curing them of their “patholopy” rather than \ changing the racism and victimization that create their “pathologies.” : Consider an incidept that occurred in Pennsylvania less than one year ago, When a father took his seriously il baby to the emergency clinic.of a local hospital, a young resident physician on duty instructed him to take the baby home and feed it sugar water. The baby died that afternoon of pygumanja and dehydration. The overwrought father cgmplaingd to the board of the local : applicable to other rungs. Vor example, employment of the have-nots in a program or on a planning staff could occur at any of the cight rungs and could represent either a legitimate or illegitimate characteristic of citi- zen participation. Depending on their motives, power- holders can hire poor people to coopt them, to placate them, or to utilize the have-nots’ special skills and insights. Sone mayors, in private, actually boast of their strategy in hiring, militant black leaders to muzzle them while destroying their credibility in the black community. Community Action Agency. Instead of launching an the official, the citizens accepted the “information” and investigationofthehospitaltodeterminewhatchanges endorsedtheagency'sproposaltoplacefourlotsinthe wouldpreventsimilardeathsorotherformsofmal- whiteneighborhood." practice, the board invited the father to attend the 4. CONSULTATION Inviting citizens’ opinions, like informing them, can be a legitimate step toward their full participation. But if Less dramatic, but more common examples of consulting them is not combined with other modes of therapy,masqueradingascitizenparticipation,maybe participation,thisrungoftheladderisstillashamsince seen in public housing programs where tenant groups itoffers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will are used as vehicles for promoting control-your-child or be taken into account. The most frequent methods used cleanup campaigns. The tenants are brought together for consulting people are attitude surveys, neighborhood CAA’s (therapy) child-care sessions for parents, and promised him that someone would “telephone the hos- pital director to see that it never happens again.” to help them “adjust their values and attitudes to those of the larger society.” Under these groundrules, they are diverted from dealing with such important matters as: arbitrary evictions; segregation of the housing proj- ect; or why is there a three-month time lapse to pet a broken window replaced in winter. The complexity of the concept of mental illness in “our time can be seen in the experiences of student/civil rights workers facing guns, whips, and other forms of terror in the South. They needed the help of socially mectings, and public hearings. When powerholders restrict the input of citizens’ ideas solely to this level, participation remains just a window-dressing ritual. Pcople are primarily perceived as statistical abstractions, and participation is measured by how many come to meetings, take brochures home, or answer a questionnaire. What citizens achieve in all this activity is that they have “participated in participa- tion.” And what powerholders achieve is the evidence that they have gone through the required motions of attunedpsychiatriststodealwiththeirfearsandtoavoid involving“thosepeople.” paranoia.’ 3. INFORMING Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options can be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation. However, too frequently the emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information Attitude surveys have become a particular bone of contention in ghetto neighborhoods. Residents are in- creasingly unhappy about the number of times per week they are surveyed about theic problems and hopes. As one woman put it: “Nothing ever happens with those damned questions, except the surveyer gets $3 an hour, and my washing doesn’t get done that day.” In some —from officials to citizens—with no channel provided communities, residents are so annoyed that they ace for feedback and no power for negotiation, Under these conditions, particularly when information is provided at a late stage in planning, people have little opportunity to influence the program designed “for their benefit.” The most frequent tools used for such one-way com- poverty funds) has “documented” that poor housewives munication are the news media, pamphilets, posters, and responses to inquiries. Meetings can also be turned into vehicles for one-way communication by the simple device of providing super- ficial information, discouraging questions, or giving something small, they might just get something useful irrelevant answers. At a recent Model Cities citizen © in the neighborhood. Had the mothers known that a planning meeting in Providence, Rhode Island, the topic free prepaid health insurance plan was a possible option, was “tot-fots.” A group of elected citizen representa- they might not have put tot-lots so high on their wish tives, almost al of whom were attending three to five lists. meetings a week, devoted an hour to a discussion of the placement of six tot-lots. The neighborhood is half black, half white. Several of the black representatives noted that four tot-lots were proposed for the white district and only two for the black. The city official responded with a lengthy, highly technical explanation about costs per square foot and available property. It was clear that most of the residents did not understand his explanation. And it was clear to observers from the Office of Economic Opportunity that other options did exist which, considering available funds, would have brought about a more. equitable distribution of facilities. Intimidated by futility, legalistic jargon, and prestige of ARNSTEIN A classic misuse of the consultation rung occurred at a New Haven, Connecticut, community meeting held to consult citizens on a proposed Model Cities. grant. James V. Cunningham, in an unpublished report to the Ford Foundation, described the crowd as large and “mostly hostile:” ° demanding a fee for research interviews. Attitude surveys are not very valid indicators of com- munity opinion when used without other input from citizens. Survey after survey (paid for out of anti- most want tot-lots in their neighborhood where young children can play safely. But most of the women aa- swered these questionnaires without knowing what their options were. They assumed that if they asked for Members of The Hil] Parents Association de- manded to know why fesidents had not partici- pated in drawing up the praposal. CAA director — Spitz explained that it was merely a proposal for secking Federal planning funds—that once funds were obtained, residenty would be deeply involved in the planning. An oytsiqe observer who sat in * 219 5. PLACATION It is at this level that citizens begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism is still apparent. An example of placation strategy is to place a few hand- picked “worthy” poor on boards of Community Action Agencies or on public bodies like the board of educa- tion, police commission, or housing authority. If they are not accountable to a constituency in the community and if the traditional power elite hold the majority of seats, the have-nots can be easily outvoted and outfoxed. Another example is the Model Cities advisory and planning committees. They allow citizens to advise or plan ad infinitum but retain for powerholders the right to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. The degree to which citizens are actually placated, of course, depends largely on two factors: the quality of technical assistance they have in articulating their priorities; and the extent to which the community has been organized to press for those priorities. It is not surprising that the level of citizen participa- tion in the vast majority of Model Cities programs ts at the placation rung of the ladder or below. Policy- makers at the Department of Housing and Urban De- velopment (HUD) were determined to return the genie of citizen power to the bottle from which it had escaped 220 $$ = eee the audience described the mecting this way: “Spitz and Mel Adams ran the meeting on their own. No representatives of a Hill group mod- crated or even sat on the stage. Spitz told the 300 residents that this huge mecting, was an (in a few cities) as a result of the provision stipulating “maximum feasible participation” in poverty programs. Therefore, HUD channeled its physical-social-economic rejuvenation approach example of ‘participation in planning. To prove this, since there was a lot of dissatisfaction in the audience, he called for’a ‘vote’ on each component of the proposal. The vote took this form: “Can I sce the hands of all those in favor of a health clinic? All those opposed?’ It was a little like asking who favors motherhood.” for blighted neighborhoods through city hall. It drafted legislation requiring that al Model Cities’ moncy flow to a local City Demonstra- tion Agency (CDA) through the elected city council. ‘As enacted by Congress, this gave local city councils final veto power over planning and programming and ruled out any direct funding relationship between community groups and HUD. HUD required the CDAs to create coalition, policy- making boards that would include necessary local power- holders to create a comprehensive physical-social plan during the first year. The plan was to be carried out in a subsequent five-year action phase. HUD, unlike OEO, did not require that have-not citizens be included on the CDA decision-making boards. HUD’s Performance Standards for Citizen Participation only demanded that “citizens have clear and direct access to the decision- making process.” Accordingly, the CDAs structured theie policy- making boards to include some combination of elected officials; school representatives; housing, health, and welfare officials; employment and police department representatives; and various civic, labor, and business leaders. Some CDAs included citizens from the neigh- borhood. Many mayors correctly interpreted the HUD provision for ‘access to the decision-making process” as the escape hatch they sought to relegate citizens to the traditional advisory role. Most CDAs created residents’ advisory committees. An alarmingly significant number created citizens’ policy boards and citizens’ policy committees which are totally misnamed as they have cither no policy-making function or only a very limited authority. Almost every CDA created about a dozen planning committees or task forces on functional lines: health, welfare, education, housing, and ungmployment. In most cases, have-not citizens were invited to serve on these committees along with technicians from relevant public agencies. Some CDAs, on the other hand, structured planning committees of technicians and parallel committees of citizens. In most Model Cities programs, endless time has been spent fashioning complicated board, committee, and task force structures for the planning year. But the rights and responsibilities of the yarious elements of those structures are not defined and are ambiguous. Such It was a combination of the deep suspicion aroused at this meeting and a long history of similar forms of “window-dressing participation” that led New Haven residents to demand control of the program. By way of contrast, it is uscful to look at Denver where technicians learned that even the best intentioned among them are often unfamiliar with, and even in- sensitive to, the problems and aspirations of the poor. The technical director of the Model Cities program has described the way professional planners assumed that the residents, victimized by high-priced local storekeep- ers, “badly needed consumer education.” *° The resi- dents, on the other hand, pointed out that the local storekeepers performed a valuable function. Although they overcharged, they also gave credit, offered advice, and frequently were the only neighborhood place to cash welfare or salary checks. As a result of this con- sultation, technicians and residents agreed to substitute the creation of needed credit institutions in the neighborhood for a consumer education program. \ ambiguity is likely to cause considerable conflict at the end of the one-year planning process. For at this point, citizens may realize that they have once again exten- sively “participated” but have not profited beyond the extent the powerholders decide to placate them. Results of a staff study (conducted in the summer of 1968 before the second round of seventy-five planning grants were awarded) were released in a December 1968 HUD bulletin.® Though this public document uses much more delicate and diplomatic language, it AIP Tore arn attests to the already cited criticisms of non-policy- It also urge: CDAs to experiment with subcontracts makingpolicyboardsandambiguouscomplicatedstruc- tures, in addition to the following findings: 1. Most CDAs did not negotiate citizen par- ticipation requirements with residents. 2. Citizens, drawing on past negative experi- ences with local powerholders, were extremely sus- piciousofthisnewpanaceaprogram.Theywerelegiti- mately distrustful of city hall's motives. underwhichtheresidents’groupscouldhiretheirown trusted technjcians. A more recent evaluation was circulated in February 1969 by OSTI, a private firm that entered into a con- tract with OEO to provide technical assistance and train- ing to citizens involved in Model Cities programs in the northeastregionofthecountry.OSTI'sreporttoOEO corroborates the earlier study. In addition it states: 2 3. Most CDAs were not working with citizens’ groups that were genuinely representative of model neighborhoods and accountable to neighborhood con- stituencies. As in so many of the poverty programs, those who were involved were more representative of the upwardly mobile working-class. Thus their ac- quiescence to plans prepared by city agencies was not likelytoreflecttheviewsoftheunemployed,theyoung, plannersoftheCDAandtheplannersofexisting the more militant residents, and the hard-core poor. 4. Residents who were participating in as many as three to five meetings per week were unaware of their minimum yights, responsibilities, and the options avail- able ta them under the program. For example, they did not realize that they were not required to accept techni- cal help from city technicians they distrusted. 5. Most of the technical assistance provided by CDAs and city agencies was of third-rate quality, paternalistic, and condescending. Agency technicians did not suggest innovative options. They reacted bu- requcratically when the residents pressed for innovative approaches, The vested interests of the old-line city agencies were amajor—albeit hidden—agenda. 6. Most CDAs were not engaged in planning that was comprehensive enough to expose and deal with the roots of urban decay. They engaged in “'meetingitis” and were supporting strategies that resulted in “proj- ectitis,”” the outcome of which was a “Jaundry list’’ of traditional programs to be conducted by traditional agencies in the traditional manner under which slums emerged in the first place. 7. Residents were not getting enough informa- tion from CDAs to enable them to review CDA de- veloped plans or to initiate plans of their own as re- quired by HUD. At best, they were getting superficial copies of official HUD materials. 8. Most residents were unaware of their rights to be reimbursed for expenses incurred because of par- ficipation—babysitting, transportation costs, and so on. 9. The training of residents, which would en- able them to understand the labyrinth of the federal- state-city systems and networks of subsystems, was an item that most CDAs did not even consider. These findings led to a new public interpretation of HUD's approach to citizen participation. Though the requirements for the seventy-five “second-round” Model City- grantees were not changed, HUD's twenty-seven page technical bulletin on citizen participation repeat- ¢dly advocated that cities share power with residents. ARNSTEIN agencies are carrying out the actual planning with citizens having a peripheral role of watchdog and, ultimately, the “rubber stamp’ of the plan gen- erated. In cases where citizens fave the direct responsibility for generating program plans, the time period allowed and she independent technical resources being made ~yailable to them are not adequate to allow them tp do anything more than generate very traditional approaches to the prob- lems they are attempting to solve. In general, little or no thought has been given to the means of insuring continued citizen partici- pation during the stage of implementation. In most cases, traditiqnal agencies are envisaged as the implementors of Mode (Cities pragrams and few mechanisms have been developed bor encouraging organizational change or change in the method of program delivery within these agencies or for in- suring that citizens will have some influence over these agencies as they implement Model Cities programs. .. . By and large, caple are once again being plannedfor.Inmostsituationsthereel ning decisions are being made by CDA staft and approved in a formalistic way by policy boards. 6. PARTNERSHIP At this rung of the ladder, power is in fact redistributed _ through negotiation ketween citizens and powerholders. In practically no Medel Cities structure does citi- zen participation mean truly shared decision- making, such that citizens might view themselves as‘thepactnersinthisprogram. ...”’ In general, citizens are finding jt impossible to have a significant impact on the comprehensive planning which is going on. In mast cases the staff information. At worst, they were not even getting \They agree to share planning and decision-making responsibilities through such structures as joint policy boards, planning committees and mechanisms for re- solving impasses. After the groundsules have been established through some form of giye-and-take, they are not subject to unilgteral change. Partnership can wask most effectively when there is an organized power-byse jn the community to which the citizen leaders are accpuntable; when the citizens group has the financial resoyeces tq pay its leaders reasonable ~ honoraria for their time-consuming efforts; and when the group has the respurces to hire (and fire) its own technicians, lawyers, and community organizers. With these ingredients, citiyens have some genuine bargain- 221 city’s description of the model neighborhood from a | | ! x ; } paternalistic description of problems to a realistic analy- | sis of its strengths, weaknesses, and potentials.) Consequently, the proposed policy-making committee parallel groups of citizens and powerholders, with pro- of the Philadelphia CDA was revamped to give five out vision for citizen veto if differences of opinion cannot of eleven seats to the residents’ organization, which is be resolved through negotiation. This is a particularly called the Area Wide Council (AWC). The AWC), interesting coexistence model for hostile citizen groups 7. DELEGATED POWER Negotiations between citizens and pubtic officials can also result in citizens achieving dominant decision- making authority over a particular plan or program. Model City policy’ boards or CAA delegate agencies on which citizens have a clear majority of scats and genuine specified powers are typical examples. At this level, the ladder has been scaled to the point where citizens hold the significant cards to assure accountability of the pro- gram to them. To resolve differences, powerholders need to start the bargaining process rather than respond to pressure from the other end. Such a dominant decision-making role has been at- tained by residents in a handful of Model Cities includ- ing Cambridge, Massachusetts; Dayton, and Columbus, Ohio; Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Louis, Missouri; Hartford and New Haven, Connecticut; and Oakland, California. In New Haven, residents of the Hill neighborhood have created a corporation that has been delegated the power to prepare the entire Model Cities plan. The city, which received a $117,000 planning grant from HUD, has subcontracted $110,000 of it to the neighborhood corporation to hire its own planning staff and consul- tants. The Hill Neighborhood Corporation has eleven representatives on the twenty-one-member CDA board} which assures it a majority voice when its proposed plan is reviewed by the CDA. Another model of delegated power is separate and { | obtained a subcontract from the CDA for more than too embittered toward city hall—as a result of past $20,000 per month, which it used to maintain the neigh- borhood organization, to pay citizen leaders $7 per meeting for their planning services, and to pay the salaries of a staff of community organizers, planners, and other technicians. AWC has the power to initiate plans of its own, to engage in joint planning with CDA committees, and to review plans initiated by city agen- California, the city council agreed to a citizens’ counter ; 222 “collaborative efforts’—to engage in joint planning. Since all Model Cities programs require approval by the city council before HUD will fund them, city coun- cils have final veto powers even when citizens have the majority of seats on the CDA Board. In Richmond, AIP JOURNAL july 1969 cies. It has a veto power in that no plans may be sub- mitted by the CDA to the city council until they have been reviewed, and any differences of opinion have been successfullynegotiatedwiththeAWC. Representatives of the AWC (which is a federation of neighborhood organizations grouped into sixteen neighborhood “hubs”) may attend al meetings of CDA task forces, planning committees, or subcommittees. Though the city council has final yeto power over the plan (by federal law), the AWC believes it has a neighborhood constituency that is strong enough to negotiate any eleventh-hour objections the city council might raise when itconsiders such AWC proposed in- novations as an AWC Land Bank, an AWC Economic Development Corporation, and an experimental income maintenance program for 900 poor families. { | At their next meeting, citizens handed the city offi- cials a substitute citizen participation section that changed the groundrules from a weak citizens’ ad- visory role to a strong shared power agreement. Phila- delphia'sapplicationtoHUD includedthecitizens’ ing influence over the outcome of the plan (as long as | both parties find it useful to maintain the partnership). - One community leader described it “like coming to city | hall with hat on head instead of in hand.” In the Model Cities program only about fifteen of the so-called first generation of seventy-five cities have reached some significant degree of power-sharing with residents. In al but one of those cities, it was angry citizen demands, rather than city initiative, that led to the negotiated sharing of power.” The negotiations were triggered by citizens who had been enraged by previous forms of alleged participation. They were both angry and sophisticated enough to refuse to be “conned” again. They threatened to oppose the awarding of a planning grant to the city. They sent delegations to HUD in Washington. They used abrasive language. Negotiation took place under a cloud of suspicion and rancor. In most cases where power has come to be shared it was taken by the citizens, not given by the city. There is nothing new about that process. Since those who have | power normally want to hang onto it, historically it has oe: tobewrestedbythepowerlessratherthanproffered y the powerful. Such a working partnership was negotiated by the residents in the Philadelphia model neighborhood. Like most applicants for a Model Cities grant, Philadelphia | wrote its more than 400 page application and waved it at a hastily called meeting of community leaders. When | those present were asked for an endorsement, they angrily protested the city’s failure to consult them on preparation of the extensive application. A community spokesman threatened to mobilize a neighborhood pro- test against the application unless the city agreed to give the citizens a couple of weeks to review the application and recommend changes. The officials agreed. ubstitution word for word. (It also included a new citizen prepared introductory chapter that changed the veto, but the details of that agreement are ambiguous to developa series of economic enterprises ranging from a novel combination shopping-center-public-housing Various delegated power arrangements are also project to a loan guarantee program for local building emerging in the Community Action Program as a result contractors. The membership and board of the non- . of demands from the neighborhoods and OEO’s most profit corporation is composed of leaders of major com- recent instruction guidelines which urged CAAs “to munity organizations in the black neighborhood. and have not been tested. exceed (the) basic requirements” for resident participa- tion.'* In some cities, CAAs have issued subcontracts to resident dominated groups to plan and/or operate one or more decentralized neighborhood program components like a multipurpose service center or a Headstart pro- gram. These contracts usually include an agreed upon the coop (which included the use of force to stop line-by-line budget and program specifications. They trucks on the way to market), first year membership also usually include a specific statement of the significant grew to 1,150 farmers who earned $52,000 on the sale powers that have been delegated, for example: policy- of theic new crops. The elected coop board is composed making; hiring and firing; issuing subcontracts for building, buying, or leasing. (Some of the subcontracts are so broad that they verge on models for citizen control.) 8, CITIZEN CONTROL Demands for community controlled schools, black con- trol, and neighborhood control are on the increase. Though no one in the nation has absolute control, it is very important that the rhetoric not be confused with intent. People are simply demanding that degree of power (or control) which guarantees that participants or residents can govern a program or an institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be able to negotiate the conditions under which “outsiders” may change them. A neighborhood corporation with no intermediaries between it and the source of funds is the model most frequently advocated. A small number of such expeti- mental corporations are already producing goods and/or social services. Several others are reportedly in the development stage, and new models for control will undoubtedly emerge as the have-nots continue to press for greater degrees of power over their lives. of two poor black farmers from each of the ten economi- cally depressed counties. Though the bitter steuggle for community control of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools in New York City has aroused great fears in the headline reading public, less publicized experiments are demonstrating that the have-nots can indeed improve their lot by handling the| power and accountability rest with the city council. entire job of planning, policy-making, and managing a Daniel P. Moynihan argues that city councils are program. Some are even demonstrating that they can do representative of the cormmunity, but Adam Walinsky al this with just one acm because they are forced to use illustrates the nonrepresentativeness of this kind of their other one to deal with a continuing barrage of local opposition triggered by the announcement that a federal grant has been given to a community group or an all black group. ! representation: *° Who . . . exercises “control” through the repre- sentative process? In the Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto of New York there are 450,000 people—as many as in the entire city of Cincinnati, more than in _ Most of these experimental programs have been capi- talized with research and demonstration funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity in cooperation with | the entire state of Vermont. Yet the area has only_ other federal agencies. Examples include: 1. A $1.8 million grant was awarded to the Hough Area Development Corporation in Cleveland to plan economic development programs in the ghetto and ARNSTEIN one high school, and 80 per cent of its teen-agers are dropeuss the infant mortality rate is twice the national average; there are over 8000 buildings abandoned by evesyone but the rats, yet the arca received not one qollay pf urban renewal funds \ 223 2. Approximately $1 million ($595,751 for the second year) was awarded to the Southwest Alabama Farmers Cooperative Association (SW ATCA) in Selma, Alabama, for a ten-county marketing cooperative for food and livestock. Despite local attempts to intimidate 3. Approximately $600,000 ($300,000 in a supplemental grant) was granted to the Albina Cor- poration and the Albina Investment Trust to create a black-operated, black-owned manufacturing concern us- ing inexperienced management and unskilled minority group personnel from the Albina district. The profit- making wool and metal fabrication plant will be owned by its employees through a deferred compensation trust lan. 4. Approximately $800,000 ($400,600 for the second year) was awarded to the Harlem Common- wealth Council to demonstrate that a community-based development corporation can catalyze and implement an economic development program with broad community support and participation. After only eighteen months of program development and negotiation, the council will soon launch several large-scale ventures including operation of two supermarkets, an auto service and repair center (with built-in manpower training pro- gram), a finance company for families eacning less than $4,000 per year, and a data processing company. The al black Harlem-based board is already managing a metal castings foundry. Though several citizen groups (and their mayors) use the rhetoric of citizen control, no Model City can meet the criteria of citizen control since final approval — NOTES 1The literature on poverty and discrimination and their effects on people is extensive. As an introduction, the following will be 224 AIP JOURNAL JULY 1969 helpful: B. Bagidikian, In the Midst of Plenty: The Poor during the entire first 15 years of that program's operation; the unemployment rate is known only to God. in. America’ (New York: Teacon, 1964); Paul Jacobs, “The Drutalizing, of America,” Dissent, XI (Autumn 1961), p. 423-8; Stokely Carmichacl and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (New York: Random House, 1967); Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (New York: McGraw-Hill, Clearly, Bedford-Stuyvesant has some special needs; yet it has always been lost in the midst of the city’s eight million! In fact, it took a lawsuit to win for this vast area, in the year 1968, its first Congressman, In what sense can the repre- sentative system be said to have “spoken for’ this community, during the long years of neglect and decay? 1968); L. J. Duhl, The Urban Condition; People and Policy in the Metropolis (New York: Basic Books, 1963); William H. Grier and P. M. Cobbs, Black Rage (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmitian, 1962); Peter Marcis and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Cammunity Action in the United States (New York: Atherton Press, 1967); Mollie Orshansky, “Who's Who Amone the Poor: A Demographic View of Poverty,” Social Security Bulletin, XXVII (July 1965), 3-32; and Richard T. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State (New Haven: Walinsky’s point on Bedford-Stuyvesant has general Yale University Press, 1968) applicability to the ghettos from coast to coast. It ts 2 The poster is one of about 350 produced in May or pene 1968 at Atélicr Populaire, a graphics center launched by students from therefore likely that in those ghettos where residents the Sorbonne’s Ecole des Beaux Art and Feole des Acts Decoratifs 3 This typology is an outgrowth of a more crude typology I circulated in March 1967 in a HUD staff discussion paper titled Model Cities planning process, the first-year action plans “Rhetoric and Reality.” The carlier typology consisted of eight levels that were Jess discrete types and did not necessarily suggest a chronological progression: Inform, Consult, Joint Planning, institutions entirely governed by residents with a speci- Negotiate, Decide, Delegate, Advocate Planning, and Neighbor- have achieved a significant degree of power in the will call for the creation of some new community fied sum of money contracted to them. If the ground- rules for these programs are clear and if citizens under- stand that achieving a genuine place in the pluralistic scene subjects them to its legitimate forms of give-and- take, then these kinds of programs might begin to demonstrate how to counteract the various corrosive political and socioeconomic forces that plague the poor. hood Control. - 4For an article of some possible cmployment strategies, sec, In cities likely to become predominantly black through population growth, it is unlikely that strident citizens’ groups like AWC of Philadelphia will even- tually demand legal power for neighborhood self- government. Their grand design is more likely to call for a black city ‘hall, achieved by the elective process. In cities destined to remain predominantly white for the aay foresceable future, it is quite likely that counterpart groups to AWC will press for separatist forms of neighborhood government that can create and control decentralized public services such as police protection, education systems, and health facilities. Much may February 1, 1969, pp. 27, 28, and 35. depend on the willingness of city governments to enter- tain demands for resource allocation weighted in favor of the poor, reversing gross imbalances of the past. 13 In Cambridge, Massachusetts, city hall offered to share power with residents and anticipated the need for a period in which a representative citizens group could be engaged, and the ambiguities of authority, structure, and process would be resolved. At the re- quest of the mayor, HUD allowed the city to spend several months of Model Cities planning funds for community organization activi- ties. During these months, staff from the city manager's office also helped the residents draft a city ordinance that created a CDA com- Among the arguments.against community control are: itsupports separatism, itcreates balkanization of public services: it is more costly and less efficient; it enables posed of sixteen elected residents and cicht appointed public and minority group “hustlers” to be just as opportunistic and disdainful of the have-nots as their white prede- cessors; it is incompatible with merit systems and pro- fessionalism; and ironically enough, itcan turn out tobe a new Mickey Mouse game for the have-nots by allow- ing them to gain control but not allowing them sufh- private agency representatives. This resident-dominated body has the power to hire and fire CDA staff, approve all plans, review all model city budgets and contracts, set policy, and so forth. The ordinance, which was unanimously passed by the city council also includes a requirement that all Model City plans must be approved by a majority of residents in the neighborhood through arefer- endum. Final approval power rests with the city council by federal statute. cient dollar resources to succeed.* These arguments are not to be taken lightly. But neither can we take lightly of Community Action Programs (Washington, D.C.; December 1, the arguments of embittered advocates of 1968), pp. 1-2. 15 Adam Walinsky, “Review of Maximum Feasible Mitunder- community control—that every other means of trying to end their standing” by Daniel P. Moynihan, New York Times Book Review, February 2, 1969 Victimization has failed! 16 For thoughtful academic analyses of some of the potentials and pitfalls of emerging neighborhood control models, see, Alan Edmund M. Burke, “Citizen Participation Strategies,” ournal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXIV, No. 5 September 1968), 290-1. $US., Department of Housing and Urban Development, Workable Program for Community Improvement, Answers on Cur zen Participation, Program Guide 7, February, 1966, pp. 1 and 6. 6David Austin, “Study of Resident Participants in Twenty Community Action Agencies,” CAP Grant 9199. 7Robert Coles, “Social Struggle and Weariness,” Psychiatry, XXVIII (November 1961), 305-15 I am also indebted to Daniel M. Fox of Harvard University for some of his general insights into therapy being used as a diverston from genuine citizen participation, 8Sce, Gordon Fellman, “Neighborhood Protest of an Urban Highway,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV, No. 2 (March 1969), 118-22. 9James V. Cunningham, “Resident Participation, Unpublished Report prepared for the Ford Foundation, August 1967, p 54. A. Interview with Maxine Kurtz, Technical Director, Denver 11U.S, Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Citizen Participation in Model Cities,” Technical Assistance Bulle- tin, No. 3 (December 19638). 12 Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, Six-Month Progress Report to Office of Economic Opportunity, Region 1, 1$U,S., Office of Economic Opportunity, OEQ Instruction, Participation of the Poor in the Planning, Conduct and Evaluation Altshuler, “The Demapd For Participation in Large American _ Cities.” An Unpublished Papes prepared for the Urban Institute, December 1968; and Hans Yj. C. Spiegel and Stephen D. Mitten- thal, “Neighborhood Pqwer and Control, Implications for Urban Planning,” A Report prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Nayember 1968. hnaageceey AIM : TO ESTABLISH A FREELY AVAILABLE ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN AND ADVICE SERVICE. 2.0 PRESENT PATRONAGE Zio Lise ANOMALIES 3.1 Anomalies in Control and Use PROPOSED RESEARCH PROJECT The problems which stem from this basic injustice have been described often enough. Lack of power and control as the root cause is slowly emerging as one of the options which might be tackled. etl To study practical implications of setting up an architectural design service which would be available to all. The study would include the identification of financial, legal and political problems. od To establish an experimental locally based, small scale, short life project to test proposals. STATEMENT A recent report sponsored by the Association of Consulting Architects discusses the ills of architecture and concludes that there are too many architects. A more searching analysis might have decided that the way forward is to have more patrons. As the patron effectively controls the direction of architecture, it is clear that a large proportion of the population are excluded from this position. The tendency for large organis- ations to grow larger and thus reduce in overall numbers, suggests that there will probably be less, not more, patrons if the present trend continues. The present patrons of architecture are well enough known not to require cataloguing here; they are either rich and powerful individuals or organisations. The people who are not patrons of architecture form some 80% of the population. If the resulting architecture affected only the patron then it could be argued that this situation is acceptable. Unfortunately, the general rule now is that the patron is usually one of the few people not affected. The users rarely have control over either the design or subsequent management of buildings which they occupy. They must adapt to an environment imposed on them from outside. SEU ANOMALIES (continued) 32 Anomalies in Design The environment into which users must fit are dictated by bureaucracies who compromise the major patrons, whether public or private. They tend to see every design commissioned asa large scale exercise, assuming that size equals rationalisation, equals efficiency, equals economy. (Less expenditure or more profit). This often results in architects being asked to design buildings particularly for local councils under impossible conditions on what is often a totally unsuitable site. However, it is often true that architects compound this by striving for the simple, bold statement. Ona large site this can become pretty simple and pretty bold. The rationalising process must necessarily exclude all deviations. Those elements which are honestly and clearly expressed in small scale work must be rationalised and suppressed for the sake of the same architectural honesty and clarity, because of their quantity. The resulting plain design then requires some applied decoration which can be achieved by the form of the structure, lift enclosures, plant rooms etc. Without the demands and feedback from the users, we have had to rely on architectural magazines for approval or design. They have taught us from our student days that good architecture is visually exciting and every building is a potential monument. We have tended to forget that the built environment is composed of a large amount of background, however rich and varied, which acts as a foil to a small number of monuments. Anomalies in Architect / Client Relationship Many architects do not meet their clients. Even when they do it is rare indeed that they feel any empathy with their clients or sympathy to their aims. This is usually mutual and it is surprising that good buildings are sometimes created under these conditions. One can only speculate on the effect which the relationship between Le Corbusier and the Dominican monks had on the design of la Tourrette. 3.0 ANOMALIES (continued) 3.4 Conclusions 4.0 It is socially important that the users of buildings control the design process. Accordingly, the design should be carried out on a small scale local basis. Our recent experience suggests that while the sum of many buildings can produce a rich and varied environment, this cannot be achieved by designing the whole first and then trying to break it down into small parts. If the design is to work upwards from the parts, it can only be achieved properly by extending the patronage base considerably. One of the side benefits would be the opportunity for patrons and architects to achieve a creative working relationship. ULTI MATE AIM To have architects' services freely available to all, through a locally controlled National Design Service, which would give people the rights to which they are entitled. No doubt there would still be room for private practice. A large part of the proposed research would have to be devoted to identifying the many problems, including legal and financial ones which would confront such a solution. POSSIBLE INTERIM SOLUTION Technically it would seem to be a straight forward matter for such a technique to be employed in local government. Design teams, which are at present centrally situated and controlled could be dispersed through the local authority area to form local offices, in each ward for example. These teams would provide a design service to their area and would work directly with the people both with individuals and with groups. They should be controlled by local groups and local councillors. Again it would be necessary to identify problems during the research period. At this stage the most apparent of these seems to be that both councillors and chief officers would lose power to the people. It is doubtful that they will see this as an attractive proposition if their present attitude to HAAs is anything to go by. 9.0 1.0 Research 2.0 3.0 Evaluation Comments PROPOSED RESEARCH PROGRAMME 1.2 Identify particular problems, eg financial, legal and political. Wad Establish interim proposals on which to base stage 2.0. ot Study existing experiments and projects sponsored by local authorities and by other sources, eg HAAs, CDPs, law centres, ASSIST etc. Action Del Set up small scale short life locally based project (say Analyse aims, principles, working methods, range of work, source of finance etc. 2 - 3 people for 1 - 2 years) to test proposals and to form possible future prototype. oral Evaluate, write up and publicise. I recognise that the difficulties facing such a solution are numerous. Nevertheless, I am convinced that this is one way to move forward. The work being carried out by ASSIST in Govan, the moves towards involving local people in HAAs, and the possibilities for tenants control being discussed by the Minister of Housing, all give me cause for optimism that there is scope for initiatives at the present time, which will reflect the demands being pressed by tenants and other groups. Internationale Zeitschrift far Bauen und Wohnen VERLAG BAUEN +WOHNEN GmbH Redaktion Dear John I should like to thank you again for the time you had to talk to me in London, which interesting. Sincercly yours, Bauen+Wohnen Veli Schifer Editor i-A. Judith Pfau was very injoiable and Mr. John Murray 5 Milton Avenue GB -LondonN6 Bauen Vel aTaT=ya Bauen Wohnen Briefadresse: Postfach 8033 Zorich Telefon 01/289566 rj Construction A A Habitation Inseratenverwaltung Abonnementsverwaltung 8006 ZGrich, Vogelsangstr. 48 Zurich 22nd August 1977 jp As soon as there is something published out of the material you gaved me, I shall let you know, KeDarby Grove Loka Nothghan May 2277) L0Os (John) Nee ce Gk He NAM Uarordschor Giferoce hat Ke Noksxho~ goup WUL agar 4 Cutetasse wal Lvov. kkiy pie Speak neh Choa Dei Serres. The ones 4 bhFake Place on ie pi cst id & & BR hated Qrwd Dee ee ce 4.*Pole (Qa. plese a-fym a5 Maas possible IcDoveorofnolisn kethRaGe, ADB4 (st prebenol, (avies tnd (of b/eo. [of Ke Bimrgha. eo (as aliea.d eee bo Speak Cd e polkkrel Leeasmy of AOusA7 Csr ()2ose XGloGY Son28-2 prow Yj Utero . ARCHITECTURAL ASSOCIATION SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE Chairman: Alvin Boyarsky, B.Arch (McGill)., M.R.P. (Cornell), M.R.A.L.C., 34-36 Bedford Square London WCIB 3ES 01-636 0974 11 November 1976 John Murray 5 Milton Avenue London N6 Dear John: not be with you, but I had a bad cold. George tells me students greatly enjoyed your talk and I would like to thank you very much indeed. I enclose a cheque for £10 as we agreed. Hope to see you soon. Yours sincerely, LADLowe Briah Anson The School is run by the Architectural Association Incorporated, a company limited by guarantee and registered in England under No,171402. Its registered office address is as above. The AA (Inc) is also a registered charity under Section 4 of the Charities Act 1960. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource John Murray; RC, LdeG, AM; AIPJ; John Murray Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975-1977 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/a56fbc9cbc29716d2fde925de8e226d7.pdf 86d0bf931240ab0175d05179a1fd4068 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Design Group Description An account of the resource Argued that it was only through the public sector that the majority of people could have access to the land and resources needed for housing, education and other essential services. The task was therefore to reform the practice of architecture in local councils to provide an accessible and accountable design service. The Public Design Group proposed reforms to the practice of architecture in local councils to provide a design service accessible and accountable to local people and service users. The following 6 Interim Proposals were developed which were later initiated and implemented in Haringey Council 1979-1985 by NAM members. <ul><li style="font-weight:400;">Local area control over resources </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Design teams to be area based </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Area design teams to be multi-disciplinary </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Project architects to report directly to committee</li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Abolish posts between Team Leader and Chief Architect </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Joint working groups with Direct Labour Organisations</li> </ul> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A National Design Service Subject The topic of the resource 22 page report for London Seminar including reprint of paper dated 11/76 Description An account of the resource JOIAUSS NOISIO TWNOLVN V 2= THE NEW ARCHITECTURE MOVEMENT London Seminar : May 1976 A NATIONAL DESIGN SERVICE Paper No. 2 May 1976 Reprinted June 1976 10 Introduction At the Harrogate Conference last November we called for a National Design Service which would meet the right of everyone to exercise control over the buildings which surround them and in which they live and work. This is a right denied in part or in total to mest people in this country. We saw that the present system of patronage is such that 80% of the population have no real control over what is built, where it is built, and who uses it. They must adapt to an environment which is imposed upon them, at best through a system of spurious choices, and usually not even that. The patrons, a minority of rich and powerful organisations and individuals effectively control the direction of architecture. The design and type of buildings reflect their structure and values. The tendency for these organisations to grow larger by incorporating smaller and weaker ones, results in fewer and fewer patrons commisioning bigger and bigger buildings. Architects' working arrangements are similarly affected. Larger and thus fewer practices are required to handle the big jobs. At present 36% of medium and large private practices carry out 81% of the work. These same offices employ 82% of increasingly frustrated salaried architects. The bigger the jobs, the greater the profit, so it is not surprising that the principal dominated RIBA, while commiserating on the'crisis' in architecture, looks everywhere for the answer except towards the real cause - a system of public and private patronage, in which initial access and subsequent control is severely limited. The remedy for this will not be architectural. It will only be achieved when society's vaues change. exists in the service provided by the albeit in a very limited and unsatisfactory that the present power structures are to achieve our aim of a national decentralised local government offices to local people. Nevertheless has set itself and in the coming how this may be achieved. achieved. 20 We believe that any new form of architectural service must include a formal mechanism of local control through which architects are accountable, not only to their clients, but to those who are affected by their designs. Only in this way can competence and quality of service be measured adequately. Although we would encourage co-ownership in private practice, it is clear that without lcal accountability, such a development would merely extend professional elitism and allow a wider distribution of profits within the prfession. At this stage we do not think that an amended private practice system, however desirable, could provide the type of service which we envisage. Within the present economic system it is only through the state that the majority of people can gain their rightful access to the resources necessary for their material well being. The major step following from this is to bring existing publicity owned resources under the directcontrol of the public at local level, and to ensure that all new facilities brought into state ownership are directly accountable to, and controlled as architecture is concerned they must opinion therefore the basis of a national by local users. As far be the patrons. In our design service already local authority design offices - manner. We recognise must be radically changed if we design service in the form of controlled and accountable this is one of the tasks which months we shall be considering NAM If our strategies for action are to be effective, we need to understand the reasons behind the present unsatisfactory situation. The purpose of this paper is to examine the present processes at work in each area of current architectural patronage and to try to draw out factors which will help to clarify both the kind of service which would be desirable and the means by which that might be 2.0 SYMPTONS AND CAUSES 2.1 Curing Symptons From school of architecture onwards architects are conditioned to accept the context in which they work, and to look for the solutions to the problems of architecture in the symptons of the malaise. After all, anything more searching would involve questioning the status quo. So the architectural establishment, the schools, the RIBA and the magazines have elevated physical form to the position where it is widely accepted that bad design is at the root of all architecture problems. The contention is, of course, that universal good design would solve everything. This preoccupation with form has led us to view, in their time, structural expression modular co-ordination, prefabrication, rationalised traditional et al, as the panacea for all ills. Now energy conservation is being dressed up for this exacting role. To all of these we are told, must be added the ingredient of novelty. Improving the ideas of others is not accepted as valid in this concept - even though we know that the various elements in the Parthenon had been around for centuries before the architect put them together in a particular way. He wasn't asked to invent then. Creation has come to mean innovation - in a substantial way and from scratch. But to innovate is to experiment with the people who will use our buildings. As we do not know who these people are, there is a tendency for the large buildings created for their use to be anonymous also. This is where innovation comes in, where we use a variety of devices to add visual interest. The result is always false and frequently foolish as well. In this respect schemes like Parkhill in Sheffield are at least a more honourable expression of the brief than those produced by architects who, to the delight of the magazines, attempt to conceal the monolithic nature of the brief by the use of complicated and arbitary forms. ignoring the basic issue of patronage. throughout history. people to control the design of their environment. 2.2 Examining the Causes: Architecture is a service industry and it is wholly dependent on external factors for its existence. The fortunes of architecture fluctuate with the fortunes of the patrons. The present high proportion of unemployed salaried architects and the massive number of unemployed building workers is salutory evidence of this basic fact. Architectural patronage has two basic prerequisites - access to finance and control of land. The ability to raise finance is the key aspect for it enables the patron to gain the initial control over land and then to pay for the actual building. Clearly in our society only the state and a minority of private organisations and individuals can aspire to this position. At present, the distribution of architectural patronage is 60% by value public and 40% by value private and we should have a clear understanding of the present system if we are to discover where advances can be made towards a more equitable distribution of patronage in the short term, and a complete redistribution in the long term. Without the demand and feedback from the users, all designs are carried out in a vacuum, and it is naive to look for a new architecture in the means of construction and form, while The designs which we create reflect precisely the values and aspirations of the patron and John Berger has described how this has been true - with one or two exceptions - of art We believe that there will only be a new architecture when the patronage base is radically extended to enable the majority of practice and the relationships between user and architect. 3.0 LAND The last official comprehensive register of all land holdings in this country was produced in 1874. Today there is no official register of private land holdings and all attempts to create one have been systematically blocked in Parliament. From this we can perhaps deduce that the majority of land is in private ownership. Land takes its value not only from its present use but also from its potential use, and it is at its most expensive under the pressure of competing uses in city centres. The use to which the land is put is dictated by the profitability of the use; hence prime sites are always taken by those activities which yield the highest profits. Although the free market in land is tempered somewhat nowadays by the local planning authority, this intervention in itself results in changes in land values. In the docklands area of London, for example as ageing and unprofitable industries close down or move out to green field sites, un-unionised labour and government subsidies, they realise their main asset - land. The most profitable use for thisland is now expensive riverside housing, hotels and yachting marinas for the rich. This change has already begun and without the intervention of the local authorities (under pressure from local people) it would now be well established. It remairsto be seen whether the five dockland Boroughs are able or willing to insist on uses which will regenerate appropriate industry in the area. The end product of the free market in land therefore is not in the interests of the community. Thousands of jobs are lost and local housing problems are not solved. The next three sections discuss briefly the role of land ownership, the link between control of resources and control of architecture, and the resulting effect on design, architectural Similarily in the chain of escalating land values between the virgin land and the speculative house, the original land owner profits, the developer profits on both the land and the houses and the proud new owner buys into the market at the limit of his income. Then the individual house on its small plot of land continues to be a commodity, and the price continues to rise. Because private profit is the motive underlying the free market in land, working people cannot penetrate this market far less control it, except through the medium of the state. It is for this reason that the proportion of publicity owned land is so high in working class communities; as high as 80% for example in parts of the East End of London. But the inadequacies of public finance quite often results in cheap and unsuitable sites being bought for public use, and the need to optimise even this, leads to gross over use. High densities are therefore accepted as the norm for public housing giving rise to balcony access and other manifestations virtually unknown in the private sector. Under the present system of land ownership this is unlikely to change. 4.0 PRIVATE PATRONAGE The building sector financed by private patronage falls into three broad sectors - Industrial, Commercial and private howing. This work accounts for around 63% by vaue of all commissions undertaken by private practice. 4.1 The Patrons The major patrons are those companies and individuals who control these sectors. Financial institutions now ow controlling share holdings in British companies and through their executives and directors dictate the patterns of investment throughout the economy. These are the main private patrons of architecture and although private individuals do exercise patronage, the value is minute in comparison. 4.2 Reasons for Patronage just how short term the benefits were. Money will therefore only be put into tmildings in the first place if that is, or will lead to, the most profitable way of using the money. The type of development, whether industrial, commerical or private housing will be chosen according to the same logic. 4.3 Affect on Architecture The architecture will reflect the directness of the relationship between profit and the building. So if the activity yields the profit, as in industry say, then the building is required merely to house the activity, and little in the way of cosmetics are applied beyond that which is necessary to satisfy the Health and Safety at Work Act and the Planning Officer. On the other hand, speculative housing and office development, are in themselves the means of achieving profit. Sufficient money will therefore be directed into the appearance, commensurate always with the market for which it is aimed. Capital in any company is accumulated by profit. On the basis of its profitability, shares in it are bought through the money market, which finance further development with a view to creating further profit. The money market determines into which sectors resources should flow to gain the greatest return. The money market is otherwise indiscriminate. It is not its function to distinguish between those investments which benefit society as a whole and those which do not. Therefore we have seen moneyflowing out of older and increasingly less profitable industry into very profitable unproductive sectors like property. escalating rents and prices may have brought short term benefits to a minority but it was at the expense of working people. saw house prices disappearing time as they were losing their They even further out of reach at the same in the economy dwindle, the rest of society is beginning to realise The resulting bonanza of jobs. As the productive sectors Be 4.4 User Control of Design? Real user control over the design is achieved when the architect is designing private villas for the directors. In other instances those same directors and executives will certainly control the design process of a new office and factory but they will almost invariably by absentee clients. Where they are not they will be well insulated from reality in the penthouse, surrounded by solar reflecting glass and Barcelona chairs. The workers on the shop floor or in the offices, on the other hand, are still unable to control the design of their environment, (although it is in the interests of the more enlightened managements to indulge in participation) even although that design, as in the case of open plan offices, is a direct function of decisions to change working methods to increase productivity. There is no element of user control in speculative housing either. 62% of this market is designed by private practice but architects and users never meet. Although people who are able to buy into this market gain a certain amount of contxrl through choice, the choice is initially limited by income and location, and further limited in terms of accommodation and design. These have more to do with the developer's profit margins than the buyer's real needs. But the relationship between house prices and earnings is so organised as to exclude half the population and in some working Where it is more profitable, the patrons will elect to build their own offices, which will fulfil the dual function of housing their activities and presenting the required public image. The Commercial Union building is therefore designed to create an aura of prestige, restrained good taste, wealth and stability, while concealing the rather squalid nature of its source of wealth. It fulfils this function admirably. class areas, over three quarters. In a free market house prices 4.5 Public Accountability? The executives who control the building design are responsible only to their shareholders. Their job is to ensure maximum return on investment. The public good does not feature in this equation - nor can it. The people affected by private buildings have no control over the developer's actions other than indirectly through Planning Control. Even where the Planning Officers do profess to have some regard for the ethic of public service, they will be in conflict with and will often be overridden by the local political requirements such as rate income. The arguement is that the interests of the public as a whole takes precedence over the interests of a few local people, no matter how disastrous the effect on their lives may be. Planning Control has failed too often in these situations in the past for us to have any confidence in its ability to safeguard the public interest. Private practice in turn is not accountableto the commmity affected by its designs. Not only is the partners! liability to the client, but the practice is also dependent on the client financially. Not surprisingly therefore, private practice rarely opposes the client's demands. 4.6 Conclusion. Control over design cannot be separated from control over resources. In the private sector these resources are controlled by a minority - formerly rich individuals, now the representatives of giant institutions. The Private patron of architecture adopts this role solelyto create more wealth, and is not accountable in any will always be out of reach of the majority of the working class. Any one who doubts this should consider what £60 per week buys in the Londonhousing market, and that many people earn a lot less than this. meaningful way to the people affected by his buildings. Similarly, =10= alter this basic fact. 5.0 PUBLIC PATRONAGE: Public patronage of architecture comes through the central state, the nationalised industries, but in the main through local authorities. It accounts for all the work produced by public sector architects, and 37% of work by value of private practice. In total the state is responsible for 60% of the Building Industry's annual turnover. 5.1 Reasons for State Patronage. It has been said that the state fulfils two basic functions. The first is to try to promote or maintain the conditions in which economic growth is both possible and profitable for the private sector. Secondly the state trys to maintain and promote the conditions for social harmony, and make the existing social order seem acceptable. Both factors are at work when the state finances building. On the one hand, the state must intervene in the arena previously described, to provide enough housing, hospitals and schools to prevent the population from becoming restless. On the other hand, a well housed, healthy and reasonably educated working class are necessary if economic growth is to be achieved and sustained. The main organ of this system of control is the Local Authority. 5.2 Local Authorities Finance: The largest part of Local Authority finance is in the form of Private practice is in business to service these interests. Under a system of private patronage the needs of working people will be in conflict with the dictates of the client. Profit sharing and co-operative working arrangements may increase the material well being of the salaried architect but they will not central government grants. A much smaller proportion comes from ie rates. The services provided from these funds, constitutes the return we get on taxes and rates paid by us the public. Pressure to hold down rates and taxes results in a short fall of finance, and local authorities are forced to resort to the private money market to make up the difference. This is a very lucrative business for the private money lenders, to the extent that 1/3 of the housing expenditures of an Inner London Borough goes into paying back interest to the finance companies. Whatever the source, the public pays it eventually, either through increased taxes, rates and charges, or by the reduction in services for which we thought we had already paid - witness the present expenditure cuts. 5.3 Control over Resources The directness of this flow of our resourcetso the state appears to be in inverse proportion to the extento which we,the public, are able to control, or even understand the mechanism for producing what we have paid for. local Authorities are the local arm of central government and are obliged by law to carry out central policies, whether or not local politicians believe that these are in the interests of their constituents. All public resources are therefore controlled from the centre through grants, approvals and regulating machinery such as cost allowances and Housing Yardsticks. 5.4 User Control of Design? Control of architectural patronage at local authority level is power being wielded by the committee are serviced by their departmental up by arguments prepared by a large of this formidable array it is little little more than rubber stamp councillors are unable to play an active role in controlling services exercised by the relevant spending committee, a large part of that Chairmen. The committee Chairmen chief officer whose advice is backed team of specialists. In the face wonder that the full council can do committee decisions, and that even ward to the people they represent, let alone the users themselves. oe which has no doubts as to where "participation" begins and ends. 5.5 Design We are only too familiar with the effect which scarce,minimum resources and the lack of user control has on the buildings. While there is just not enough money, the design decisions which have to be made by the architect in the absence of user instructions, undoubtedly mean that what money there is will often be allocated wrongly. 5.6 Public Accountability of the Architect? The local authority departments - edwation, housing, social services, architecture etc, are concerned with the provision of city wide services and by andlarge they treat the city as a whole. Sectional interests, whether of wards or of classes of people are generally subordnated to those of the general population. Centralised offices follow naturally from this city wide view. The departmental chief officers are accountable to the Council via the Chairman of the relevant Committee, and a hierarchal pyamidal structure must follow. The individual job architect who actually produces the work is responsible to the Chief Officer through a series of steps in the hierachy. The chain of accountability of job architect to user is through: group architect, principal architect, chief architect, spending department chief officer, committee chairman, committee, ward councillor, User. Seven steps between architect and user. Those steps are so immovable and concerned with prestige, screening and face saving operations that in practice the local authority jobs architect is not accountable to the userat all. Contact between user and architect is discouraged if not forbidden, and excépt for example where a head teacher is involved in the design of a replacement school, there are few opportunities for the user to gain control over the design. It is a system in which a certain product is demanded of individual architects The product is imposed or "sold" to local groups by apolitical leadership in return for continued employment. 5.7 Conclusion. are substantial indeed. maintained existing council developments. 6.0 ALTERNATIVES The trend towards rehabilitation and small scale infill in areas of predominantly old privately rented or privately owned working class housing has resulted in the growth of a third area of patronage, which is interesting in terms of its potential for user control, and the changed attitudes and raised expectations which could follow from it. 6.1 Sources of Finance: Finance is provided through a diverse range of public and private grants. In the private sector it includes grants from developers and various trust funds which are used to resource community design services arse The changes which are necessary to convert this monolithic structure into a freely available and loally controlled National Design Service However, in setting out the ills and authoritarian practice of government structures it is important not to lose sight of the more fundamental fact that these structures directly or through grants supply the resources, and buy the land necessary to meet basic social requirements. It is not possible farpeople to demand control over the design of buildings if there are no resources to build them. The relevance of public resources to the question of control is seen most clearly in housing. In old working class communities up and down the country there are millions of people living in clearance areas in which badly built spec housing of the last century has rotted for decades. Housing which may often need redevelopment rather than rehabilitation. The long term cuts in public spending in order to make good the lack of private in industry and the economy mean the fact that resources for new homes is not to be made available. areas have become marginal, peripheral up homes is what people will be offered alongside increasingly under that people inthese areas are faced with These and in the end expendable. Patched investment Ae. so far as they fulfil this hidden motive. Public grants, which usually cover a high proportion of land, construction and design costs, range from improvement grants for individual dwellings through to the finance available to Housing Associations via the Housing Corporation. HAAs and GIAs can call on higher grants and special L.A. loans — they also have available important compulsory powers. 6.2 Control of Finance: The key aspect, as always, is who controls the use to which the finance isi put. Private sources often leave considerable discretionary power over the use of such resources, within the overall terms of the grant. Projects like ASSIST are examples of how such community design offices can be made accountable to and controlled by local residents, and resident controlled Housing Associations. HAAs and GIAs are designated by the local authority usually at their own behest. It should be noted however that in England, local residents also have the right to petition the local authority to have their area so designated. The local authority sets up locally based design teams to carry out the work and although this is a step forward, they invariably limit the role of residents to an advisory capacity. Architects are only directly accountable to local people where the residents themselves control the process through their own Housing Associations, and it is in this area that there has been the greatest advance. The current direction of resources into non-resident controlled housing of a kind not provided by the local authority. Such sources of finance usually ultimately rest upon less than respectable activities and hence the importance of philanthropic gestures to buy an honest and respectable image. This is not an argument against pursuing such funds; merely a reminder that such grants are renewable only in of local people. 6.3 Conclusion. and tightly controlled beaurocracy in the Town Hall. interest rather than merely extending the share of high profits. 7.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS Local Authorities already provide a public architectural service through a national network of design offices. Can thisstructure be changed into a freely available, locally controlled national design service or should we provide a parallel service? As stated at the beginning of this paper, in our opinion the local authorities associations is no substitute. It may bring work and profits to private architects and other professionals but it is at the expense The importance of this third area of patronage lies in its scope for change, not only in itself, but also as a means to raise expectations of the service which could be provided by the Local Authority. As such it is a pointer to the future direction of Local Authority services. It is possible for the resident organisation which controls the resources to be both client and user. Although this has not been the norm, where it has occurred, it has been eminently successful. e.g. ASSIST in Govan, and Rod Hackney at Black Road Macclesfield. do provide in the long term the basis of a national design service. While there is considerable room for improvement, especially in terms of local control of design, in local authority HAAs and GIAs, it is difficult to believe that residents, having once experienced a more direct service, will settle for anything less in the future, or that the design teams will readily accept their return to a centralised A further by-product of this area of patronage is the opportunity it has given to change architect's working arrangements. Hierarchical power structures can and have been replaced by collective authority and co-operative working relationships. The choice is open to work for a reasonable salary and turn the excess fees over to the public We have seen that local authorities are centrally important as the main and often the only structure through which people can exert demands and gain the necessary access to land, finance and other resources. In seeking to change them we should not forget that they are equally important as structures of authoritarian social control which cannot afford to and have no intention of giving away power to the grass roots. In principle, local authorities are structures which cannot be radically changed in our society, of that we should have no illusions. However, we have seen from history that as the lowest tier of government they are not only necessary from above but are also susceptible to the threats of vigorous pressure from below. They can be made to change direction. 7.1 Campaign within Local Authorités. A national design service as we envisage it means control over local resources and local design teams by local residents. This is not going to happen overnight and we should begin in those areas where changes have already occurred and where the potential for further change exists. Within our own localities we should therefore: * support the demands of local groups who represent the interests of the users and who call for direct control over thelocal authority design process. * support the demands of residents committees for executive control over HAAs and GIAs. * campaign for the rapid extension of HAAs and GIAs. * support tenants demands for control over present and future local authority housing. The public expenditure cuts have already resulted in tenants being "allowed" to control maintenance in many areas. 26s 2i7= 7.2 Alternative Services: In parallel with action within the local authorities we should initiate a number of short life locally controlled design offices. By winning public support such projects can be used as practical examples to raise expectations of people's real right, and to pressurise local councils into incorporating changes. ASSIST have done this with success in Glasgow, and we endorse their view that local projects must be seen as vehicles for change, not as cop-outs for discontented architects. These demands and activities will inevitably be strongly opposed. NAM must therefore develop strategies to enable these demands to be achieved. These strategies should include means whereby sympathetic architects can organise inside local authorities, and demand direct accoutability to users and the decentralisation of offices. We shall require the support of local groups, local councillors, trades councils, UCCAT and the public service unions. Finally, in considering our strategies for change we should be aware that change in the past has often been a two edged sword. Benefits for the majority have usually been gained at the expense of reinforcing the status quo. We should always remember that our concept of a freely available, national design service must in the long term mean that the resources of land and finance are to be controlled by the majority of the population. They will be the new patrons. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource North London Group Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray & John Allan 3cc Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1976 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/508efbdd7948ae2e322616fdba4b3b60.pdf d61a52c560d42596917a96f50a1e2f99 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Public Design Group Description An account of the resource Argued that it was only through the public sector that the majority of people could have access to the land and resources needed for housing, education and other essential services. The task was therefore to reform the practice of architecture in local councils to provide an accessible and accountable design service. The Public Design Group proposed reforms to the practice of architecture in local councils to provide a design service accessible and accountable to local people and service users. The following 6 Interim Proposals were developed which were later initiated and implemented in Haringey Council 1979-1985 by NAM members. <ul><li style="font-weight:400;">Local area control over resources </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Design teams to be area based </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Area design teams to be multi-disciplinary </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Project architects to report directly to committee</li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Abolish posts between Team Leader and Chief Architect </li> <li style="font-weight:400;">Joint working groups with Direct Labour Organisations</li> </ul> Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A National Design Service Doc 1 Subject The topic of the resource Paper presented by John Murray to the first NAM Congress at Harrogate 21-23 November 1975 as requested by Brian Anson Description An account of the resource 1.0 Introduction A NATIONAL DESIGN SERVICE Paper No 2. May 1976 At the Harrogate Conference last November we called for a National Design Service which would meet the right of everyone to exercise control over the buildings which surround them and in which they live and work. This is a right denied in part or in total to most people in this country. We saw that the present system of patronage is such that 80% of the population have no real control over what is built, where it is built, and who uses it. They must adapt to an environment which is imposed upon them, at best through a system of spurious choices, and usually not even that. Architectsworking arrangements are similarly affected. Larger and thus fewer practices are required to handle the big jobs. At present 36% of medium and large private practices carry out 81% of the work. These same offices employ 82% of increasingly frustrated salaried architects. The bigger the jobs, the greater the profit, so it is not surprising that the principal dominated RIBA, while commisera- ting on the ‘crisis’ in architecture, looks everywhere for the answer except towards the real cause - a system of public and private patronage, inwhichinitial access and subsequent control is severely limited. The remedy for this will not be architectural. It will only be achieved when society's values change. Within the present economic system it appears to us that it is only through the state that the majority of people can gainetheir. right= ful access to the resources necessary to have control over their environment. In our opinion therefore, the existing service provided by local government offices, provides, albeit in a very limited and unsatis- factory manner, the basis of a national design service. We recog- nise that to achieve our aim, the present power structures must be radically changed. Nevertheless we shall press for a freely avail- able national design service in the form of decentralised local government offices, coupled to local accountability and control. The patrons, a minority of rich and powerful organisations and indi- viduals effectively control the direction of architecture. The design and type of buildings reflect their structure and values. The tendency for these organisations to grow larger by incorporating smaller and weaker ones, results in fewer and fewer patrons commi= ssioning bigger and bigger buildings. The purpose of this paper is to examine the present processes at work in each case of current architectural patronage and to try to draw out factors which will help to clarify both the kind of service which would be désirable and the means by which that might be achieved. 2.0 SYMPTOMS AND CAUSES 2.1 Curing symptoms From school of architecture onwards architects are conditioned to accept the context in which they work, and to look for the solu-. tions to the problems of architecture in the symptons of the malaise. After all, anything more searching would involve questioning the status quo. So the architectural establishment, the schools, the RIBA and the magazines have elevated physical form to the position where it is widely accepted that bad design is at the root of all architecture problems. The contention is, of course, that universal good design would solve everything. This preoccupation with form has led us to view in their time, structural expression, modular coordination, prefabrication, rationalised traditional and so on, as the panacea for all ills. Now energy conservation is being dressed up for this exacting role. To all of these we are.told, must be added the ingredient of creati- vity. Improving the ideas of others is not accepted as valid in this concept -— even though we know that the various elements jn the Parthenon had been around for centuries before the architect put them together ina particular way. He wasn't asked to invent them. Creation has come to mean innovation — and in a substantial way and from scratch. But to innovate is to experiment with the people who will use our buildings. As we do not know who these people are, there is a tendency for the large buildings created for their use to be anonymous also. This is where innovation comes in, where we use a variety of devices to add visual interest. The result is always false and frequently foolish as well. In this respect schemes like Park- hill in Sheffield are at least a more honourable expression of the brief than those produced by people like Darbourne and Darke who, to the delight of the magazines, attempt to conceal the monolithic -nature of the brief by the use of complicated and arbitary forms. The latest "answer" as per participation in Bykker, looks suspi- ciously like yet another attempt to fool the working class. Without the demand and feedback from the users, all designs are carried out in a vacuum, and it is naive to look for a new archi- 3.0 LAND tecture in the means of construction and form, while ignoring the basic issue of patronage. ‘The designs which we create reflect precisely the values and aspira- tions of the patron and John Berger has described how this has been true - with one or two exceptions —- of art throughout history. We believe that there will only be a new architecture when the patronage base is radically extended to enable the majority of people to control the design of their environment. 2.2 Examining the Causes Money and land are necessary prerequisites of architectural patron- age, but the ability to raise and control finance is the key aspect and the basis of all patronage, for it enables the patron to gain control over land. Clearly in our society, only the state and a minority of private organisations and individuals can hope to be in this position, and the distribution is 40% by value private and 60% by value public architectural patronage. We should have a clear understanding of the present system, if we are to discover where advances can be made towards‘a more equitable distribution of patronage in the short term, and a complete redis-— tribution in the long term. The next three sections discuss briefly the role of land ownership, the link between control of resources and control of architecture, and the resulting effect on design, architectural practice and the relationships between user and architect. The last official comprehensive register of all land holdings in this’country was produced in 1874. Today there is no official register of private land holdings and all attempts to create one have been systematically blocked in Parliament. From this we can perhaps deduce that the majority of land is in private ownership. While we do not know-the average division of land between private and public ownership, we do know that in working class communities the proportion of publicly owned land is very high; as high as 80% for example, in-parts of the East End of London. Although the ownership of land is a necessary prerequisite of archi- tectural patronage clearly the converse is not true, as most owner occupiers have no direct contact or control over architects services. Land takes its value not only from its present use but also from its potential use, and it is at its most expensive under the pressure of competing useS5 as in city centres. The use to which the land is put is dictated by the profitability of the use; hence prime sites are taken by those activities which yield the highest profits. Although the free market in land is tempered somewhat nowadays by the local planning authority, this intervention in itself results in changes in land values. Because private profit is the motive underlying the free market in land, working people cannot penetrate this market far less control it, except through the medium of the state. But the inadequacies of public finance quite often results in cheap and unsuitable sites being bought for public use, and the need to optimise even this, leads to gross over:use. High densities are therefore accepted as the norm for public housing, giving rise to balcony access and other manifestations virtually unknown in the private sector. Under the present system of land ownership this is unlikely.to change. 4.0 PRIVATE PATRONAGE The building sector financed by private patronage falls into three broad sectors — Industrial, Commercial and private housing. This work accounts for around 63% by value of all commissions undertaken by private practice. h.|) The Patrons The major patrons are those companies and individuals who control these sectors. Financial institutions now own controlling. share- holdings in British companies and through their executives and directors dictate the patterns of investment throughout the economy. These are the main private patrons of architecture, and although private individuals exercise patronage, the value is minute in comparison. 4.2 Reasons for Patronage 4.3 Affect on Architecture The architecture will reflect the directness of the relationship between profit and the building. So if the activity yields the profit, as in industry say, then the building is required merely to house the activity, and little in the way of cosmetics are applied beyond that which is necessary to satisfy the Health and Safety at Work Act and the Planning Officer. 4.4 User Control of Design? Capital in any company is accumulated by profit. On the basis of its profitability, shares in it are also bought through the money market, which together finance further development with a view to creating further profit. The money market determines into which sectors resources should flow to gain the greatest return. On the other hand, speculative housing and office development, are in themselves the means of achieving profit. Sufficient money wil] therefore be directed into the appearance, commensurate always with the market for which it is aimed. Where it is more profitable, the patrons will elect to build their own offices, which will fulfil the dual function of housing their activities and presenting the required public image. The Commer-— cial Union Building is therefore designed to create an aura of prestige, restrained good taste, wealth and stability, while con- cealing the rather squalid nature of its source of wealth. It ful- fils this function admirably. Real user control over the design is achieved when the architect is designing private villas for the directors. In other instances those same directors and executives wi 1] certainly control the design process of a new office or factory but they will almost invariably be absentee clients. Where they are not they will be well insulated from reality in the penthouse, surrounded by solar reflecting glass and Barcelona.chairs. Money will therefore only be put into buildings in the first place if that is, or will lead to, the most profitable way of using the money. The type of development, whether industrial, commercial or private housing will be chosen according to the same logic. The workers on the shop floor or in the offices, on the other hand, are still unable to control the design of their environment, (although it is in the interests of the more enlightened manage- ments to indulge in participation) even although that design, as in the case of open plan offices, is a direct function of decisions to change working methods to increase productivity. There is no element of user control in speculative housing either. 62% of this market is designed by private practice but architects and users never meet. Although people who are able to buy into this market gain a certain amount of control through choice, the choice is initially limited by income and location, and further limited in terms of accommodation and design. . These have more to do with the developer's profit margins than the buyer's real needs. But the relationship between house prices and earnings is so organ- ised as to exclude half the population and in some working class areas, over three quarters. Ina free market house prices wil] always be out of reach of the majority of the working class. Any- one who doubts this should consider what £60 per week buys in the London housing market and remember that many people earn a lot less than this. 4.5 Public Accountability? The executives who control the building design are responsible only to their shareholders. Their job is to ensure maximum return on investment. The public good does not feature in this equation - nor can it. The people affected by private buildings have no control over the developer's actions other than indirectly through Planning Control. Even where the Planning Officers. do profess to have some regard for the ethic of public service, they will be in conflict with, and wil] often be overridden by the local political requirement for rate income. The argument is that the interests of the public as a whole takes precedence over the interests of a few local people, no matter how disastrous the effect on their lives may be.. Planning Control has failed too often in these situations in the past for us to have any confidence in its ability to safeguard the public interest. Private practice in turn is not accountable to the community affected by its designs. Not only is the partners' liability to the client, but the practice is also dependent on the client finan- cially. Not surprisingly therefore, private practice rarely opposes the client's demands. 4.6 Conclusion. Control over design cannot be separated from control over resources. In the private sector these resources are controlled by a minority - formerly rich individuals, now the representatives of giant instit— utions. The Private patron of architecture adopts this role solely to create more wealth, and is not accountable in any meaningful way to the people affected by his buildings. -Simi larly, Private prac- tice is in business to service these interests. Under a system of private patronage the needs of working people will be in conflict with the dictates of the client. Profit sharing and cooperative working arrangements may increase the material well being of the salaried architect but they will not altar this basic fact. 5.0 PUBLIC PATRONAGE: Public patronage of architecture comes through the central state, the nationalised industries, but in the main through local authori- ties. Jt accounts for all the work produced by public sector architects, and 37% of work by value of private practice. In total the state is responsible for 60% of the Building industry's annual turnover. 5.1 Reasons for State Patronage. It has often been argued before that the state fulfils two basic functions. The first is to try to promote or maintain the condi- tions in which economic growth is both possible and profitable for ‘the private sector. Secondly the state trys to maintain and pro- mote the conditions for social harmony, and make the existing social order seem acceptable. Both factors are at work when the state finances building. On the one hand, the state must intervene in the arena previously described, to provide enough housing, hospitals and schools to prevent the population from becoming restless. On the other hand, a well housed, healthy and reasonably educated working class are necessary if economic growth is to be achieved and sustained. The main, organ of this system of control is the local Authority. 5.2 Local Authority Finance: The largest part of local Authority finance is in the form of central government grants. A much smaller proportion comes from rates. The services provided from these funds, constitutes the return we. get on taxes and rates paid by us the public. Pressure to hold down rates and taxes results in a short fall of finance, and local authorities are forced to resort to the private money market to make up the difference. This is a very lucrative business for the private money lenders, to the extent that 1/3 of the housing expenditures of an Inner London Borough goes into paying back interest to the finance companies. 5.3 Control over Resources The directness of the flow of resources to the state is in inverse proportion to the extent to which the public are able to control, or even understand the mechanism for producing what we have paid for, local authorities are the local arm of the central state, and are obliged by law to carry out central policies, whether or not local politicians believe that these are in the interests of their constituents. All public resources are therefore controlled from the centre through grants, approvals and regulating machinery such as cost allowances and Housing Yardsticks. 5.4 User Control of Design? Control of architectural patronage at local authority level is exercised by the relevant spending committee, a large part of that power being wielded by the committee Chairman. The committee Chairmen are serviced by their departmental chief officer whose advice is backed up by arguments prepared bya large team of specialists. In the face of this formidable array it is little wonder that the full council can do little more than rubber stamp committee decisions, and that even ward councillors are unable to play an active role in controlling services to the people they represent, let alone the users themselves. Except, for example, where a head teacher is involved in the design of a replacement school, there are few other opportunities for the user to gain control over the design. It is a system in which a certain product is demanded of individual architects in return for continued employ ment. The product is imposed or "sold" to local groups by a poli- tical leadership which has no doubt as to where "participation" begins and ends. Whatever the source, the public pays it eventually, either through increased taxes, rates and charges, or by the reduction in services for which we thought we had already paid — witness the present expenditure cuts. 5.5 Design We are only too familiar with the effect which scarce, minimum re- sources and the lack of user control has on the buildings. Whi le there is just not enough money, the design decisions which have to be made by the architect in the absence of user instructions, un=- doubtedly.mean that what money there is will often be allocated wrongly. 5.6 Public Accountability of the Architect? The local authority departments - education, housing, social services, architecture etc. are concerned with the provision of city wide services and by and large they treat the city as a whole. Sectional interests, whether of wards or of classes of people are generally subordinated to those of the. general population. 5.7 Conclusion. . Centralised offices follow naturally from this city wide view, the departmental chief officers are accountable to the Counci| via the Chairman of the relevant committee, and a hierarchal pyramidal structure must follow. The individual job architect who actually produces the work is responsible to the Chief Officer through a series of steps in the hierachy. The chain of accountability of job architect to user is through: group architect, principal architect, Chief architect, spending department chief officer, committee chairman, committee, ward councillor, User. Seven steps between architect and user. Those steps are so immovable and con= cerned with prestige,screening and face saving operations that in practice the local authority jobs architect is not accountable to the user at all. The changes which are necessary to convert this monolithic structure into a freely available and locally controlled National Design Service are substantial indeed. However, in setting out the ills and authoritarian practice of government structures it is important not to lose sight of the more fundamental fact that these structures directly or. through grants supply the resources, and buy the land necessary to meet basic — social requirements. It is not possible for people to demand control over the design of buildings if there are no resources to build them. The relevance of public resources to the question of control is seen most clearly in housing. In old working class communities up and down the country there are millions of people living in clearance areas in which badly built spec housing of the last century has rotted for decades. Housing which needs redeve=~ lopment not rehabilitation. The long-term cuts in public spending in order to make good the lack of private investment in the economy mean that people in these areas are faced with the fact that re= sources for new homes is not to be made available. These areas have become marginal, peripheral and in the end expendable. Patched up rehab. is what people will be offered alongside increasingly under maintained existing counci|] developments. 6.0 ALTERNATIVES The third area of patronage is interesting in terms of the poten- tial for raising expectations of what can be possible in the way of alternative practice. 6.1 Source of Finance: In the private sector it includes grants from developers like Wates to Assist or the Ealing project andtrust funds of one kind or another to enable the provision of special buildings and services. Such sources of finance usually ultimately rest upon less than respectable activities and hence the importance of philanthropic gestures to buy an honest and respectable image. This is not an argument against pursuing such funds; merely a reminder that such grants are only renewable insofar as they fulfil this hidden motive. They usually dry up when they fail to do so. 6.2 Control of Finance: The source of finance is provided throughadiverse range of public and private grants which to varying degrees cover land, design and development costs. Grants from public sources include H.A.A.'s, GIA's, Housing Associations via the Housing Corporation and possibly Urban Aid in resourcing community design services. But once secured they often create considerable discretionary power over handling such resources, within the overall terms of the grant. This power is expressed in the growth of resident=controleld housing associations which employ technical services on their own terms. This is by no means general. Local Authority controlled H.A.A.'s usually strictly limit the role of residents and on the other hand many Housing. Associations are merely private practices masquerading in disguise. Control of their activities by local residents. is not on their agenda either. Lfwebelievethatcompetenceandqualityareintegrallytied-up with who controls the process, then it should also give rise to designs which are welcomed and liked. 6.3 User Control and Local Accountability: But because of the facility for innovation there is scope for change in the traditional pattern of patronage. It is possible for the resident organisation which controls and manages the resources to be both client and user.. In employing the services of an architect there is no ambiguity about accountability. Where resources are controlled via the 'professionals' a serious attempt to place such structures in aposition of accountability to a locally controlled Management Committee can be innovatory. However a major drawback is the same as that which arises when work is done on a voluntary basis. Real power rests on being able to change your designer if you don't like them. Limited access to alternative source of such skills distorts the relationship on either side. 6.4 Practice Structures: The further by-product which ‘alternative projects' can create is in the office structure. Hierarchal power structures normal to private and public offices can be replaced by collective authority:| and cooperative working relationships. A further choice is to work for a reasonable salary turning the excess fees over to the public interest, rather than merely extending the sharing of excess profits. C ONC LUS |ONS This summary of the three ways in which architectural patronage is exercised provides the foundation for a more realistic discussion of what strategies can be employed to begin to lay the basis for a national design service within the real control of ordinary working people. — Local Authority Services Local] Authorities are clearly, centrally important as the main structure through which people can exert demands and gain the necessary access to land and resources created by taxation and rates, They are also equally important structures of authoritarian social control which cannot afford and have no intention of giving © away power to the grassroots. In principle, local authorities are structures which cannot be radically changed in our present society —- of that we should have no illusions. However, as the lowest tier of government they are not only necessary from above but are also susceptible to the threats of vigorous pressure from below. In our view we must campaign to support the demands of those local groups, who represent the interests of future users, and who cal] for a direct relationship of control over local authority architects delegated to design peoples future homes etc. - control which “extends to rejection of unsatisfactory proposals. Such a demand will inevitably be strongly opposed and in NAM we need a strategy which can help sympathetic architects to organise inside local authorities, to demand direct accountability to users and the creation of small locally based offices. To protect individuals, we need to secure the support of public service unions and UCCAT for the principle of this demand. Alternative Initiatives: No-one who has worked in a local authority can listen to talk of changing Local Authorities without asinking heart! This leads on to the second conclusion, which is that one of the best ways to raise expectations of what people's real rights over design are, is to increase the number and range of alternative short-term initia- tives. Where they are successful in winning public support they can be used as practical examples to pressurize local: councils into incorpora- -ting changes. More widely, we must never ignore the basic fact that small scale alternatives are based on the limited sponsorship of private or public sources of finance which can usually only meet the demands of a small number of specific groups of people. But they can offer the means to work and demonstrate how local groups and neighbourhoods can effectively extend control over decisions and resources effecting peoples lives. Local design centres which place themselves in a formal relationship of accountability to the community have a contribution to make in this process. We need a strategy for pursuing sponsorship of such initiatives. These two major conclusions and the way they should be carried forward are suggested as the basis of discussion. What does this imply in terms of a national design service? Local Authorities already control.a national structure of public sector architects. Do we wish to or change this existing structure or provide a parallel service? Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource John Murray Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Nov 1975 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/6b8c60e20e39ef8b9d5bf1318fb3ade1.pdf f2a3a445dbc6f43be1521bbf965a958d Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NAM 4th Congress Report AJ 14 November 1978 Description An account of the resource The fourth annual national Congress of the New Architecture Movement was held at the School of Architecture in Cheltenham last weekend. In between wholesome meals and a rejuvenating to a punk rock group, over 90 people thrashed out the neat year’s policy of a movement which in only four years has significantly altered the face of architectural politics in Britain. Tension over alternative practice After virtually the only contentious debates in the whole weekend, Congress agreed to set up an Alternative Practice issue group ‘to develop the theory and practice of NAM members involved in worker controlled private sector organisations with the aim of providing socially responsible alternatives’. Participants were shown work carried out by the ARCAID group in Leeds and Support in London, both of which operate in the private sector but work co-operatively for poor clients such as tenants and community groups. Members of these groups believe that in the short term this kind of work provides the best way of making architects’ skills available to working class users. But several people believed there was a danger of the group clashing with the already established Public Design Group which recently submitted its OWN report on community architecture to Minister of Housing Reg Freeson.* This report argues forcibly that a community architectural service ‘should be based on the public sector and not on the private sector’. Despite initial tension between these two Views, itwas generally accepted by both groups that they could work in parallel. It was likely to take years to achieve reforms in the public sector and until that time the private sector experiments could provide valuable experience, a vehicle for propaganda, and a means of providing working class people with services they would otherwise be denied. *Community Architecture: a public design service, available from NAM, 9 Poland Street, London W1. £1. the abolition of the mandatory fee scale and the introduction of a fee system ‘based on standardised elements of service and ranges of cost to safeguard the public against unreasonable price increases and check the profession from unhealthy price cutting’. An end to secrecy Symbolising an end to the cloak and dagger secrecy that has been a feature of the movement until now, it was agreed that telephone numbers of spokespersons for the different issue groups should be circulated to the press. Speakers however reiterated that the movement should avoid creating ‘leaders’, because issues and ideas then* easily became obscured by personalities. New constitution A constitution for the Movement was adopted which firmly establishes itasa federation of issue, local and working groups accountable to the annual Congress and working for the general aim of promoting ‘effective democratic control of al people over their environment and by design and construction workers over their working lives’, A Liaison Group iselected each year to conduct administrative and financial affairs and to ‘act for the Movement’ between Congresses. Membership of NAM has increased over the last year from 92 to 120. Monday and the millenium “The Movement isgrowing inmaturity as its critique of the profession grows more refined’, said John Allan, a founder member at the opening of Congress. A substantial body of literature has been developed and the Movement’s magazine Slate isimproving with each issue. What is now needed is to translate quality into quantity. The profession ison the defensive, he said. While the trades and ‘para professions’ are becoming more professional with the introduction of codes and guidelines, the traditional profession is being forced to become more secular. NAM could take advantage of the consequent instability. Referring to the inherent tension between long term aims and short term tactics, he said that while the former could not be achieved quickly, some of the obstacles barring the way could be removed immediately. ‘Our predicament is not a question of bop <x » “ PIG is born To back up the work of NAM members acting as unattached representatives on ARCUK council and those working on the mandatory fee scale issue, Congress sct up a Professional Issues Group (PIG). The councillors have their work cut out responding to day to day issues explained the proposers. PIG would be a kind of ‘mop up’ group enabling NAM councillors to play a more positive role by taking initiatives. Congress formally endorsed the work of the eight NAM councillors, and aslate of candidates has been drawn up to contend the forthcoming unattached elections as itis anticipated there will be a further increase in the number of unattached representatives. Students wanted Student NAM groups should be set up in schools of architecture, but they should be autonomous groups and not controlled by any central body or the already established Education Group. This was the outcome of a debate in which some speakers advocated a recruitment drive among students. Few studentsaremembersofNAMalthoughdissentersCongressendorsedtheworkofthemilleniumorMonday’,hesaid,‘but more attended the Congress than in the Monopolies Group which produced an affirmation of the millenium and Previous years. the report “Way ahead’ recommending Monday.” Fee scale abolition endorsed Although there was a handful of The Architects’ Journal 15 Novernber 1978 925 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Architects Journal Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 15-Nov-78 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/79fe4a306cfa379b3460ce25aacf97f2.pdf 431469fb840ba56f27d5482be0f903f5 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NAM questions findings of RIBA earnings survey: Letter published in AJ 4 May 1977 (P2 overleaf) Description An account of the resource The editor reserves the right to shorten letters unless writers specify otherwise, Short letters can be dictated to Fane Pike over the telephone on Thursdays, for possible inclusion in the following issue of the Af. partners’ profits are greater as well. Profits vary with the size of practice. The RIBA’s method of averaging out apparently random samples, or of relating partners’ income to age is therefore of dubious value as a source of knowledge about the state of the profession, Presumably for this reason, the National Board for Prices and Incomes, in its 1968 Survey of architects’ fees and costs, used size of practice as the only relevant yardstick for comparing) incomes. This was also the method used in our submission to the Monopolies Commission, and we enclose copies of the relevant tables showing figures references and sources, We would draw your attention to the main findings: 1 There is a considerable difference between the average income of partners in small and large firms. In 1974 these incomes were £6129 and £22 327 respectively. 2 There is an increasing trend towards larger offices, the percentage of medium and large practices almost doubled as fees are exempt from the ‘social contract’, inflation has created something of a bonanza for the partners. For example it appears that it is not unusual for partners’ incomes (clear of overheads but not taxed) ina medium/large firm to range from £45 000 to £65 000. Other returns show even higher incomes. next visit to one of our sites in case he should run into one of the World’s End team. Peter A. Kreamer London SW1 Henry Herzberg replies: Iam sorry that Mr Kreamer feels that we failed to give sufficient credit to Bovis. No ‘side swipe’ was intended: the words complained of are a plain statement of fact. NAM< questions findings of RIBA earnings survey From Dan Bullen of the LondonGroup,NAM between1958and1972.The Whataboutthebuilder? FromG.WigglesworthRIBA Sir: We would take issue with the findings of the RIBA’s 1976 earnings survey (AJ 6.4.77 p635). While we are not surprised that the RIBA’s interpretation attempts to show that there is a trend towards the reduction of differentials between partners and salaried staff, we would point out that our 1976 submission to the Monopolies Commission showed the exact Opposite, It appears that it is the method of presentation of the RIBA’s results which is particularly misleading. All your readers know that the income ofa medium to large sized practice, doing medium to large sized jobs is considerably greater than that ofa two person firm eking out a living on kitchen conversions. Consequently the Prices and Incomes Board found that while comprising only 30 per cent of all practices (32-1 per cent according to the RIBA), these firms received 81 per cent of all fee income. In 1972 the same group of offices employed 82 per cent of salaried architects in private practice. 3 At the same time as partners in medium/large firms were averaging £22 327 per annum, the average income of all salaried architects in private practice was £4743. The differential between partners and salaried architects thus increases in relation to the size of practice. We are in the process of updating our data, and we would welcome further information from salaried architects regarding their partners’ profits. At this preliminary stage itappears that From Peter A. Kreamer of Bovis Construction Ltd Sir: Henry Herzberg’s article on World’s End (AJ 20.4.77) claims not to attempt to discuss the architectural, but to concentrate on other things. One would have thought that such a disclaimer would have prefaced at least some passing reference to the form of contract used to build the majority of the project. One would have thought that since that form of contract is a fee based one, and that the builder concerned is fee remunerated for all his work, that his name would be deemed worthy of a mention among the other professionals involved on p734. But no. Henry Herzberg, it seems, is so concerned with slanging what he regards as the evil main contractors of the "sixties (p743) that he doesn’t have Space to describe how the ultimate contractor on this job managed a disaster into a success story. While taking a side swipe at the client for accepting the higher of two so-called ‘tenders’ to complete the project, he fails to mention that the work was completed by the chosen contractor well within his estimate of prime cost. He also fails to mention that the management team involved achieved every phased handover by the original date promised. Finally, in his last sentence he to avoid even a grudging acknowledgment that the completion date also met the programme promised when Bovis took over in 1973. I would advise Henry Herzberg to wear a disguise before his Sir: I very much agree with Christian Hamp’s letter (AJ 13.4.77 p674) about the oriental or Japanese bath. I too enjoyed using it in Japan. It is not only very economical because the hot water is not drained away, but topped up and re-used, but itisakin to the sauna in that it is relaxing. Washing before entering the bath is, of course, essential. In the past, the Japanese used energy sparingly in their houses; there Was no attempt to warm the house, but only the person. Before getting into your padded bed, a hot bath was essential; once warm in bed, you could remain warm all night even when the room temperature might be just above freezing. G. Wigglesworth London SE1 Earning survey wrong? From M. 7. McCarthy RIBA Sir: The 1976 RIBA earnings survey (AJ 6.4.77 p635) shows that the increase in architects’ earnings between June 1975 and June 1976 was significantly greater in the public sector than in the pri- vate sector. The explanation for this disparity was attributed to ‘the existence of incremental scales for public employees which were allowed to operate during the Incomes Policy’. I believe this to be a fundamentally wrong interpretation. Local authority pay review periods run from July to July each year whereas the Incomes Policy runs from August to August. The effect of these periods is that local authority employees are one of the last groups to be affected by an Incomes Policy for any year. Between June 1975 and June Table IAverage annual income per Architectural Partner by size of Architectural Team Size of practice arch team 1-5 6-10 11-25 Average income per architectural partner 1966 1970 1974 £££ 2575 3811 6129 3778 5591 8 992 6108 9040 14537 26 or more 9381 13 884 22 327 Sources: National Board for Prices and Incomes report on architects’ 1968; Updating Factor—RICS building cost information March 1976. costsand fees Table Il Average salary of all 1966 £1993 I d archi 1970 £2950 in all private practices 1974 £4 743 _ Source: Ibid. Note: All technical salaries in 1967 formed 34-5 per cent of costs; RIBA handbook Suggests approx similar figures. Table IM Distribution of private practices by size 1958-1972 Size of practice arch staff 1-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 51 and over Source: RIBA Submission to Monopolies Commission May 1976. NAM?'s tables: see Bullen’s letter. 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 74:3 69°0 63:4 61:7 61-8 67:9 63-7 16-2 18-0 22-1 22°8 1972 22:6 18:5 20-1 13-0 2oh6:s jos 1370 14:5 15-5 123 15:6 i5}is6 0-8 1-3. The Architects’ Journal 4 May 1977 Dan Bullen London W1 Bathing for warmth 1OE fe 818 The Architects’ Journal 4 May 1977 1976 local authority employees were not ‘entitled to their annual increments on top of the £312 per annum which was the maximum increase allowed in the first year of the Social Contract’ because their pay award for that period was made in July 1975, before the Social Contract came into force. It follows that for the year in question normal negotiating procedures applied. The £312 per annum cost of living award under the first year of the Social Contract will be refiected in the next RIBA earnings survey, and itcan be expected that a closer correlation between the sectors will be shown. The 4 per cent or £4 a week second stage of the Social Contract will not be awarded to local authority employees until July of this year. When the results of the 1978 RIBA earn- ings survey are published the relative positions of the two sectors over the whole period should have balanced out. There is currently much discussion on a possible stage 3 of the Social Contract. Whatever happens, local authority employees will be forced to fund stage 3 inflation from a stage 2 increase in income. It is well known by tradeunionsthatpayawards are held down prior to the entering of a formal period of pay restraint, and that there is considerable advantage in having an annual pay review date at the beginning rather than the end of statutory periods. I believe that at the end of the period of Incomes Policy the public sector will be seen to have lost ground. Incremental scales of pay are inflexible and can be criticised on a number of grounds but they should not be blamed for discrepancies in earnings of architects in different sectors. M. J. McCarthy London WS5 Lakeside Drive designs From Michael Wilson RIBA Sir: I do not wish to deny credit to Royston Summers for his overall design scheme and commendable standard detailing system for Lakeside Drive (AJ 13.4.77 p691), but wish you to note that approximately one-third of the illustrating photographs related to ‘the only non-standard house’, and also accounted for half of the interior shots. These photographs demon- strated, in most cases, major design features which are not attributable to Royston Summers, set within an adaptation which paid respect to the overall design idiom and constraints imposed by his system. The only departure from this discipline is also the only feature that your article attributes to “different architects’, namely the placing of three windows in what would other- wise have been a blank wall (photo 22), due to a good, practical requirement for change by the client when the building was well under way. Unfortunately, the Royston Summers approach did not permit a less inharmonious solution at that juncture. Was not to ‘chop a road through Petworth’s incomparable park’ but to tunnel under the park— this following an evaluation of over 20 alternative schemes, public mectings and even a referendum of the locals, item in your issue of 13 April (p675) with a picture of the nearly completed first phase. The photograph, which I guess to be taken with a wide-angle lens, gave the effect of an isolated building surrounded by large areas of tarmac. Jeffrey Mansfield continued the work begun by Royston Summers for two years following his resignation from the commission, and handed it over to myself carly in 1972 in close liaison—particularly with reference to the above-mentioned housewhichhehadalready problemofPetworthisextremely clearwayfortheGLCandwith designed in outline. The design work to this house, and to others requiring variation, was continued by myself and my former partner, Gerald Harvey. Michael Wilson London SES Petworth county line From B. J. Seaman RIBA, West Sussex county architect Sir: Astragal’s Petworth reprieve (AJ 13.4.77 p672) must get my nomination of the year for the most inaccurate and sensational piece of journalism. Anyone who knows Petworth will certainly support a plan by West Sussex County Council to divert heavy traffic from the narrow streets of the town and anyone in the area will certainly know that the dialogue between the county council, the National Trust and the local people has been going on for many years. The council’s plan difficult. Not only is it a town of great architectural and ~ historical interest but it is also set in an outstanding landscape. I consider the council and its officers have acted and are acting in avery responsible manner. I would hope the Architectural Press would act in an equally responsible manner. B. J. Seaman Chichester, Sussex Sorry about the Hutchinson error. The council did propose to chop a road through the park—though a short tunnel was to run in front of the house. Astragal Credit for code” From Bob Giles RIBA, chairman SAG Sir: Your otherwise excellent report of the work of the RIBA Salaried Architects Group (AJ 30.3.77 p579) was marred by a misleading description of the group as ‘the leading force’ in the work of revising the Code of Professional Conduct. Although SAG was involved in the production of the final draft the present code is the culmination of nearly 10 years’ work by successive working groups under the direction of David Waterhouse, to whom just credit should be given. Bob Giles London W1 Vauxhall Bridge Road From H. A. P. Quince, architect Sir: Inoted with interest the news high buildings on its north side, and the rest of the building tapers down to match the domestic scale of the Victorian terraces to the south of Tachbrook Street. Similarly, the text could be misleading. As you know, many local authority architect’s departments have some kind of hierarchical structure and design teams containing several architects. In this context I feel it is difficult and possibly invidious to single out one individual to whom the design can be attributed. However, your news item contrasts with a similarly brief item on the next page of the same issue by not naming the job architect; instead it attributes the design to the person who was the group leader. As job architect, I designed the overall layout of the redevelopment for which planning permission was obtained, originated the design of the building illustrated and supervised its development up to tender stage. H. A. P. Quince London SW17 Tax alternatives for practices incurring losses From K.J. Slade ATII Sir: One reads ofa recession in the building and construction industry which indicates that some of your readers in private practice on their own account are suffering from adiminution of income which, in the more Serious cases, means that the practice isincurring aloss. The county surveyor, Mr Harrison (not Hutchinson), actually commented that the one virtue of the postponement was that it would enable the dialogue on Petworth’s traffic problem to continue. The This misses the whole concept of a building designed as a link between two differing urban scales. The high mass of the building fronts Vauxhall Bridge Road, safeguarded as an urban Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource NAM London Group Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 04-May-77 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/b0fcfac9e6f139e2e8ac17ce0cd5fed5.pdf 577a944c78106f7b1940ce6d30175673 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Letter to AJ re more equitable forms of architecture from John Murray and DR NAM Central London Group Description An account of the resource The Editor The Architect's Journal 9 Queen Anne's Gate London SWI 9BY @ Sir: We welcome Hellman's letter arguing for more equitable forms of architectural practice. This contrasts with the findings of a report sponsored by the Association of Consultant Architects which conludes that the ills of architecture are @aused by there being too manyarchitects. Amoresearchinganalysismighthaverevealedthattherearenot enough patrons. The fact that the present patrons of architecture are rich and powerful individuals or organisationsisreflectedinourarchitecture. Thepeoplewhoarenotpatronsof architecturecompriseover80%ofthepopulation. Theremedyforthiswillnotbe architectural. Itwillonlybeachievedwhensociety'svalueschange. A paper was given on this subject at the Harrogate Conference of the New Architecture Movement. One of its conclusions was the need for a National Design Service. Since ; then the North London Group of NAM has been studying the practical implications of such ‘® a service, in conjunction with methods of achieving cooperative office structures. Any changes in existing practice must be set in the context of the need to expand resourcesinvestedinhousing,educationandhealth. Therecentexpenditurecutsseem torepresentanattempttoreducepermanentlysuchprovision. Forpeopleinclearance areas the question of redevelopment v. rehabilitation Is being replaced by the fear that they will never secure a decent home. The current direction of resources into non-resident controlled housing associations is no substitute. Itmaybringworkandprofitstoprivatearchitectsandotherprofessional groups, but it is at the expense of working people. We believe that any new form of architectural service must include a formal mechanism of local control through which architects are accountable, not only to thelr clients, but tothosewhoareaffectedbytheirdesigns. Onlyinthiswaycancompetenceandquality of service be measured. Although we would encourage co-ownership in architects offices, it is clear that without local accountability such a development would merely extend professional elitism and allow a wider distribution of profits within the profession. The New Architecture Movement Central London Group 10 Percy Street London W | Tel: 01 580 2621 4 March 1976 pee The Editor The Architect's Journal 4 March 1976 In our opinion, the basis of a National Design Service already exists, albeit in a very inadequate way, in the service provided by local government offices. At present access to local authority architects is restricted to the spending committees whoselinktothepeopletheypurporttoserveistenuous. ThearchitectsInvolvedare solelyresponsibletothesecommitteesandthenonlythroughtheirchiefofficer. This is unsatisfactory. The New Architecture Movement will press for the principle of a national design service In the form of small scale collectively organised offices, coupled to local accountability and control. Our initial work will be sufficiently advanced for this to be the main subject of our next conference in London at the beginning of May. Yours faithfully David Roebuck and John Murray Central London Group New Architecture Movement 10 Percy Street London W | Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DR/John Murray Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 04-Mar-76 https://nam.maydayrooms.org/files/original/5a6c7eba44412f9a2909d2c16943d59c.pdf 67db042a08486d41ec20255040b8da5e Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professional Issues Description An account of the resource A cohort of NAM members became engaged with the professional registration body, standing as elected councillors on the Architects Registration Council and its various committees. Hitherto entirely dominated by the RIBA bloc, the Council began to yield to a new dynamic through NAM's involvement, enabling fresh perspectives on such issues as mandatory fee scales, greater lay representation on the body, ethically-based standards of professional conduct, etc. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource NOT QUITE A CLUB BD article by Owen Luder 10 October 1980 Description An account of the resource NOT QUITE A CLUB... THE objectivesofthe Whetherthatshouldbetheferredonitbyparliament— inreturnarequirementthataldegreeofcontrolbythePrivyareFRIBA,ARIBAorLRIBA RIBA, as set out in the 1837 situation iseitiesHCna DC) The something it increasingly buildings are designed by quali- Council on the requirements of before the 1971 charter, who charter, are “the general unhapy duality initsrole with tended to overlook over the fied architects ARnough archi- its charter and the by-laws can continue to use those advancementofcivilarchi-ARCUKhasbecomeincreas-years.Asignificantchangeoftectsmayfeelthatthisiswhichstemfromit. affixes. tectureandforthepromo-inglyobvovieroreceuntsyears.lawwillberequiredtomakeitnecessary,therearemanyout So,inadditiontoanyre- Forthosereadersunawareof IsARCUKthebodytolookmoreeffectiveandindepensidetheprofessionwhodonotcoursetocommonlawrightsofthesituationbeforethoseearth tion and facilitation of the after the consumer interest? If dent of the RIBA which has see architects in such a com natural justice in its dealings shattering, momentous acquirement of the know- it is, what is the role of the always had a substantial majo- petent light with its members, there is changes in title: ledgeofthevariousartsand RIBA? Ararefiedtradeasso- ritycontrol ofitsgoverning Arguably,ARCUK should alwaystheriogfhapptealtothe (licentiateswerethosewho sciences connected there- ciation to look after its council. lookaftersociety,theusersand PrivyCouncilifamemberor hadpractisedarchitecturefor with”. i f members? BecausetheRIBAmembers clients,whiletheRIBA con- membersfeelitisexceedingits sufficientlylongaperiodtobe Unalteredtoday,itisawide If so, what about the ofARCUK arenominatedby cernsitselfwithitsmembers’ powersorisbehavingunfairly consideredcompetent,without enoughbrieftomeanwhatyou majorityofitsmembewrhosas the RIBA establishment, the interestsandtheadvancement orimproperly. havingpassedanyexaminations want at any particular time, in salaried architects sometimes chance of ARCUK doing any- of architecture — the learned So while the RIBA has — a necessary back door, now SUEROr of any argument of feel it should be a trade union thing about RIBA general policy society role. The conflicting absolute control over member- firmly shut; icy. andnotabosses’club? seemsunlikely.IftheRegistra- pressuresindicatethatifposi- ship,itcanonlyexercisethis Dassociateswereyoungarchi- TheobjectivesindicateanIfthatisthecase,whoisres-tionActsarechanged,RIBAtivechangedoestakeplace,itcontrolwitarheaisonableandtectsqualifiedbyexamination, d looking insti yet ponsible for archi or is control would be certain to go, will result in the inevitable fair interpretation ofitscharter proud of their youthful vigour theconflictnowasthenisthatnotimportThaenatdv?an-withthebiastowardsoutsidecompromise,sothatawriterandby-laws.Itcannotactcap-andqualificationandnot between the wider interests of cement of architecture, the representation. ARCUK afew decades from now will no riciously or maliciously in wishing to be associated with society—thecommunity,peobjective,seemstohavewouldthenbecomethewatch-doubtbecommentingonthe LRIBAs,orelderlygreybeard users, consumers, clients — and een somewhat overlooked. dog of the consumer interest, unsatisfacto) relationship fellows. the self-interest of members. How this duality with er than the weak and in- between ARCUK and the Both junior classes could Ostensiblysetupin1834asaARCUKwillberesolvedeffectivewatchdogofregis-RIandBdepAloringthelackof applytobefellowsbyelection, learned society itwas, and stil remains to be seen. ARCUK’s tered architects that itistoday. emphasis on architecture. is, mainly concerned with pro- role is severely restricted by Itis doubtful whether in the ¢RIBAisaclub—but not tecting and organising the beinga statutory body. Ithasto present climate parliament a private club. In return for its interests of its members. keep within the powers con- could be persuade to accept royal charter, it accepts a after a period of years, backed by evidence of a high standard of architectural excellence in the buildings for which they were responsible. available, when allied to up-to-date roof design and high standards of workmanship by today’sreputableroofing contractors, can give modern flat roofsa greatly extended life-expectancy. They also release the potential ofthe flat roof asa building form, so that all the essential advantages it has always possessed can be utilised to the full. They are advantages that add up toan impressive total. Witha flatroofthereisgreaterflexibility of design. Large areas can be covered more easily, while in manycaseslessmaterialis needed, And because the consistent roof height obviates voids, there isno wasted space to light and heat —another important incorporating a high-performance theUSA,thescopeformoreRIBAdiplodomesanotbelong non-British architects is con- to you, so ithas to be returned, Flat roof, c.1980 Various pressures, including the need for greater subscrip- tion income (fellows paid a50 Per cent greater sub) led to ‘ellowship becoming virtually automatic after five years membership. Probationary membership is a sub-class which has dis- appeared. This was the first step on the ladder towards ful qualification for the youngster just contemplating architec- economy point for the cost- conscious '80s. Similarly, a flat roof simplifies the matter of internal partitioning. And then there isthe plain fact that, in many industrial and commercial environments, aflatroofissimply more aesthetically pleasing. The all-important difference There is surprisingly little difference in installed cost between a modern insulated roof incorporatingastandard waterproofing membrane and one membrane =in the region of 20% Yetwhentheescalatingcostsof maintenance, repair and replacementare taken into account, that modest difference can lead to enormous savings over the years. The 1980s, then, will undoubtedly be the decade in which the merits of modern high- performance roofing materials become widely known . and the decade in which you can use these materialstoprotectyourclients against the ravages of inflation as well as against the elements siderable, but as the current presumably so that you cannot rules are very restrictive, the purport to be stil a member, aie ep Tarmac Building Products Limited Ebury Gate, 23 Lower Belgrave Street, London, $.W.1. Forinstantinformationtickps|] onreaderinquirycard The 1969 revolt, when mem- The current subscription is berscalalpoelldontheissueof £64,whichistobeincreasedto BUILDING DESIGN, October 10, 1980 49 Luder/Parris ture as his vocational career. The cost was small, the benefit File accepting orrejecting members or in expelling them. minimal, but the principle of ersonal association with the nstitute become established at the outset. Today only a minority of architectural students botherto Ithasrulesandithastoapply joinasstudentmembers—a them properly and fairly, classofmembershipwhichhas otherwise itcan be challenged declined dramatically over inthecourtsorbypetitionto recent years. hoever the Privy Council. changed those rules forgot the John Parris will no doubt old adage ‘‘catch them young have much more to say on this and keep them’’. aspect when he deals with the legal powers of the RIBA over time and subsequently apply its members. Membership oftheInstitute Outstandingsubscriptions,but ispersonal and nocorporation, readmission is not necessarily firmorpartnershicapnbecome automaticeveniftheapplicant a normal member, one of the is stil qualified for admission. hurdles to be overcome ifprac- The RIBACouncilshallnot ticesubscriptionsaretocome unreasonablywithholdordelay into effect. Members do not ily although it is difficult to see a have to be British. There are situation where there would be provisions _ for — accepting much sense in refusing to oreiaa nationals but, unless accept a resignation, unless they avetrainedasarchitects therewereseriousdisciplinary inthe UK,itisnoteasyforthem actionpending. to comply with the special As the intention of that requirementsforqualification. actionispresumablytoridthe s the number of mutual Institute of a culprit, even that registration recognition would be a somewhat hollow arrangements with other exercise. countries increase, particularly If you do resign — your numbers involved so far are rather than to enable the Insti- relatively small. tutetore-issueittosomeother Qualification for normal lucky applicant. membership consistsof passing Apart from ahandful ofhon- recognised examinations or orary fellows and the like, al architectural courses. Once members are Bropedly quali- that requirement is satisfied, fied architects. Few realise, membership is, in practice, automatic yout subscription is however, that there is already needed) although applicants specific provision for a sub- have to sign an undertaking to scriber class of membership uphold the charter, by-lawsand who would not be architects code of conduct before their and not allowed to suggest they appl ation can be accepted. are architects in any way. Pre- nlike the similar declaration sumably this is intended to ARCUK requestsbeforeregis- provide an association of tration, this undertaking is people interested in architec- enforceable. ture and the RIBA objectives. membership classes, resulted £78 on January 1, 1981. in le class of membership: The loyalty of many members a classless society — no elite. will be tested when the new, Weare nowall RIBA members subscription demands ary except, or course, those who with all the other New Ye: Members may resign at any for readmission, subject to any Pp of Should RIBA be more of a trade union and less of a private club? Owen Luder takes a look at the role and membership of RIBA. Robert Harbinson. once again free. whose control panel has been As Harbison warns in his in- taken off, the visitor feels he troduction: “This book tells a should not see. Such examples disastrous history.” And itdoes, only show that functional too is for it endeavours selectively only a way of thinking, largely but with staggering confidence er the control of the designer, to chronicle the ruinous effect not a necessity leading him by of romantic individualism in the nose through ugly ducts...” thought and art from the 18th Pompidou is the most recent Martin Pawley takes a look at a book which charts the ruinous ffects of romantic ARCHITECTURE isnota century to the near-present of building mentioned by Harbison individualism. game of tennis, in which Stalin and Hitler and while one may quibble at style is bashed back and It’s divided into roughly his categorisation (the Sains chronological essays on such bury Centre is abetter example forth across the centuries, it themes as thecult of death in of functionalism: Pompidou is is a function of the social neoclassicism, tribe and race in mechanical expressionism writ order, and particularly re- anthropology and fascism, and large) the real lesson for archi sistant to coherent analysis. the millenium in modernism tects in Deliberate Regression is For this reason we should al and social realism. not here but in the second part besprenared to do a little Architecture does not play of the extract. What the author work when a promising ap- a large part in this survey. does best is to find subjective proach comes along, as it Passages are devoted to Pugin, evasion everywhere — either does with this radical work Ruskin, Burges, Lethaby, gloried in or patnencaly dis- Malevich and Lissitsky, but guised with the trappings of of art history. architecture really emerges in impersonality. Book Reviews Deliberate Regression is a asides and examples projected obody, says Harbison, will dense and fragmentary book, forward in time from the period accept the implications of science both a confusing mess and a under dissection and reason in design powerful document. Like Mc- Consider this evocation of In the case of Lethaby, once Luhan’s Understanding Media the Pompidou Centre which cited as a proto-modernist, —i t achieves notwithstandin *...masquerades as_ rational, now re-emergiinntghe cloak of many faults the Herculean task but treats bolts and wires as man, myth and magic, we see a of liberating its subject from decoration, making its greatest y figure at the dawn of the Deliberate Regression, by accepted categories of the pre- display on the underside (the Eins| era cowerinign a land- Robert Harbison. Andre sent and leaving the ground back) which, as with a machine ape of histori al associa ations, Deutsch £8.95. installedinhisbusiness. e Would you... a)Find aplace out the back fora boiler. A hot water tank. A header tank. Knock ahole in the wall fora flue tovent away the fumes. Get someone to rip up the floorboards and laylengths ofcopper piping,carefully bent to go round awkward corners. Fit the radiators to the walls. Putthefloorboardsback. Then the carpet. Carefully cut to go round the pipes. Fill the whole works up with water. And light a fire under it. (Ifyou can get the fuel these days.) ons Of the machine? hurtling through space, and the standing — the same frivolous building as an enyelope without bankruptcy, the same childish, content” petulant, stubborn evasion off Today sees the same crisis the truth. unresolved, the same scamper- “It is not always easy to ingfigureswithdifferentnames separateanauthenticsenseof andnowwithevenlessexcuse. doomfromadesireforpersonal Malevich(underpressure,Har- importance...thewishtoliveat bisonimplies)turnedhispaint- theendoftime,”writesHarbi- ingsintoarchitectureby“afew son,whosestyleismuchcriti- deft additions which make them cised by critics but which con- read as axonometric solids”. tains passages of astonishing The conceptual architects of eloquence. the 1970s, by a few deft omis- This book makes itclear that sions, make their architecture the real speculators now are read as art. those hiding in pseudo-history. The Paris artists of the first The book leaves me with one decade of the century seized final question. Why, in his evo- upon African sculpture as a cation of the “building without formal, non-historical device content” as the authentic voice whichcouldbedeployedinany ofscienceandreasoninarchi- context. The architects of post- tecture, does Harbison ignore modernism run through adreary Mies van der Rohe? —the one but extensive yocabulary of great figure of the present cen- historicalallusionsinnoorder turywhonotonlyunderstood andwithnoreasonedunder- thisbutsaidit,60yearsago. or b) Get the electricians in with some heaters, a screwdriver, and a length by clipping this coupon. ae ) Formoreinformaonteileoctnncheatingsystems,controls and tanffs, send this coupon to The Build Electric Bureau, The Building Centre, 26 Store Street, London WCLE 7BT or ask the operator for Freefor ne 2284 and talk to our commercial heating specialists. Name2s Address__ HEATELECTRIC Electricity Cot uncil, England and Wales reamcaSESSHeeaeoc on reader inquiry card rified nuts and bolts at the Pompidou Centre. BOWH) 50 BUILDING DESIGN, October 10, 1980 ING FROM EINSTEIN2 ee Your client wants heating Of. thiS)qussuenen | Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived John Murray Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 10-Oct-80